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Different countries have varying levels of globalization. Many features, such as size, play a 
part in determining the level of globalization in countries. I argue that globalization is influenced by 
veto players in systematically different ways. To understand these different relationships, 
globalization must be broken apart into three dimensions (political, economic, and social). Political 
globalization is negatively affected by veto players. Economic globalization is not affected by veto 
players directly but is influenced by related phenomena. Social globalization is positively affected by 
veto players. To test my arguments, I employ a Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) method to analyze 
a dataset covering 33 countries from 1970 to 2015. I find that as expected, each dimension of 
globalization has a fundamentally different relationship with veto players. My findings contribute to 
the growing understanding that globalization is more complex than previously thought.  I link my 
findings to disagreements in the existing literature on globalization and show that some of this 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
“Globalization is a complex issue, partly because economic globalization is only one part of it. Globalization is greater 
global closeness, and that is cultural, social, political, as well as economic.” 
 - Amartya Sen 
 
In this dissertation, I explore globalization and its relationship to institutions, specifically 
how veto players impact the level of globalization in OECD countries. The veto players framework 
aids in understanding how institutional constraints effect policy outcomes (Tsebelis 2002). Veto 
player arguments have wide implications, including effects on legislative output, budgets, civil war, 
and globalization (Tsebelis 1999; Tsebelis and Chang 2004; David 2006; Crepaz 2001a; Crepaz and 
Moser 2004; Ha 2008). I explore how veto players effect globalization. Until recently globalization 
research faced serious theoretical and empirical roadblocks (discussed shortly). I address these 
roadblocks by being among the first to utilize new advancements to overcome these obstacles. This 
allows a more accurate empirical examination of the direct relationship between veto players and 
globalization. 
Building on past theoretical research in this area (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; 
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) I start from the premise that globalization is best understood as a 
multidimensional phenomenon. There are three main aspects of globalization; political, economic, 
and social (Dreher 2006a). This starting point enables me to examine how domestic political 
characteristics, such as veto players, impact the three different dimensions of globalization. I posit 
that a unique relationship between veto players and each dimension exists. As a veto player problem 
becomes more pronounced, each dimension behaves differently. This insight furthers our current 




Examining the three dimensions of globalization separately, as opposed to aggregated 
together, is critical. Previous work, which claimed to study globalization, was actually studying a single 
indicator of a single dimension of globalization, and often not using the same indicator or dimension 
(Crepaz 2001a; Ha 2008; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Instead of claiming to study the entire 
phenomenon that is globalization, it is more appropriate to make a more conservative claim. If one 
studies capital account restrictions, it is more reasonable to argue that economic globalization is 
being examined. By the same token, if the size of the welfare state is examined, it is more 
appropriate to claim that welfare spending gets at political globalization instead of the entire 
concept. By treating globalization as complex and multidimensional, it becomes easier to understand 
its effects, not less. This insight is critical and provides a new perspective on globalization research. I 
intend to showcase this insights validity by showcasing that each dimension has a different 
relationship with institutions. 
To test my argument regarding veto players and globalization’s dimensions, I employ new 
data from the Swiss Economic Institute. These data operationalize globalization’s dimensions 
(political, economic, and social) for the first time (Dreher 2006a; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). 
These data contain individual composite measures of each dimension and are generated using the 
most advanced techniques available (principal component analysis, spatial controls, etc.). This 
enables falsification of previously untested theoretical claims about globalization, specifically its 
multidimensionality. In addition, I use both operationalizations of veto players (ideological range 
and count) (Tsebelis 2002) to test the relationship between veto players and globalization’s 
dimensions. This allows for the isolation of institutional effects, which previous work did not.1 Thus 
my argument can be subjected to rigorous empirical testing. 
 




As previous work argues (Held and McGrew 1993; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008), and my 
own findings suggest, there is merit to treating globalization as multidimensional. The relationship 
between veto players and the three dimensions of globalization are very different. Veto players and 
political globalization are negatively related to each other. Veto players and economic globalization 
have a complex situational relationship that ensures continued economic globalization with other 
institutional domains effecting the pace of change. And, veto players and social globalization are 
positively related to each other, but other institutional domains also contribute to its growth. These 
results, taken together, showcase that globalization should be treated as multidimensional. 
Otherwise, these critical differences would not have been identified. This much is clear, each 
dimension has a different relationship with domestic legislative institutions.  
My findings are particularly important given the state of the globalization literature in 
political science. Plagued by divergent findings and theoretical ambiguity, the examination of 
institutional effects on globalization has not matured to directly examining causal mechanisms. Only 
by acknowledging its complexity can globalization be further understood. For example, when treated 
as a simple concept, previous work is plagued by two sets of effects. One group of scholars argues 
that globalization has positive effects on the size of the welfare state (Rodrik 1998; Swank 2002). 
While others argue that globalization has a negative effect on the size of the welfare state (Rodrik 
1997; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). I seek to take a step back and return to how globalization was 
originally conceptualized; complex and multidimensional (Held and McGrew 1993). Using this 
insight, I fill a key theoretical gap that could explain why globalization has multiple effects. 
Additionally, no work, as of this writing, has yet to use the Swiss Economic Institute’s globalization 
data in political science circles. This is despite it being considered the gold standard in economics 




2018). Thus, I challenge globalization scholars to reopen the theoretical and empirical toolbox to 
increase our understanding of globalization.  
This chapter begins my investigation and introduces the concept of globalization. I adopt a 
definition of globalization that is consistent with the previously untested theoretical work. I then 
employ this definition to clearly separate globalization from related concepts. I then limit the scope 
of my research, by focusing primarily on two institutional effects on globalization; legislative and 
executive effects. I then lay down a road map for the remainder of my dissertation. Lastly, I 
conclude by returning to my definition and briefly point to the contents of the next chapter, which 
builds upon my definition. 
 
What is Globalization? 
Despite the term ‘globalization’ being used by journalists, academics, and in popular culture, 
many definitions exist. In fact, entire books have been dedicated to defining globalization (U. Beck 
2018). In scholarly circles, the main bone of contention is how complex globalization is. Some argue 
that globalization should be defined in a highly complex way (Held and McGrew 1993). Others 
argue for a limited definition (Keohane 2002; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005) to facilitate applied 
research. I argue that both points are well taken. A definition that captures both aspects of the 
debate is needed to address critical weaknesses in current work. A more flexible definition of 
globalization is needed. This would allow, for the first time, rigorous applied research that considers 
the complexity of globalization. This would help resolve conflicting arguments in the literature 





Before defining globalization, it is important to make one point. No one definition of 
globalization is perfect. I do not claim to have a complete definition of globalization. What I do argue is 
that previous theoretical and empirical work has given scholars additional leverage to create and 
employ a more complete definition of globalization. This opens fascinating new lines of inquiry. 
Allowing for rigorous hypothesis testing of conceptual linkages while also allowing for globalization 
to retain its complexity. In this way, my definition brings together theoretical and empirical insights 
not previously combined.  
Globalization connects all countries in the international system (Held and McGrew 1993). 
Globalization is also dynamic. Globalization fluctuates based on long-term trends like embedded 
liberalism and short-term political changes (Ruggie 1982; Garrett 1998). Globalization is 
multidimensional, as it involves many types of connections, even illicit (Eichengreen and Leblang 
2008; Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011). Lastly, globalization operates simultaneously across 
a variety of institutional domains (domestic and international). Given these facts, I define 
globalization as; a complex multidimensional dynamic process of global interconnectedness, operating simultaneously 
across several institutional domains.2 By defining globalization like this, I both acknowledge its complex 
multidimensionality while still being able to examine it empirically. Two parts of my definition are 
key. First, by acknowledging globalizations multidimensionality, isolating and studying the 
dimensions of globalization separately is possible. And second, noting its multiple institutional 
effects, it is possible to examine the impact of each institutional domain on globalization. Thus, my 
definition allows for clearly articulated linkages between empirical concepts, such as veto players and 
globalization, while also allowing globalization to be considered as a divisible whole. Thus, my 
 
2 For the purposes of this work, institutions are defined as formal rules that shape human behavior. For a more detailed 
discussion of what is or is not an institution, works by Douglas North (1990) and John Duffield (2007), among others, 




definition allows for parsimony to be considered in two ways. On the dimensional side, or on its 
relationship to institutions. 
I have elected to preserve, as much as possible, the multidimensionality of globalization. 
This is because of the sage warning by Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang (2008). To not retain 
globalizations multidimensionality will bias my results. Therefore, I limit the scope of my work by 
focusing primarily on domestic legislative institutions. I also incorporate executive institutions where 
appropriate. This closely related institutional domain cannot be overlooked, as to do so would 
compromise my research. By limiting my scope to two institutional domains, I allow globalization to 
retain its multidimensionality while focusing on specific institutional effects. This is possible thanks 
to a dataset that allows for globalization to be operationalized as multidimensional (Dreher 2006a; 
Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). This allows parsimonious empirical examinations of how 
globalization, and it’s dimensions, are affected by institutions.  
 
What Globalization is Not 
A major problem in globalization research, is disentangling it from other concepts. I contend 
that globalization is both distinct and separate. Therefore, I want to clearly outline what 
globalization is not. This is to ensure clarity, which is often not found in globalization research. For 
example, globalization can be mistaken for both regionalism and interdependence. However, 
globalization is not regionalism or interdependence. Conflating these concepts is problematic for 
globalization research, as regionalism and interdependence are central to a lasting theoretical debate 
in International Relations (IR). This injects theoretical ambiguity into globalization research, due to 




Luckily, regionalism and interdependence are different from globalization in key areas. This 
gives crude instructions on how to pull globalization from the conceptual rat’s nest and isolate it.3 
To that end, I highlight the differences between regionalism, interdependence, and globalization. I 
begin with the differences between regionalism and globalization before discussing the differences 
between interdependence and globalization. 
According to David Held and Anthony McGrew, regionalism is connections between 
countries in a similar geographic region (1993). Regionalism is therefore defined as follows; “… the 
intensification of patterns of interconnectedness between geographically contiguous states which define 
the contours of a regional subsystem [emphasis added] (1993, 263).4 Based on this definition, 
regionalism is not a global phenomenon. Therefore, globalization is not regionalism due to its global 
character. In fact, most globalization research distinguishes between regionalism and globalization 
for this reason (examples include; Vujakovic 2009; Dreher et al. 2010; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 
2018). 
For those who coined the term interdependence, it is broader than regionalism. Drawing 
upon early regionalism work, they created a broader concept (Bergsten, Keohane, and Nye 1975; 
Keohane and Nye 1977). However, interdependence is not globalization. Robert Keohane argues 
that interdependence is a static state, much like a photograph (2002). But globalization is not static. 
Previous work describes globalization as dynamic, varying significantly over time. Several examples 
illustrate globalizations dynamic nature. During the Inter-War period (1918-1939), globalization 
decreased rapidly (Hays 2009). After WWII, globalization slowly began to increase in the era of 
globalizing markets (1960-1989). And more recently, globalization has increased rapidly in the era of 
 
3 This similarity is also problematic when measuring globalization (Lockwood 2001; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). This 
topic will be taken up in the Data and Methods Chapter. 




global markets (1990-Present) (Garrett 1998). Given this shifting trend, to argue that globalization is 
static across time is vastly incorrect. Therefore, globalization is not interdependence as it fluctuates 
dynamically across time.  
What globalization is, is a complex, global, multidimensional, dynamic process. It has far 
reaching implications, such as those on the size of the welfare state (Crepaz 2001a), the fate of 
democracy (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008), and patterns of international cooperation (Mansfield, 
Milner, and Pevehouse 2007) to name just a few. I add to this body of work by exploring the direct 
effect of legislative and executive institutions on each dimension of globalization. By doing this, I 
return to the theoretical roots and emphasize the multidimensionality of globalization. While also 
systematically exploring how institutions impact each dimension differently. 
 
Globalization and Institutions 
Given my definition of globalization, the question remains which institutions impact it. The 
first two institutional domains that spring to mind are international and domestic institutions. To be 
fair, the sage wisdom of Robert Putnam (1988) is applicable here, both effect globalization 
sometimes. The more important question is how do these institutional domains impact globalization. 
While international institutions do impact globalization, I focus here on domestic institutions, 
specifically legislative and executive ones. This is because previous work points to significant 
domestic institutional effects on globalization (Garrett 1998). This can be traced back to early work 
on embedded liberalism, corporatism, and veto players.  
With the reinjection of embedded liberalism into the literature (Ruggie 1982), scholarly 
attention was directed toward domestic economic intervention. Specifically, efforts to mitigate the 




realization that corporatism, an electoral alliance between organized labor and the ideological left, is 
a key determinate of domestic economic intervention to mitigate the negative effects of trade 
(Katzenstein 1985). This soon mushroomed into a typology including; corporatism, market 
liberalism, and incoherent countries. The key differences being that each varied on the strength of 
organized labor, levels of openness, and commitment to economic intervention. This led scholars to 
eventually explore the impact of these differences on globalization. This line of reasoning is still 
actively employed by scholars (Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Hays 2009 are two examples). 
The differing relationships of corporatism, market liberalism, and incoherent countries with 
globalization have proven that domestic politics matter. 
However, the components of corporatism, an alliance between the ideological left and 
organized labor, led to other work examining if domestic political changes affect globalization 
(Garrett 1998). It was found that short-term changes in partisan politics effect globalization. In sum, 
the presence of the ideological left in government effects globalization. This finding showcased that 
domestic partisan politics trickle up and have profound implications. This brought into the 
globalization literature the insights of other areas of political science, specifically work on political 
parties (Laver and Hunt 1992 is an example). This led to the conclusion that electoral institutions 
can both shepherd in the dawn of a new era of globalization, but also its rapid retreat (Hays 2009). 
The ‘how’ is conspicuously left out in these arguments, however.     
At the same time, Veto Player Theory, used to compare across electoral systems (Tsebelis 
2002), was also being applied to globalization. This line of research sought to determine how welfare 
state shrinkage or expansion (a consequence of globalization) was connected to veto players (Crepaz 
2001a; Crepaz and Moser 2004; Ha 2008). Much like previous work on globalization, these scholars 




increase/decrease the size of the welfare state, as do veto players. I draw much inspiration from this 
line of thinking. The veto player framework brings a defined answer to how domestic political 
changes affect globalization. I make the direct relationship between veto players and globalization 
the center of my analysis.  
Drawing from both streams of the globalization literature, the next logical step is to take 
both lines of reasoning and combine them together. On the one hand, a relationship between 
political parties and organized labor does impact how globalized a country is. On the other hand, the 
veto players framework can explain domestic politics and institutional effects. This begs the 
question, do veto players, derived from partisan competition, have a systematic effect on 
globalization in the OECD? And, if so, is this relationship the same across each dimension of 
globalization? This is a key gap in our understanding of both veto players and globalization. It is this 
gap in our understanding that I fill with this dissertation. 
 
Dissertation Overview 
Immediately following this introduction is the Theory Chapter. In this chapter, I argue that 
globalization can be divided into three primary dimensions; political, economic, and social (Dreher 
2006a). I also contend that by disaggregating globalization into its dimensions, it becomes possible 
to understand why previous work suffers from divergent findings (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 
2002 are examples). Previous work was accidentally examining different dimensions and expecting 




I then turn to an overview of Tsebelian Veto Player Theory (1995; 2002).5 This theory 
provides analytical leverage to explain the effects of domestic institutions on globalization. Thus, 
Veto Player Theory is perfectly suited to examine the effect of legislative and executive institutions 
on globalization’s dimensions. As it allows for comparison across varying institutional structures. 
This enables a generalizable argument to be constructed regarding how institutions impact 
globalizations dimensions across the OECD. I then turn to each dimension of globalization 
(political, economic, and social) and posit a relationship between it and veto players. This results in 
three different predicted relationships. First, veto players cause political globalization to decrease. 
Second, veto players do not affect economic globalization. And veto players increase social 
globalization. For executive institutions, only economic and social globalization are affected. 
Executives exaggerate the growth of economic globalization. While they increase social globalization 
in conjunction with veto players. With each dimension of globalization having a different 
relationship with veto players and executives, thinking about globalization as an aggregate concept is 
problematic. 
After the Theory Chapter, is the Data and Methods Chapter. This chapter expands upon the 
theoretical, by examining multidimensional globalization data. I discuss the Swiss Economic 
Institute’s Globalization Index, as it has been found to be the best available data (Gygli, Haelg, and 
Sturm 2018). This is due to it containing individual measures of all three primary dimensions of 
globalization (political, economic, and social). Additionally, it is the most advanced composite 
globalization data that is currently available. This captures globalizations complexity with a high 
degree of accuracy. 
 
5 This is not to be confused with veto points scholarship such as work by Markus Crepaz (2001a), which is very different 




I then turn to my dependent variables, starting with veto players. Of the two 
operationalization’s of veto players (ideological range and count), I argue that ideological range is the 
most appropriate, due to a lack of measurement error. However, I will still employ the count 
measure as a robustness check throughout my analyses. This is to showcase that variable selection 
does not drive my results. I also derive a number of control variables that are common across all 
three of globalizations dimensions (political, economic, and social).6 Examples include; the era of 
globalizing markets (1960-1989) (Garrett 1998), corporatism (Katzenstein 1985), and others. 
Variables specific to certain dimensions are discussed in the relevant chapters. 
I also discuss the common statistical estimators for Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) data; 
Ordinary Least Squares, Feasible Generalized Least Squares, and Panel Corrected Standard Error 
regression (Stimson 1985; N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). Of the three estimators, Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) regression emerges as the most appropriate. This is due to its 
ability to produce unbiased standard errors. However, when employing PCSE, certain model 
specifications are necessary to deal with any autocorrelation in the data. I discuss the two primary 
methods of doing this; including a lagged dependent variable and assuming an autoregressive one 
(AR1) process in the data. With these two model specifications in place, PCSE produces the most 
accurate model estimates. 
After the Data and Methods Chapter, I move to the first of three empirical chapters, one for 
each dimension of globalization, beginning first with political globalization. The Political 
Globalization Chapter tests my theoretical argument about veto players and political globalization, 
where I theorize a negative relationship. I briefly recap my argument but focus more on the 
relationship between ideological range and political globalization. I argue that as the ideological 
 




range of the veto players increases, political globalization decreases. The variables employed in the 
model are overviewed, paying special attention to variables specific to the political dimension. This 
includes a year specific effect for 1991 not found in other dimensions. I find evidence to support my 
hypothesis, veto players and political globalization do have a negative relationship. I then use my 
findings to explain variation in political globalization between OECD members. 
The second empirical chapter examines veto players and economic globalization. This 
chapter reviews my argument that all veto players favor increased economic globalization. I contend 
that the electoral incentive, present in all democratic systems, causes at least one veto player to favor 
economic globalization. This results in any proposed changed to economic globalization being 
vetoed. Additionally, when a liberal executive is present, economic globalization increases at a faster 
rate than normal. The variables employed in the economic globalization model are discussed, noting 
dimension specific ones, such as ‘peak oil.’ I find that economic globalization tends to increase over 
time, but more rapidly when a liberal executive is present. My results allow for key differences 
between countries to be attributed to liberal executives. 
The third empirical chapter examines the effect of veto players on social globalization. I 
contend that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, social globalization tends to 
increase. This is because only a unified veto player can slow normative change. In addition, I argue 
that liberal executives, due to their ideology and institutional position also increase social 
globalization. I then derive hypotheses to test for these relationships. The variables employed in the 
social globalization model are reviewed, as is the PCSE estimator. From my results, patterns of 
social globalization can be marginally attributed to veto players. Liberal executives also increase 




Lastly, I pull the threads of my argument together in the Conclusion Chapter. I return to my 
theoretical argument and how it fared against the evidence. I found support for my predictions 
regarding political and economic globalization, and marginal support for my predictions about social 
globalization. All in all, my theoretical argument fared well against the evidence. These findings, 
taken together, form a cohesive picture that expands the current understanding of globalization. 
First, the different directional relationships of each dimension with veto players supports the notion 
that globalization is multidimensional. As does the performance of dimension specific independent 
variables. I also find that increased globalization, for most dimensions, tends to be a preference of a 
liberal actor. In most cases, the preference of a liberal executive. In addition, certain dimensions are 
affected by other factors in different directions. For example, EU membership has different effects 
on economic and social globalization. I then look to avenues for future work on globalization and its 
dimensions, based on my findings. Specifically, what effects other institutional domains, such as 




In this dissertation I examine globalization’s relationship to legislative and executive 
institutions. The current chapter has introduced the concept of globalization and developed a 
working definition consistent with prior work (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; 
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008 and others). I contend that globalization is complex, 
multidimensional, dynamic, and operates across several institutional domains simultaneously. It is 
also not to be confused with regionalism or interdependence, as these concepts do not exhibit 




globalization is not. Interdependence is static, while globalization is dynamic across time. Thus, 
globalization is not to be confused with either concept. With this established, it is clear what is 
globalization, and what is not. 
Given what globalization is, I narrow the focus of my work. I have chosen to explore the 
impact of two institutions, the legislature and the executive, on globalization. This is a novel 
addition, as previous work often lumped together institutions and estimated this impact on 
globalization (Crepaz and Moser 2004 is an example). Instead, I propose to use Veto Player Theory 
to isolate two institutional effects (legislative and executive). However, dimension specific factors 
determine which institutional effect is more relevant. For example, the primacy of the executive in 
two areas; economic decisions and the marketplace of ideas. These two items indicate that economic 
and social globalization may have executive institutional effects (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; 
Kernell 2006; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Ballentine and Snyder 1996) 
I then laid down a road map for how this dissertation will be structured. In the Theory 
chapter, I present my detailed account of why globalization is multidimensional and has three 
different relationships with veto players. In the Data and Methods chapter, I discuss the 
globalization and veto data selected to test my theory. In the political, economic, and social empirical 
chapters I test precise directional hypotheses regarding veto players and each dimension of 
globalization. In the Conclusion, I tie my three sets of findings together. 
The next chapter will lay out my theoretical argument in detail. I argue that previous 
scholarship has merit, and that globalization should be disaggregated into three primary dimensions 
(political, economic, and social). I then argue that each of these three primary dimensions can be 
explained by Veto Player Theory. This results in three different directional predictions. This sets the 




Chapter 2: Theory 
 
From the previous chapter’s discussion, it is apparent that theoretical scholarship poses 
several unanswered questions regarding globalization’s complex relationship with domestic 
institutions. This chapter begins to unpack these theoretical questions, by first delineating the 
primary dimensions of globalization. Using this framework, can globalization be better understood if 
treated as multidimensional (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) and operating across several 
institutional domains (Held and McGrew 1993)? This chapter seeks to answer this question by 
arguing that yes, it can. I then define the three primary dimensions of globalization (political, 
economic, and social) according to previous work (Dreher 2006a; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). 
Filling in key conceptual gaps to promote clarity.  
In addition, to support my argument that each dimension of globalization is related to 
legislative veto players, I briefly review Tsebelian Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002). This allows 
me to clearly delineate this particular theory from other veto perspectives (Lijphart 1999; O’Reilly 
2005). This step is critical, as it informs many later decisions on variable selection in the coming 
chapters. Veto Player Theory data is vastly different from veto points data (W. J. Henisz 2000; 
2002). This distinction is critical given my definition of globalization, as veto points scholarship 
precludes the isolation of institutional domains. 
I also argue that Veto Player Theory has defined analytical leverage to explain each 
dimension of globalization. This assertation is based on previous work that showcased Veto Player 
Theory’s relevance in general (c.f. Tsebelis 2002; Ha 2008) as well as the definition of the three 
primary dimension of globalization (political, economic, and social) (Dreher 2006a). I draw 




a unique relationship with legislative institutions. This results with three different predicted 
relationships between veto players and globalization’s dimensions. 
 
Why Globalization Should Be Disaggregated 
Globalization is a complex phenomenon. Globalization involves political connections, 
market integration, and social norms. It also involves individuals, institutions, and the connections 
between them (Held and McGrew 1993). Globalization is more than a one-dimensional concept that 
only effects economic relations. Theoretical and empirical scholars that study globalization instead 
think of it as multidimensional (Held and McGrew 1993; Lockwood 2001; Keohane 2002; T. M. 
Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Vujakovic 2009; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). 
Given my definition of globalization, established in the previous chapter, I also embrace the notion 
that globalization is multidimensional. The wider literature tends to ignore these arguments, as 
scholars cannot agree on the number of dimensions globalization is composed of.7 Some argue that 
globalization is composed of two dimensions (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005) while others say it can 
be as many as five or more (Held and McGrew 1993). The main problem is that this lack of 
agreement between scholars, as Robert Keohane argues, borders on the nonsensical (2002). This 
causes the valuable insight that globalization is multidimensional to be written off, despite its rich 
possibilities. 
Empirical globalization scholars tend to focus on the economic dimension of globalization 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni 2006 is an example). This focus on a single dimension is problematic, as 
scholars ignore the theoretical consensus that globalization is multidimensional. This leads to overly 
 
7 This debate is not only a disagreement within the discipline of political science, but it is also a point of contention 




narrow empirical work on globalization. Scholars tend to assume globalization is strictly an 
economic phenomenon and limit their research questions. This leaves an untapped well of 
knowledge about globalization left unattended by scholars. The flow of policies and social norms, 
which make up a critical part of globalization, go unstudied.  
Additionally, with the theoretical work so bogged down in the minutia, applied empirical 
scholars tend to engage in lax theorizing. For example, some empirical scholars create new 
dimensions (environmental globalization) off hand, and never fully define them theoretically 
(Martens and Raza 2009). This leaves empirical findings nearly as convoluted as the theoretical 
arguments. The need for a middle ground regarding the number of globalization’s dimensions is of 
paramount theoretical and empirical importance to further understand globalization. Especially 
given the consensus that globalization is multidimensional. The implication of ambiguity over the 
exact number of globalizations dimensions, divides the theoretical work from the empirical work. 
On one hand, the theoretical work argues over which dimensions are most relevant, (Held and 
McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005). While, on the other hand, the applied 
empirical scholarship ignores the issue of dimensionality and studies the implications of globalization 
instead of direct causal links. These include welfare state expansion (Ha 2008), capital flows (Hays 
2009), and others. This balkanization of globalization scholarship prevents new knowledge from 
being generated.  
Additionally, empirical scholars often poorly operationalize globalization in their models. 
Many follow the tradition laid down by Geoffrey Garrett (1998) and equate trade openness with 
globalization. But, globalization is far more than trade openness, and to equate the two concepts is 
to dangerously oversimplify (T. M. Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Ha 2008; Eichengreen and 




trade openness often being inseparable from global trade openness (Vujakovic 2009). This 
oversimplification leads to conflating globalization with regionalization when operationalizing 
globalization via trade openness. Even more sophisticated operationalizations, which often combine 
trade openness and capital account restrictions (such as Ha 2008), do not solve the problem entirely. 
In their examination of this very problem, Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang state that, 
“Without acknowledging that globalization has multiple dimensions… it is impossible to determine 
whether a study’s findings are a figment of the particular aspect of globalization on which the 
investigators focus…” (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008, 319). I wholeheartedly agree and would go a 
step further. Globalization scholars are often forced to use a multidimensional framework, due to 
variable selection, but have no idea that they are doing so. Thus, the questions posed about 
globalization and the answers returned by quantitative models are answers to different questions 
than were asked. This breeds conflicting results, and leaves questions of how each dimension of 
globalization is affected by other concepts unanswered. 
Recent work in economics, heeding the argument that globalization is, “…driven by a set of 
discrete but intersecting logics.” (Held and McGrew 1993, 263), has attempted to address this 
theoretical ambiguity, by defining globalization as composed of three primary dimensions; political, 
economic, and social (Dreher 2006a).8 Each of these three dimensions of globalization capture a 
critical element of previous work. Political globalization captures the argument made by Liberals 
(Held and McGrew 1993) and Neoliberals (Keohane 2002), that politics is a critical part of 
globalization. Economic globalization captures arguments made by Embedded Liberalism scholars 
(Ruggie 1982; 2003; Hays 2009) that economic relations are also a key part of globalization. While 
 
8 I do not argue that political, economic, and social globalization are the only three dimensions of globalization. I do 
argue that all other dimensions of globalization are segments of the three primary dimensions originally articulated by 
Robert Keohane (2002) and Axel Dreher (2006a). This is evident based on research by the Swiss Economic Institute 




social globalization captures the arguments of Constructivists (Adler 1997; Wendt 1999) that norms 
matter. For the first time, scholars of globalization can close the theoretical gap, and treat 
globalization as a divisible multidimensional concept. This allows for new and fascinating lines of 
inquiry regarding how each dimension of globalization might be related to other concepts. The three 
dimensions of globalization, as defined by Axel Dreher (2006a), are summarized below in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. The Dimensions of Globalization 
Dimension of Globalization Description 
Political Globalization The diffusion of government policies among states 
Economic Globalization Long distance flows of goods, services, and capital, 
and the information and perceptions that 
accompany market exchange 
Social Globalization The spread of ideas, information, images, and 
people 




I argue that each of the three dimensions of globalization are fundamentally different from 
each other, and that this difference can explain divergent findings on globalization. Previous work 
has established, via overlap statistics, that each dimension is different statistically (Gygli, Haelg, and 
Sturm 2018). However, some overlap still exists. This is both a theoretically relevant point (Held and 
McGrew 1993), and a statistical reality. Political and economic globalization are correlated at .457. 
Political globalization is correlated with social globalization at .5, and economic and social 
globalization are correlated at .814.9 However, it would be strange if the dimensions of globalization 
did not overlap, as they are part of a divisible whole. I argue that each dimension of globalization is, 
“best understood as being driven by discrete but intersecting logics [specific to each dimension]” 
 




(Held and McGrew 1993, 263). There is also solid statistical evidence to support the disaggregation 
of globalization into its component dimensions. These tests are discussed in a Swiss Economic 
Institute working paper (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018), and clearly show that Held and McGrew’s 
argument is correct. Globalization is composed of three separate dimensions. 
Previous work has also hinted that each dimension of globalization to a unique causal 
process. However, this has yet to be exploited to theorize different relationships between political, 
economic, and social globalization and other concepts. According to Table 1, political globalization 
involves the diffusion of policy, which is intimately related to the policy diffusion process (Walker 
1969; Swan 1973; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993; Strang and Meyer 1993; Simmons and Elkins 
2004; 2005; Shipan and Volden 2008; Solingen 2012). Economic globalization, on the other hand, 
involves market exchange, and is therefore related to economic performance (Krugman 1991; 
Krugman and Venables 1995; Dreher and Gaston 2008a; Bergh and Nilsson 2010a). While social 
globalization involves the exchange of ideas and norms which is related to the market place of ideas 
(Ballentine and Snyder 1996). 
Assuming a multidimensional framework provides answers as to why the globalization 
literature is plagued by two different directional relationships (one positive the other negative) in two 
different sub-literatures. Given that globalization is a complex and multidimensional concept, it is 
possible that different causal relationships are because different dimensions have different 
relationships with the same variables. Thus, when different dimensions are inadvertently employed 
in statistical models, the likely result is divergent findings in the literature. Two examples are 
illustrative. 
First, in the globalization/welfare literature, one set of scholars argue that globalization 




welfare state to shrink. The expansion argument assumes that as globalization increases and the 
world approaches neoliberal convergence, the voters on the wrong side of efficiency demand more 
welfare benefits. This results in increased welfare spending  (Garrett 1998; Rodrik 1998; Swank 
2002; Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005). The shrinkage argument assumes much the 
opposite. As globalization increases, the gains of trade are spread across the globe more evenly. This 
diffuse benefit causes welfare recipients to no longer need it. This results in reduced welfare 
spending across the globe (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Rodrik 1997).  
The divergent findings in the globalization/welfare literature are due to not treating 
globalization as a complex multidimensional concept. In this literature, it is common to equate 
globalization with two distinctly economic phenomena; trade openness and capital account 
restrictions (c.f. Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Ha 2008). Thus, only the economic dimension of 
globalization is inadvertently included. Additionally, welfare is often equated with the redistributive 
capacity of the state (public spending, % below the median household income, social security 
transfers, etc.) (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Crepaz 2001a; Ha 2008). Given evidence that welfare is 
political (Hacker 2004; Young 2007), welfare is likely related to the political dimension of 
globalization. I contend that to compare apples (trade openness) to oranges (welfare) like this is 
dicey at best, and at worst, completely incorrect. The only way to ensure appropriate cross result 
comparison is to employ a multidimensional framework when studying globalization. No amount of 
theoretical handwaving can make this fundamental disconnect disappear.  
Second, the globalization/electoral politics sub-literature is plagued by another set of 
divergent findings. For example, Geoffrey Garrett (1998) argues that electoral politics cause short-
term fluctuations in globalization. Different electoral coalitions have different policy positions on 




how globalized a country is. Thus, globalization may encounter a hostile/agreeable government at 
various intervals. On the other hand, Jude Hays (2009), argues that electoral politics do not cause 
short-term fluctuations in globalization. Hays argues that liberalism is so embedded in democratic 
systems, that no fluctuation occurs because all actors agree that more liberal reforms are better. 
Globalization then encounters mostly pro-globalization governments across time and space. The 
divergent findings in the globalization/electoral politics sub-literature is also due to not treating 
globalization as multidimensional. Taking both Garrett (1998) and Hays’ (2009) arguments at face 
value, it is entirely possible for certain countries to be consistent with both arguments. For example, 
Switzerland and Japan have been controlled by a liberal/conservative political party for years 
(Katzenstein 1980; Encamation and Mason 1990; Obinger 1998; G. W. Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 
1999; Doring and Manow 2019), and therefore embodies Hays’ argument. However, a great many 
other countries do not experience this type of ideological consistency in government. Countries such 
as Australia, often experience governments whose ideologies are vastly different, and their position 
on globalization varies as well. Equating Australian Prime Minister’s John Howard, of the Liberal 
Party and Kevin Rudd, of the Labor Party is to gloss over significant ideological differences. Even 
when ‘liberal’ is defined as broadly as possible (Castles and Mair 1984; Benoit and Laver 2006), both 
Prime Ministers cannot be considered the same ideologically. Thus, the Australian case is more 
consistent with Garrett’s argument. But, if evidence exists that both Garrett and Hays are correct, 
the question is, why? I argue it is because both authors employ a uni-dimensional globalization 
framework. They accidentally capture some aspects of globalization and not others, leading to 
different findings. Only by treating globalization as complex and multidimensional can these two 
divergent findings be understood. Indeed, evidence of this already exists, as both authors dependent 
variables were scrutinized in this way (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). The proposed cure was a 




Both sets of divergent findings in the globalization/welfare and the globalization/electoral 
politics literature explain why it is so important to employ a multidimensional globalization 
framework. Only by breaking globalization into its three primary dimensions (Dreher 2006a), can 
these impasses be overcome. By conceptualizing globalization as composed of political, economic, 
and social dimensions, we come closer to the true complex concept as outlined in the qualitative 
literature (c.f. Held and McGrew 1993). And, by explicitly noting its dimensions and defining them, 
it becomes possible to create composite measures of globalization (such as the KOF Globalization 
index and others) (T. M. Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Vujakovic 2009; Gygli, 
Haelg, and Sturm 2018). This allows for dimension specific arguments to be made and tested. These 
findings present the best possible way to reconcile divergent findings on globalization. And, with 
each dimension related to a defined subset of concepts, it opens new research possibilities to 
understand how each dimension is impacted by other concepts. This work seeks to be the first to 
explore how institutions, by using Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002), impact each of the three 
dimensions of globalization.10 
 
What is Veto Player Theory? 
With each dimension of globalization defined, the next step is to adopt a theoretical 
perspective. This work employs Veto Player Theory to explain the relationship between institutions 
and globalization (Tsebelis 2002). This begs the obvious question, what exactly is Veto Player 
Theory? Veto Player Theory is a theoretical perspective derived from a strand of game theory 
 
10 For the purposes of this work, I employ the version of Veto Player Theory described by George Tsebelis (1995; 2002). 
This is not to be confused with veto point scholarship in the tradition of Lijphart (1999) and others (Crepaz 2001a; 




known as cooperative game theory.11 Using the principals of cooperative game theory (Tsebelis 
1990; 1995; 2002), Veto Player Theory seeks to explain how formal rules, or institutions, shape the 
behavior of various types of political actors.12 Veto Player Theory has been used to explain a wide 
variety of subjects, including but not limited to; preferential trade agreements (Mansfield, Milner, 
and Pevehouse 2007), regional integration (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2008), and civil war 
duration (David 2006). I use Veto Player Theory to explain the dimensions of globalization.  
According to Veto Player Theory, veto players are any, “individual or collective actors whose 
agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo.” (Tsebelis 2002, 19). Each veto player has an 
ideal policy that they want implemented on an issue (trade, welfare, etc.). When a new policy is 
proposed, they compare the new policy to the status quo, selecting the policy that is closer to their 
ideal point, and then vote for that policy (a vote for the status quo is a veto for the new policy).13   
Veto players can be divided into two distinct types; institutional veto players and partisan 
veto players (Tsebelis 2002). An institutional veto player is an official government post created by a 
country’s constitution, who can block change.14 These constitutional posts might include the office of 
the president, if it is endowed with the power of veto, or both houses of the legislature in bicameral 
systems where agreement is required for policy implementation (Money and Tsebelis 1992). A 
partisan veto player is a veto player generated by elections results, who can block change. Partisan 
veto players often take the shape of political parties, regardless of whether the government is a 
 
11 This is not to be confused with non-cooperative game theory, which employs the same logic, but reaches vastly 
different conclusions. For a detailed discussion of non-cooperative game theory, I recommend the work of James 
Morrow (1994). 
12 For this work, institutions are defined as humanly defined constraints on behavior (North 1990). For more on what 
constitutes an institution, please refer to the work of John Duffield (2007). 
13 Any policy that is equidistant from the ideal point and the status quo, results in the veto player being indifferent 
between them. For detailed proofs of the arguments laid out here, I suggest Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work 
(Tsebelis 2002). 
14 As opposed to simply stall or modify legislation, as is common in veto points arguments, which are vastly different 




coalition government. If all veto players (either institutional or partisan) do not agree on a policy 
change, the outcome is the status quo, or the already implemented policy.   
The distinction between institutional and partisan veto players can be blurry. For example, in 
the case of the United States, the executive illustrates this point. The Office of the President, created 
by the US Constitution,15 is an institutional veto player, as the office can block policy change. 
However, the President, the individual who holds the office at any given time, can be a partisan veto 
player, when either the Democratic, or Republican party (in modern times) controls neither 
congressional chamber. Veto Player theorists, for simplicity, refer to the total number of relevant 
veto players (institutional and/or partisan) as the effective number of veto players (Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001).16 The effective number of veto players represents the total number of veto 
players given the institutional and partisan context. The effective number of veto players can vary 
within and across political systems. For example, in 2011, Belgium had six effective veto players, 
while in 2014 that number was four (Doring and Manow 2019). At the same time, the United States 
had one effective veto player in 2011, and two in 2014. 
Countries with many effective veto players experience less change, while countries with few 
veto players, especially one veto player, experience more change (Tsebelis 2002). The 
number/ideological distance of the veto players determines the frequency, scope, and speed of 
policy change. For example, a country with one veto player is more likely to pass a piece of 
legislation than a country with two veto players, etc. Or, ideologically distant veto players may result 
in gridlock, making change highly unlikely. When there are many veto players, or they are 
ideologically distant, a veto player problem exists. 
 
15 https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution  




When a country has many or ideologically distant veto players the creation of new policy is 
difficult. But, when a new policy is implemented, it is very hard to repeal. By contrast, when a 
country has a small veto player problem, the veto players make the adoption of new policy 
significantly easier. However, the new policy can be changed just as easily (Haggard and McCubbins 
2001). This allows for the creation of predictions based on the size of the veto player problem in a 
country. In the United States for example, under divided government, only policy that is bipartisan 
can become law. If a policy is partisan, one of the veto players (President, Senate, or House) would 
block final passage (Krehbiel 2010).  
According to Tsebelis (1995), the main benefit of Veto Player Theory is to facilitate 
comparison across political systems using a common criteria (veto players). This enables scholars to 
compare across the various types of democracies, economic types, (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998), 
etc. Regardless of different institutional structures, according to Veto Player Theory, one can still 
form predictions based on the size of the veto player problem. This is regardless of the focus on the 
research, whether it is examining the domestic level (Becher 2010), the international level (Hallerberg 
2002) or both (Putnam 1988; Tsebelis 1990). In short, Veto Player Theory provides a parsimonious 
explanation of state behavior, using a precise criterion. 
Veto Player Theory is not to be confused with veto points17 scholarship. This dissertation 
draws on veto players scholarship in the vein of George Tsebelis (2002) and is not related to 
scholarship on veto points. I have elected to employ Veto Player Theory over veto points, as it is both 
more parsimonious and enables more precise predictions regarding the effect of institutions on the 
dimensions of globalization.  
 




Veto Player Theory is more parsimonious, as it allows for the comparison of countries 
across a single institutional domain (legislative), while veto points scholarship tends to cast a much 
wider net and consider multiple institutional domains (legislative, executive, bureaucratic, and 
judicial) (W. J. Henisz 2000; 2002). While veto points provide a more contextual understanding, the 
inclusion of additional institutional domains prevents isolating the individual impact of each domain 
on a specific dimension of globalization. By focusing on one institutional domain, it becomes 
possible to form predictions regarding how legislative veto players uniquely impact political, 
economic, and social globalization. Veto points measures consider the entire institutional fabric of 
all OECD countries across time and space and prevent the isolation of specific institutional effects. 
As my goal is to isolate specific institutional effects, Veto Player Theory was selected. 
Veto Player Theory is also more precise in its predictions, as the role of veto players is clear, 
they prevent change (Tsebelis 1999; Hug and Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002; Tsebelis 
and Chang 2004; Tsebelis 2006), while the role of veto points varies (Crepaz and Moser 2004), and 
includes; delaying, slowing, and blocking change. Veto Player Theory, due to its legislative focus, can 
generate more precise predictions regarding how the size of the veto player problem impacts each 
dimension of globalization. This allows for the formation of clear and directional hypotheses.  
Veto points scholarship is also heavily context bound due to certain assumptions in their 
theorizing. For example, veto points scholarship relies on U.S. context bound arguments regarding 
legislative and bureaucratic relations (W. J. Henisz 2000; 2002; O’Reilly 2005), and neglect to 
incorporate evidence that bureaucratic discretion varies. This is vividly evident in the page length of 
legislation. In countries where the legislature can trust the bureaucracy to reflect their preferences, 
policy will tend to be vague, resulting in few pages. But, in countries where the legislature cannot 




result in larger page counts (Bawn 1995; 1997; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001). The Clean Air Act 
in both the United States and the United Kingdom illustrates this point, as the US law is 455 pages 
(as of 2018) while the UK equivalent is 18 pages (as of 2019). The US law is 25 times longer than the 
UK law. Veto point scholarship assumes that bureaucratic discretion does not vary and cannot 
explain the UK case. Thus, the promise of a more contextually rich theory is fraught with issues. 
Additionally, veto points measures are often assumed to be statistically interchangeable with 
veto players measures (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2007; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 
2008; T. M. Peterson and Thies 2010), they are not. Despite veto points measures (W. J. Henisz 
2000; 2002) being inspired by and conceptual cousins to veto players measures (Tsebelis 2002), 
statistical tests reveal this to not be the case. Both the count of the veto players and the ideological 
range of the veto players are weakly correlated with the veto points measure, Political Constraints 
(POLCON). The count of the veto players is correlated with POLCON at .458, while the 
ideological range of the veto players is only correlated with POLCON at .329.18 This casts doubt on 
whether the veto points measure is measuring what it purports to be. And, is evidence enough to 
warrant serious reservations regarding veto points data, and its past results. Thus, it is more 
appropriate to rely on Veto Player Theory as originally created by Tsebelis (1995; 2002).  
 
Veto Player Theory and Globalization 
Given Veto Player Theory, as outlined above, how can it help to explain the changes in the 
dimensions of globalization across time and space? It is the purpose of this section to outline how 
 




Veto Player Theory can explain the trends in all three primary dimensions of globalization, whether 
it be political, economic, or social. 
To be fair, my work is not the first to use Veto Player Theory to attempt to shed light on 
globalization (Ha 2008). However, the application of Veto Player Theory to globalization is still in its 
infancy.19 For example, the work of Eunyoung Ha, amongst the earliest work to use Veto Player 
Theory to explain globalization, was published in the midst of a tectonic shift in globalization 
scholarship, with the dimensions of globalization being formally defined and composite indicators 
for each finally available to researchers (Dreher 2006a; Dreher and Gaston 2008a). Based on a 
survey of the literature, what work there is, tends to focus on how veto players can explain the 
expansion or shrinkage of the welfare state [a consequence of globalization] (Crepaz and Moser 2004; 
Ha 2008). But no work examines the direct causal relationship between veto players and 
globalization. 
Another problem with Veto Player Theory scholarship on globalization, is that these 
arguments fail to specify which dimension of globalization is at play (Dreher 2006a). Median 
household income is likely to be primarily related to economic globalization, but political 
globalization may also play a role (Crepaz 2001a). Public expenditures (Crepaz and Moser 2004), are 
likely to be highly related to both economic and political globalization. Welfare spending (Ha 2008) 
is linked to political globalization, in addition to possibly others (Hacker 2004; Young 2007). The 
question then is, which dimension of globalization is each author capturing? Or is it several? 
By thinking and looking at globalization as an aggregate concept, one can miss important 
distinctions among the dimensions. This may account for the vastly different results found in the 
 
19 In fact, the majority of scholars in the early days of veto/globalization research often relied on veto point theory 




literature on globalization. Some contend that globalization causes one set of effects (Rodrik 1997; 
Strange 1996; Garrett and Mitchell 2001, among others), while others contend the exact opposite 
(Garrett 1998; Rodrik 1998; Katzenstein 1985; Swank 2002, and others). This work seeks to bridge 
this divide in the literature by disaggregating globalization and testing if each dimension of 
globalization might have a different relationship with veto players. This could begin to explain the 
divergent findings in the globalization literature, as globalization’s multidimensionality (Eichengreen 
and Leblang 2008) may be driving the lack of consensus. 
This work takes a page from economics scholarship, pioneered by Axel Dreher (2006a; 
Dreher, Sturm, and Ursprung 2008; Dreher and Gaston 2008a), and seeks to bring the most cutting-
edge globalization research in economics and marry it with Veto Player Theory. By acknowledging 
that globalization is multidimensional, it becomes possible to explain three unique stories of how 
veto players affect each dimension of globalization. While each story will have some similarities with 
the others, the differences among political, economic, and social globalization might be just the 
theoretical insight needed to propel the debate in the globalization literature forward. 
From a Veto Player Theory perspective, it seems quite logical to argue that veto players 
would affect how a country responds to changes in each dimension of globalization over time. In 
the face of a large veto player problem (number or distance) a country should expect difficulty 
adjusting to increased political, economic, or social globalization. When faced with a small veto 
player problem, a country would be more able to respond to the effects of increasing political, 
economic, or social globalization more easily. The next three sections take Veto Player Theory and 
globalization scholarship and posit a unique theoretical relationship between each dimension. The 
first section discusses how veto players are related to political globalization, the second to economic 





Veto Players and Political Globalization 
Man is by nature, a political animal. 
Aristotle – The Politics 
 
The first of the three dimensions of globalization is political globalization. According to 
several scholars (Dreher 2006a; Dreher and Gaston 2008a; Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012; 
Charron 2009; Fors 2014), political globalization is defined as; “…the diffusion of government 
policies [among state actors]” (Dreher 2006a, 1092). This definition is broad and merits further 
discussion. 
First, exactly what policies constitute political globalization? This topic is generally glossed 
over (c.f. Potrafke 2009), unless a specific policy is of interest (Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 
2012). Research indicates that political globalization includes various types of policy such as; welfare, 
human rights, environmental, education, security, democratization, moral20, and others (Gershuny 
1979; Meier 1999; Pevehouse 2002; Sandholtz and Gray 2003; Hacker 2004; Soss and Schram 2007; 
Young 2007; Ha 2008; Seddon 2008; Capie 2008; Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011; Dreher, 
Gassebner, and Siemers 2012; Poast and Urpelainen 2014; Zapp and Dahmen 2017; Arbolino et al. 
2018; Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 2018). The policy areas that are considered political globalization 











Table 2. The Policies of Political Globalization21 
Policy Area Description 
Welfare Wealth redistribution across income groups, etc. 
Human Rights Systemic discrimination, etc. 
Environmental Pollution regulations, carbon regulations, etc. 
Education Curriculum policy, funding policies, etc. 
Security Diplomatic contact, UN Security Council Missions, 
etc. 
Democratization Policies of institutionalization, rule of law, etc. 
Moral Policy Abortion, drugs, prostitution, etc. 




A keen observer will notice the word ‘diffusion’ in the definition of political globalization. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the term diffusion represents the concept as outlined by Beth 
Simmons, Zachary Elkins, and others (Simmons 2000; Simmons and Elkins 2004; 2005; Simmons, 
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Policy diffusion is defined as when a law, originating in one country, 
crops up in another country.  A successful instance of policy diffusion occurs when a country adopts 
a new policy, or repeals an old one, for one of the four following reasons; 1) learning, 2) economic 
competition, 3) imitation, and 4) coercion (Shipan and Volden 2008). Each of these mechanisms of 





21 This list is generated from a survey of the diffusion literature across three academic disciplines, political science, 
economics, and sociology. For an introduction to this literature, I recommend work by Charles Shipan, Craig Volden, 
and E.R. Graham that surveys this broad sub-field (Shipan and Volden 2008; Shipan and Volden 2012; E. R. Graham, 






Table 3. The Mechanisms of Diffusion 
Mechanism of Diffusion Description 
Learning State A learns of a new law in State B. It implements 
the policy, but adapts it to fit its own political context 
Economic Competition State A adopts policy P. State B fearing an economic 
loss, adopts policy P as well. 
Imitation22 State B watches State A adopt policy P. Policy P 
benefits State A, so State B adopts it to gain a similar 
benefit. 
Coercion State A adopts policy P. State A demands that State B 
also adopt policy P. 




Each mechanism, listed above, represents a way the policies of political globalization can be 
diffused. Regardless of mechanism, a successful instance of political globalization diffusion occurs 
when one country adopts the policy of another. However, the policies of political globalization are 
subject to institutional constraints, which can prevent successful diffusion (Bunce and Wolchik 
2006). The primary institutional constraint for the diffusion of political globalization policies is veto 
players. 
How can a veto player problem explain the diffusion patterns of political globalization 
policy? For a new policy to be adopted in a country, the status quo policy must be defeated. And, 
the likelihood of defeating the status quo, is dependent on the number and/or ideological distance 
of the veto players in the country (Tsebelis 2002). If the veto player problem is large, then it 
becomes increasingly difficult for political globalization to diffuse. When the veto player problem is 
 
22 There exists a debate in the diffusion literature regarding how to distinguish between imitation and learning. This is 
both a methodological and a theoretical question, that is still being actively explored in the literature (Swan 1973; 
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993; Strang and Meyer 1993; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Boehmke 2009; Solingen 2012; 




small, it is much easier for political globalization to diffuse. Thus, veto players affect the adoption of 
the policies of political globalization in a country. Specifically, by altering the ease at which policy 
diffusion occurs. 
While veto players are an institutional constraint that can prevent the diffusion of political 
globalization, the question is, how to veto players influence the direction political globalization is 
moving? It is possible for veto players to slow the growth and decline of political globalization, as 
they prevent policy change regardless of direction. According to previous scholars, aggregate 
globalization is generally seen as increasing over time (Hays 2009), leading to eventual neoliberal 
convergence (Crepaz and Moser 2004). I argue that this increasing trend is generalizable to political 
globalization, and that this dimension is subject to fluctuations caused by veto players. The growth 


























This trend in my data lends support to my argument that political globalization, like 
aggregate globalization, tends to increase over time. However, this graph is silent on if this trend is 
subject to institutional impediments. Previous work indicates that there are such effects for 
aggregate globalization (Garrett 1998), but is silent on if these effects impact political globalization. I 
argue that veto players negatively impact political globalization. As the size of the veto player 
problem increases, the slope of this trend tends to flatten out. As the veto player problem changes in 
size, the diffusion of political globalization will vary along with it. Based on the logic of veto player 




each state. Conversely, as the veto player problem decreases in size, political globalization should 
increase. 
 
Veto Players and Economic Globalization 
Economics is too important to leave to the economists. 
Steve Keen, PhD. Economics 
 
Unlike the literature on political globalization, economic globalization is more developed 
theoretically (both in political science and economics). I define economic globalization as; “…the 
long distance flows of goods, services, and capital, and the information and perceptions that 
accompany market exchanges.” (Dreher 2006a, 1092). This definition is consistent with others in the 
globalization literature (Keohane 2002; Bergh and Nilsson 2010 and others). The types of economic 
phenomena that are considered economic globalization are summarized in Table 4, below. This is 
not an exhaustive list. 
 
 
Table 4. Components of Economic Globalization 
Market Activities of Economic Globalization Description 
Exchange of Goods Raw materials for manufactured goods, etc. 
Exchange of Services Currency for banking services, IT services, etc. 
Capital Flows FDI, FPI, any restrictions, etc. 
Tariff Barriers to Trade A tax levied on imports 







When studying economic globalization, most actors tend to embrace economic liberalism. 
With various groups favoring a specified amount of government intervention in the economy 
(Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Waltz 2001). According to survey results, a majority 
of people tend to favor liberalism (Ruggie 2003; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005; Ehrlich 2010).23 Thus, 
voters tend to support political parties that promise liberal economic policies wholeheartedly in the 
case of market liberal countries, or bundled with others in the case of corporatist countries 
(Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998). This creates an electoral incentive for strategic politicians as 
macroeconomic performance is a significant predictor of reelection (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 1977; 
Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Heckelman 2001). If the electoral incentive of politicians and the 
views of voters are added together, it can be argued that liberalism tends to be embedded in 
democracies (Milner and Kubota 2005; Rudra 2005; Mousseau 2002b).24 Thus, the acceptance level 
of economic liberalism as an ideology has a significant impact on economic globalization.  
How does Veto Player Theory fit into this narrative? One of the key features of all 
democratic countries is the presence of domestic veto players (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). From a veto 
player perspective then, at any given time, at least one (possibly more) veto player(s) favors increased 
liberalization as a policy outcome. While other veto players may prefer a different level of 
liberalization, any attempt to alter the status quo will be problematic, as the veto player who prefers 
increased liberalization will veto that policy. Thus, democratic multi-veto player systems tend to be 
fairly liberalized (Milner and Kubota 2005; Rudra 2005), with some slight variation in exactly how 
 
23 The support for free trade and globalization in public opinion research shows that the classic findings of Philip 
Converse (Converse 2006) also pertain. The public sees ‘free trade’ and ‘globalization’ as separate concepts, and rates 
then differently. This finding also notes a difference among income groups (Ehrlich and Hearn 2014; Wolfe and 
Mendelsohn 2005). 
24 While not discussed in more detail here, due to the fact that such considerations are treated as exogenous in rational 
choice scholarship (Downs 1957). There is a great deal of work that argues liberal values actually proceed democratic 
values and have an influence on how individuals and countries form their views on the a variety of issues (Mousseau 




much (Milner 1987; Garrett 1998). Thus, veto players ensure a certain degree of openness, by 
preventing protectionism.25 Thus, liberalism is embedded, unless all veto players who prefer 
increased liberalism are removed. Veto players, in this case, all agree that increased economic 
globalization is good. However, veto players often lack proposal power for global economic policy. 
This power is in the hands of the executive. With proposal authority frequently delegated to the 
executive on global economic policy (Haggard and McCubbins 2001; Huber 1992; Borghetto 2018). 
Veto players are unable to draft new policy that can increase economic globalization, they can only 
veto policy that would decrease it. Thus, veto players cannot increase economic globalization by 
themselves, they can only prevent its decrease.  
This institutional configuration imbues the executive with agenda setting powers. This allows 
the executive to select a policy that is optimal given their domestic game and the available 
international partners (Tsebelis 1990). This provides executives with a defined institutional 
advantage regarding economic globalization. Additionally, similar to veto players, economic 
performance is the main predictor of an executive’s electoral fate (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 
1992; Hibbs 2000). Thus, there is a defined electoral incentive for executives to increase economic 
globalization, and certainly not to decrease it. The agenda setting power of the executive (Tsebelis 
and Aleman 2005; Tsebelis and Rizova 2007) thus aggravate the growth trend of economic 
globalization. 
 
25 In those rare cases where veto players do pass illiberal policy, it is typically for moral reasons (Gilman, GoldHammer, 
and Weber 2011). However, these policies encounter a problem; demand for immoral services is constant (Meier 1999). 
Policies that regulate or ban the flow of immoral market exchange, simply push these exchanges out of the formal 
economy and into the black-market economy (Andreas 2004; Seddon 2008). Overall, these policies tend to be highly 
ineffective (Gershuny 1979), as they often regulate behavior indirectly. Recent political experiments in legalization of 
previously banned goods and services seem to indicate that states may have learned this very lesson, and are attempting 
to slowly, thanks to veto players, bring some deviant exchange back into the formal economy (Simon and Chavez 2018; 





These facts, taken together, showcase that economic globalization is thus affected by two 
institutional domains. Economic globalization is unmolested by domestic veto players, as they 
preserve openness, unless all veto players with a preference for liberalism are removed. However, 
the growth of economic globalization is conditioned on the actions of the executive. And, executives 
tend to, given their electoral incentives, prefer increased economic globalization. This empowers the 
executive and renders veto players impotent. Economic globalization then, is a case of intersecting 
logics (Held and McGrew 1993). The status quo level of economic globalization is preserved by veto 
players, while an executive employs his institutional advantage to ratchet up economic globalization. 
This should result in a generally positive trend in economic globalization. Figure 2 showcases the 
















26 I differ from Embedded Liberalism scholarship, in that I contend that retreats of economic globalization towards 
protectionism, are unlikely as these policies immediately encounter a veto player problem and a sticky status quo (Milner 











Given the argument laid out above and the trend in my data, I argue that economic 
globalization is generally unaffected by the size of the veto player problem. A veto player with a 
preference for increased liberalism ensures a status quo of continued economic globalization, but 
nothing more. While an executive, imbued with agenda powers, increases the growth rate of 
economic globalization. Thus, economic globalization has a complex relationship with veto players 





Veto Players and Social Globalization 
According to Dreher (2006a) and others (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018; Fors 2014), social 
globalization can be defined as, “…the spread of ideas, information, images and people” (Dreher 
2006a, 1092). Unfortunately, this definition raises more questions than it answers. Ideas are the 
express domain of Constructivist scholars (such as Wendt 1999), while information is linked to Veto 
Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002). This leaves both theories with analytical leverage to explain social 
globalization. Which perspective, Constructivism or Veto Player Theory, is more appropriate when 
studying social globalization? I argue that the answer is not which theory, but how both can together 
explain social globalization better together than they can apart. 
The first problem my argument faces is that it is difficult to discern a consensus regarding 
what Constructivism is. For simplicity sake, I subscribe to the famous classification attributed to 
John Ruggie (1998). This divides Constructivists into three groups; Neo-classical Constructivists 
(which Ruggie labels himself), post-modernist Constructivists (such as Ashley 1984), and naturalistic 
Constructivists (such as Wendt 1999).27 Each group shares several common assumptions; norms are 
key to understanding social reality (Wendt 1987; 1995; 1999) and norms are dynamic (Adler 1997; 
Ruggie 1998; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007). Where they differ is on how these assumptions 
are interpreted.  
The most radical of these are the post-modernist Constructivists. Constructivists of this 
stripe strictly interpret the assumption that norms and social reality is ever changing. This results in a 
rejection of positivist social science (broadly defined) (V. S. Peterson 2002). Empirical truth cannot 
be revealed, as even truth is socially constructed, and subject to the influence of normative forces 
 
27 While imperfect, this classification is a useful starting point. For example, this classification scheme places 
Functionalists in the neo-classical constructivist tradition (E. B. Haas 1961; P. M. Haas 1992). This would likely ruffle a 




(Campbell 1998). This precludes the ability to explain social globalization empirically, except that it is 
socially constructed. As this is exactly what I am attempting to do, this perspective is altogether not 
helpful. Therefore, I expressly reject post-modernist Constructivist explanations.  
Neo-classical Constructivists employ the same theoretical insights as post-modernists, but 
their interpretation is more pragmatic (Ruggie 1998). They acknowledge the shifting nature of social 
reality (Adler 1992; 1997), but would argue that it is possible to use Constructivism to explain social 
globalization. The explanation, however, would only provide context bound insight. Empirical truth 
is knowable, but a moving target. Thus, the work of neo-classical Constructivist scholars, may not 
always have empirical purchase, as context changes. 
Naturalistic Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt (1999), are the newest branch of 
Ruggie’s typology, and are less understood (1998). What is known, is that they more firmly embrace 
positivism than either post-modernist or neo-classical’s. This stems from their laxer interpretation of 
subjective reality, which is more stable and more knowable. For example, they often view themselves 
as the compliment of other theories, rather than their bitter enemy (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 
2007; Checkel 2001).  
Of the three, I embrace a fusion of neo-classical and naturalistic traditions. I do this, as 
despite variation, the common assumptions of both groups are necessary to understand social 
globalization. These include; norms are key to understanding social reality (Wendt 1987; 1995; 1999), 
norms are dynamic (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007), and social reality is fluid (Adler 1997; 
Ruggie 1998). However, it is important to define some key terms before diving into a 
Constructivist/Veto Player Theory account of social globalization. Primarily, to define what a norm 




I adopt the definition used by Jonathan Jacob Ring, which defines norms as ideas that slowly 
become institutionalized principals over time, with the power to shape actors understanding (2014). 
According to this definition, norms alter how individuals interact with abstract ideas (Ruggie 1998), 
and influence behavior (Wendt 1999). The problem, however, is that norms, which compose social 
reality, depend upon human agreement to exist (Adler 1997; Ruggie 1998). If a person does not 
accept a norm, then it does not shape their behavior. Thus, the level of agreement on a given norm 
can fluctuate. This fluctuation means that the ability of norms to shape behavior varies, depending 
on the individual’s acceptance of the norm in question. 
Social reality, the normatively constructed cognitive schema which assigns importance, is 
composed of norms. It also, by extension, fluctuates. Social reality is constantly being revised (Adler 
1997) by individuals who interact with each other, both within and outside institutions. Small 
normative changes, over time, slowly shift social reality, making previous contexts vastly different 
from the current ones (Redmond 2005).28 For the analysis of social globalization across time and 
space, these normative shifts are critical concerns.29 As how the ideas of social globalization fit 
within social reality will likely impact its increase or decrease over time. 
Given the above, it is quite possible to imagine social globalization being researched from a 
Constructivist perspective. But, as the influence of norms varies, Constructivism is an imperfect 
explanation of social globalization. A Constructivist perspective, while seeking a contextual 
understanding, has a distinct lack of a priori assumptions, (Ruggie 1998) except that norms matter 
(Wendt 1999). This leads to research devoid of any institutional considerations, as institutions are 
simply a permeable membrane that norms pass through (Park 2005; 2006). This neglects the role of 
 
28 Once such example is the Frankenstein Problem (Guzman 2013), where institutional goals shift over time. 




institutions in effecting the spread of norms. This places defined limits on Constructivism’s 
explanatory power over social globalization’s relationship to institutions.  
Following in the footsteps of previous scholars (Bieler 2001; Checkel 2001; Van Kersbergen 
and Verbeek 2007; Ring 2014), I contend that Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002), when combined 
with Constructivism can provide vastly increased explanatory power regarding social globalization. 
This is due to Constructivism explaining the ideational origin of preferences, which is beyond the 
pale for Veto Player Theory. While Veto Player Theory can explain how normatively derived 
preferences are mediated through the membrane of institutions. This provides a richer explanation 
of social globalization’s relationship to institutions than either theory could alone. 
On its face, my argument about combining Veto player Theory and Constructivism appears 
to be highly controversial. Many would claim that Veto Player Theory and Constructivism cannot be 
combined on ontological and epistemological grounds. Ontologically, the argument can be made 
that Veto Player Theory emphasizes the agent over structure, while Constructivism emphasizes both 
agents and structure equally (Wendt 1987). However, this is incorrect, as Veto Player Theory does 
not fit this mold. Looking at Veto Player scholarship (Tsebelis 2002), both actors and structures are 
emphasized equally. Strategic actors both create institutions and are also influenced by the very 
institutions they create. Thus, to dismiss a synthesis of Veto Player Theory and Constructivism out 
of hand solely on ontological grounds is incorrect. 
A similar critique can be leveled at my argument on epistemological grounds, that asserts 
Veto Player Theory and Constructivism cannot be combined due to epistemological differences. In 
this case, the problem lies in a misunderstanding of the heterogeneity of Constructivism. Many 
Constructivist scholars vary on their epistemological attachments (for example Ashley 1984; and 




Theory on epistemological grounds is also incorrect, as I embrace a form of Constructivism that is 
epistemological compatible with Veto Player Theory (a synthesis of Neo-classical and Naturalistic). 
In fact, many Constructivists speak highly of rational choice theory, and by extension Veto Player 
Theory. In that it is quite compatible with their own work (Wendt 1998; Adler 1997; Ruggie 1986; 
Ruggie 1998). Given this, I content that Veto Player Theory and Constructivism are quite 
compatible. Together, they explain the origin of preference and how preferences become behavior. 
Once a norm emerges successfully from the market place of ideas (Ballentine and Snyder 
1996), and is accepted via collective agreement (Adler 1997), it becomes incorporated into the 
cognitive schema of social reality. It then can assign value to abstract concepts (Ruggie 1998). From 
there, this value allows individuals to compare various alternatives, and select the one they prefer the 
most. However, simply preferring one concept over another is not enough (Arrow 2012). Structure 
is needed to prevent iritic outcomes. These institutions bring predictability to social life. Various 
institutional features impact social globalization. 
I argue that it is possible to use veto player logic to complete the empirical picture of social 
globalization started by Constructivists. According to Veto Player Theory, when two veto players are 
ideologically distant, change is unlikely (Tsebelis 2002). This hamstring’s the ability of a country to 
act on a multitude of levels (Tsebelis 1999; Hallerberg 2002; David 2006). Assuming the implications 
of a veto player problem extend into the marketplace of ideas (Ballentine and Snyder 1996), where 
norms are revised by collective agreement, this has profound implications. 
When veto players are distant, they are unable to promote the spread of norms they agree 
with, and they are also unable to prevent the spread of norms that they find disagreeable. In the case 
of a multiparty government, the inability to act results in minimal normative influence for all veto 




constant by the government, to be altered. Thus, the spread of ideas and norms, a critical 
component of social globalization, is likely to be influenced by the presence of a veto player 
problem. 
The same logic of normative influence also applies to other domestic actors as well. Thus, 
social globalization, does not operate in an institutional vacuum. It “…operates simultaneously 
across several institutional domains” (Held and McGrew 1993, 263–64). To ignore other domestic 
institutional actors, when isolating the legislative, is highly problematic. Of specific interest is the 
executive, a powerful normative agent, who can affect social globalization. Thus, for social 
globalization, like its economic cousin, it is critical to incorporate a second institutional domain as 
well. Previous work on the US executive often terms this ‘going public’ (Kernell 2006) and has 
identified ideational effects of executives (D. Lewis 1997; Welch 2003). There is also related 
evidence for similar executive influence outside the US context (Neto and Lobo 2009). I argue that 
this executive normative influence impacts social globalization. 
In the domestic context, when legislative institutions are hamstrung by ideologically 
distant/many veto players, ideas and norms flow more freely, unaffected by institutional actors. This 
in turn makes social reality more mailable, allowing it to change at a more rapid pace. This is likely to 
result in the increase of social globalization, and certainly not its decrease. Therefore, when veto 
players are ideologically distant, social globalization should increase. In addition, social globalization 
will also increase when the executive uses his normative influence to alter social reality. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the theoretical argument laid out above, each dimension of globalization, whether 




is clearly linked to veto players, as their assent is needed for any policy to be diffused. Thus, as the 
veto player problem increases, political globalization should decrease. Economic globalization, 
however, has a much different relationship with veto players. Veto players ensure openness of a 
given country, as the preference for liberalism ensures they would rather retain the status quo of 
economic globalization than attempt to alter it. This allows a liberal executive to use his institutional 
advantage to increase the growth rate of economic globalization. Social globalization, on the other 
hand, benefits from a veto player problem. When hamstrung by a veto player problem, the spread of 
norms and ideas is unhindered. In addition, when an executive uses his normative influence, social 
globalization also increases. The predicted relationships between veto players and each dimension of 
globalization are summarized in Table 5, below. 
 
 
Table 5. Predicted Relationships 
Dimension of Globalization Predicted Relationship with Veto Players 
Political Globalization As the veto player problem increases, political 
globalization decreases 
Economic Globalization A veto player problem does not affect economic 
globalization. An executive increases the growth rate 
of economic globalization 
Social Globalization A veto player problem increases social globalization. 




The theoretical work on globalization, discussed above, poses some fascinating questions 
(Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Of interest here is how 
the multidimensional concept operates across a single institutional domain; the legislative. This work 
seeks to begin unpacking this puzzle by dividing globalization into its three dimensions; political, 




legislatures; veto players. This resulted in three different predicted relationships between legislative 
veto players and each dimension of globalization. 
In the next chapter, the data brought to bear to test the three theoretical relationships, 
outlined here, is discussed in detail. The operationalization of veto players, each dimension of 
globalization, and a swath of other variables are discussed. In addition, the choice of statistical 
estimator used to analyze these data will also be explained in detail. This will facilitate the testing of 




Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
As of now, I have introduced the topic of globalization and adopted a working definition 
consistent with prior work that emphasizes its multidimensionality (Held and McGrew 1993; 
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Next, I argued that globalization is composed of three primary 
dimensions; political, economic, and social. I also argued that each dimension has a unique 
relationship with veto players. The next step in analyzing the relationship between veto players and 
the dimensions of globalization is to select data and a statistical estimator to test for these 
relationships. That is the focus of this chapter. 
This chapter discusses both the data and statistical method used in the subsequent empirical 
investigations of veto players’ effect on each dimension of globalization (political, economic, and 
social). The first section of this chapter discusses the Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) data 
employed in this work. Focusing on the independent variables common to all three dimensions, and 
why each was selected. The second section focuses on the statistical estimator needed to analyze 
TSCS data. This section discusses the challenges inherent in TSCS data and the proposed fixes for 
these challenges. Based on the nature of TSCS data and the severity of problems like 
autocorrelation, a statistical estimator is chosen that best deals with these challenges and produces 
the least biased results.  
 
Data 
To test my argument regarding the relationship between veto players and each dimension of 
globalization (political, economic, and social) data is required. This section will discuss the data 




of the variables in my data and why each variable was selected. Discussions of any dimension 
specific variables are reserved for the relevant empirical chapter. 
The dataset employed here30 is a TSCS dataset [also referred to as panel or stacked panel 
data]. These data cover the years 1970 to 2015, for 33 OECD countries, excluding Mexico, Chile, 
and South Korea. Mexico, Chile, and South Korea are excluded here for several reasons. First, this is 
a rather routine practice (c.f. Dreher 2006c; Potrafke 2009). This is because what data that is 
available on these countries results in unbalanced panels. For this reason, most scholars do not 
include Mexico, Chile, and South Korea (or some combination thereof). However, I fundamentally 
disagree with this practice, as to toss out data is not advisable (Baltagi and Song 2006). Instead, these 
countries are excluded here primarily because the ParlGov data (Doring and Manow 2019) used to 
construct my main independent variable, veto players, (discussed shortly) does not have data on 
these countries. Thus, I was forced to drop these countries from my analyses. Additionally, data 
sources that do have data on Mexico, Chile, and South Korea (“The Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems” 2020) have severely limited time series. For example, South Korea’s data is only available 
from 2000 to 2012. This only includes four national elections for South Korea (2000, 2004, 2008, 
and 2012). To make generalizable conclusions from such limited data is unwise, as previous work 
clearly shows (Garrett 1998). Therefore, I dropped Mexico, Chile and South Korea from my 
analysis.  
Data sources that do have a sufficiently long time series for Mexico, Chile, and South Korea, 
such as the political constraints variable (POLCON), are not theoretically compatible with my 
analyses (W. J. Henisz 2000; 2002). These data lump together four institutional domains (legislative, 
executive, judicial, and bureaucratic), which is contrary to the theoretical assumptions that motivates 
 
30 The data discussed in this chapter is available from the author upon request. Please email: 




my research (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). This topic is 
discussed shortly, in the Independent Variable section.  
In addition, due to data limitations, the United States could only be included in models 
employing the count operationalization of veto players. This is due to ideological position data for 
the US being constructed using an entirely different process (Poole and Rosenthal 2001; McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2007; J. B. Lewis et al. 2019). No method of conversion currently exists to 
translate US ideological position data into the more typical scale used in other subfields (c.f. Castles 
and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Doring and Manow 2019). However, using the Data Base of 
Political Institutions (DPI) data, which I employ for other purposes discussed shortly, I was able to 
create count data for the United States for all years (T. Beck et al. 2000). I elected to include the 
United States due to being able to code the entire time series, which was not possible for Mexico, 
Chile, and South Korea. This made the US data less problematic. However, excluding the US does 
not substantively change any of the model results.  
My data includes both eras of globalization as defined by Geoffrey Garrett (1998). The era 
of globalizing markets in my data is from 1970 to 1990, and the era of global markets from 1990 to 
2015. The unit of analysis in my data is a country/year dyad (France/1970, etc.). Each dyad is 
measured annually for all variables in the data. While annual measurement of TSCS data is 
problematic, as events that occur between measurements are often lost (Stimson 1985), all variables 
are measured annually as other dyadic forms are not available. Thus, due to data limitations, I am 
prevented from using another unit of analysis (quarterly, monthly, daily, etc.). Each dyad is grouped 
into panels representing an individual country (France from 1970 to 2015, etc.). There are some gaps 
in some of my panels, resulting in unbalanced, non-randomly missing panels. While some scholars 




inadvisable, as to toss out data is inefficient (Baltagi and Song 2006). Many of these gaps in my data 
are caused by the lack of sovereignty for Soviet satellite states (James 1991). Other panels are shorter 
as some countries had not come into existence yet (such as the Czech Republic). This prevented 
data collection on the main independent variable of interest; veto players. I treat Finland as fully 
sovereign for the entire dataset, as Finlandization is not an empirical reality, but more of a political 
term from the Cold War Era (Maude 1982).31  
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in my data operationalize each dimension of globalization; political, 
economic, and social. Each dependent variable is drawn from the Konjunkturforschungsstelle 
(KOF)32 Globalization Index. These data contain individual composite measures for each dimension 
of globalization, and it is the only dataset currently available that disaggregates globalization into its 
three primary dimensions.33 The KOF globalization index contains data on 209 states, over a 45-year 
period (1970-2015). The KOF data employs dynamic, time varying Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) to weight each component of the three composite indexes for each dimension (Gygli, Haelg, 
and Sturm 2018). KOF data also tests for the statistical merit of disaggregating globalization into 
dimensions and finds solid evidence to support my three-dimensional framework.34 Thus, the KOF 
data captures the dynamic and multidimensional nature of globalization, as noted in the previous 
 
31 Table 20, in the appendix, summarizes the years that are included for each country. 
32 Konjunkturforschungsstelle roughly translates to ‘economic institute’ in English. Translation courtesy of Dr. Christian 
Jensen. 
33 I do not contend that there are only three dimensions of globalization that are relevant. In fact, previous research has 
identified several other dimensions that are unique in their own right via factor analysis (Tobin 2000; Gygli, Haelg, and 
Sturm 2018). I simply argue that political, economic, and social globalization are the three dimensions that are primary, 
in that they are more theoretically relevant as they allow for a multidimensional framework while also simultaneously 
each dimension retains a certain degree of complexity (Held and McGrew 1993). 
34 While overlap does exist between political, economic, and social globalization, there also exists solid statistical 




chapter. In addition, dynamic PCA avoids the pitfalls of ad hoc weights that previous measures of 
globalization were criticized for (Lockwood 2001). 
All globalization data faces the problem of distinguishing between global and regional 
connections. The KOF globalization index deals with this by adjusting each of its 42 components to 
only capture global connections by parsing out regionalism. For example, trade with regional 
neighbors is weighted less than trade with a global trade partner (Dreher and Gaston 2008a; Gygli, 
Haelg, and Sturm 2018). Thus, the KOF data captures global connections and not regional 
connections. Due to its sophistication, the KOF data is referred to as the gold standard in the 
economics globalization literature (Dreher et al. 2010). Each dependent variable, operationalizing a 
different dimension of globalization, is taken from the KOF data. The KOF globalization index can 
be downloaded from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s website and is publicly available.35 How 
each dimension of globalization (political, economic, and social) is operationalized will be discussed 
in turn. Beginning with political globalization, then economic globalization, and lastly social 
globalization.  
Political globalization is operationalized as a 1-100 index. One signifies a country that is not 
politically globalized. A value of 100 signifies a country that is highly politically globalized. This 
composite index is composed of 6 variables, which are summarized in Table 6, below (Gygli, Haelg, 













Table 6. Political Globalization Components 
Embassies (Absolute number of embassies in a country) 
UN Peace Keeping Missions (Personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council Missions per capita) 
International Organizations (Number of International Organizations in which the country is a member) 
NGO’s (Number of internationally oriented Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) with members in that 
country) 
International Treaties (International treaties signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest 
legislative body for each country since 1945) 
Number of distinct bilateral investment treaty partners for a state36 




The KOF data’s political globalization variable is the only composite variable of political 
globalization currently available to researchers. The KOF political globalization variable employs all 
previously noted methodological innovations (dynamic time varying PCA to control for regionalism, 
etc.). However, there are defined limitations to the KOF political globalization variable. Two of its 
components (international agreements and investment agreements) precludes controlling for the 
effect of cooperation on globalization, as the literature indicates (Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017). 
Therefore, in the political globalization model, these control variables are omitted. They are however 
included in the other models (economic and social). But, due to no available alternative, the KOF 
political globalization variable is employed as the dependent variable in the relevant chapter. 
 
36 Traditionally, investment treaties are often thought of as economic agreements. However, looking at the data, it 
appears that investment treaties are significantly different, as Axel Dreher and others at the Swiss Economic Institute 
argue (Dreher 2006a; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). For example, in the COIL dataset (Koremenos 2013), investment 
treaties are almost always bilateral (there is only one instance of a multilateral investment agreement in the entire 
dataset). In addition, the countries who sign them are almost always systematically related in some way, typically 
reflecting deep diplomatic ties or a colonial relationship. I argue that since investment treaties are almost always bilateral 





My second dependent variable is the KOF economic globalization measure. This measure is 
constructed like political globalization, as a 1-100 score representing how economically globalized a 
country is. A value of 1 indicates low economic globalization, and 100 indicates high economic 
globalization. The KOF composite index of economic globalization is composed of 14 components. 
Each component is summarized in Table 7, below. 
 
 
Table 7. Economic Globalization Components 
Trade in Goods (Sum of exports and imports in goods as a share of GDP) 
Trade in Services (Sum of exports and imports in services as share of GDP) 
Trade partner diversification (Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index) 
Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Foreign Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) 
International Debt (% of GDP) 
International Reserves (% of GDP)37 
International income payments (% of GDP) 
Trade Regulations (Average of prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers and compliance costs of importing and 
exporting) 
Trade Taxes (income from taxes on international trade as % of revenue) 
Tariffs (Unweighted mean of tariff rates) 
Prevalence of foreign ownership and regulations to international capital flows 
Chinn-Ito index of financial openness 
Jahan-Wang index of openness of the capital account 





37 There is evidence that international reserves are driven by political considerations (Helleiner 2008; Kirshner 2003; 
Norrlof 2014). However, I would argue that the inclusion of international reserves here is correct. Under an embedded 
liberalism framework (Ruggie 1982; Abdelal and Ruggie 2009; Hays 2009) most veto players tend to embrace one of the 
cluster of ideologies that is economic liberalism. Thus, their preferences for policy (such as international reserves) is so 
similar that any differences are more likely to be driven by purely economic considerations and not by political 




Looking at Table 7, the benefits of the KOF measure of economic globalization are 
apparent. Previous research on economic globalization (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009 for example) tends 
to employ either trade openness or capital account restrictions as dependent variables.38 Both of 
these variables are included as components in the KOF economic globalization variable.39 In 
addition, the KOF economic globalization variable includes other components commonly employed 
in the literature. These include measures of financial globalization (Foreign Direct Investment and 
Foreign Portfolio Investment) and others (Tobin 2000; Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang 2006; 
Schmukler and Vesperoni 2006; Winchester 2009; Pelc 2013; Azzimonti, Francisco, and Quadrini 
2014). KOF’s competitors, the Anderson and Herbertsston Index (AHI) (2003) and the New 
Globalization Index (NGI) (2009) do not have the same level of methodological sophistication, and 
they impose severe data limitations (fewer years and countries). Thus, the KOF measure of 
economic globalization is far superior to either major alternative. However, the KOF economic 
globalization measure comes with limitations. Looking at Table 7, several components of the 
economic globalization measure are constructed using Gross Domestic Product (GDP). With GDP 
functioning in the background, this precludes including GDP as a control.40 This is the primary 
weakness of the KOF measure of economic globalization.  
The third dependent variable is the KOF composite measure of social globalization. Like the 
measures of political and economic globalization, it is operationalized as a 1-100 index representing 
 
38 Other common dependent variables include measures of the size of the welfare state and survey data. However, these 
variables are not clearly linked to economic globalization in the theoretical work (Crepaz 2001b; Crepaz and Moser 2004; 
Ha 2008; Ehrlich 2010). 
39 It is important to keep in mind, that the two variables listed in the above table, trade in goods and trade in services, are 
equivalent to trade openness. Both indicators are constructed as trade over Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and when 










= 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 . This is because the denominator, GDP, is common across both 
fractions and one simply adds together the numerators, then reduces the fraction to create a trade openness variable. 




how socially globalized a country is. Again, 1 signifies a low value, and 100 a high value.  This 
composite measure is composed of 22 components, which are summarized in Table 8, below. 
 
 
Table 8. Social Globalization Components 
International voice traffic (Sum of landline and mobile telephone traffic in minutes per capita) 
Transfers (Sum of gross inflows and outflows of goods, services, income or financial items without a quid pro 
quo per capita) 
International tourism (Sum of arrivals and departures of international tourists as a % of the population) 
Migration (Number of foreign or foreign-born residents as a % of the population) 
Patent Applications (Patent applications by non-residents as a % of the population) 
International students (Sum of inbound and outbound tertiary students as a % of the population) 
High Technology Exports (Exports of products with a high R&D intensity as a % of total merchandise 
exports) 
Trade in Cultural Goods (Sum of exports and imports of cultural goods defined by UNESCO) 
Trademark Applications (% of applications for trademarks by non-residents as a share of total applications) 
Trade in Personal Services (Sum of exports and imports in personal services) 
McDonald’s Restaurants per Capita 
IKEA stores per capita 
Telephone subscriptions (landline and mobile telephone subscriptions as a % of the population) 
Freedom to Visit (% of states for which a state requires a visa from foreign visitors) 
International airports (Number of airports that offer 1 or more international flights, per capita) 
Television (% of households with a television) 
Internet Users (% of the population) 
Press Freedom (Numerical score evaluating press freedom) 
Internet Bandwidth (Total capacity of international internet bandwidth in bits per second per capita) 
Gender Parity (Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary education, including private schools) 
Expenditure on Education (Government expenditures on education per capita) 
Civil Freedom (Quantification of freedom of expression, belief, association, organization, rule of law, personal 
autonomy, and individual rights) 







There are no alternatives to the KOF measure of social globalization currently available. Due 
to this fact, the KOF measure of social globalization was selected as the dependent variable for the 
social globalization model.41 
 
Independent Variables 
My main independent variable of interest is veto players. In the literature there are two ways 
that veto players are typically operationalized (Tsebelis 2002). First, as a count of the effective veto 
players, and second, as the ideological range between the veto players. Each of these were briefly 
noted in the previous chapter. But my prior discussion did not focus on the statistical problems that 
each operationalization faces. These are critical, as the severity of these problems provides a guide as 
to which is more appropriate for my analyses. Operationalizing veto players as a count, while 
suggested by George Tsebelis, can in certain specified circumstances, incorrectly estimate the size of 
the veto player problem. For example, in the case of Germany, the Social Democrats and Greens 
have very similar positions on a range of issues. While the Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats diverge significantly. Ideally, a veto players measure should capture this difference 
between the two governing coalitions. But, according to the count operationalization, a Social 
Democratic/Green coalition and a Social Democratic/Christian Democrat coalition would both 
have a count of 2, omitting the substantial variation between cases. In my data, cases such as this are 
rather common. This is problematic, as it introduces measurement error into my statistical models. 
Specifically, these types of cases cause problems for coefficient estimation (Salkind 2010). With veto 
 
41 Other variables, while including components that are considered social globalization (AT Kearney 2002; 2003) cannot 





players being the main independent variable of interest, this is especially problematic, as it may bias 
my results. Because of this, the count variable is employed only as a robustness check. 
Instead, following Tsebelis (2002), I operationalization veto players as an ideological range. 
To calculate this range, I employ the same procedure as previous work (Castles and Mair 1984; 
Laver and Hunt 1992, etc.). Each party is assigned a value on a 1-10 scale of economic liberalism. A 
value of 1 represents a political party that accepts state economic intervention, while a 10 represents 
a party that does not accept state intervention in the economy.42 These ideological scores are the 
current gold standard in the literature when comparing political parties within and across systems.43 
Using these values, an ideological range of the parties in government can be calculated. Subtracting 
the right most party’s score from the left most, results in an ideological range (right most – left most 
= range). The resulting number represents the size of the veto problem, as an ideological range. 
Larger values are associated with larger veto player problems and smaller values associated with the 
opposite (Tsebelis 2002). I argue that this operationalization of veto players is superior, statistically, 
to the count measure. When veto players are operationalized as an ideological range, the size of the 
veto player problem varies more. This allows for the comparison of situations where the count is 
identical, but the range is not. For example, in Finland in 2015 the count is 3, but the ideological 
range is 1.44. In such cases, the ideological range is a more accurate estimate of the size of the veto 
player problem than a count. Ideological range is therefore a more fine-grained measure and is more 
sensitive to the true size of the veto player problem. This helps to prevent measurement error. It is 
for this reason that ideological range has been selected over count. 
 
42 Essentially, parties vary on their attachment to the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith 1776). 
43 This continuum of intervention in the economy, while widely used, is not a perfect reflection of all types of political 
parties. It has difficulty accurately predicting the location of fringe parties on this continuum. For example, Hitler’s 1933 
Nazi cabinet is assigned the value of 8.7, despite favoring economic intervention against Jews (Halbrook 2009). 





The party scores (1-10) used to calculate the ideological range of the veto players is taken 
from the ParlGov Cabinet dataset.44 This dataset contains the needed liberalism scores for the 
OECD counties in my data.45 The scores assigned to each political party are an average computed 
from multiple sources (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Bakker et al. 2015). This forces 
the ParlGov data to hold each party’s score constant across time. This makes the measure less 
precise than other alternatives, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). But this sacrifice of 
precision is necessary, in the globalization context, as other ideological position data suffers from 
two critical problems. First, is the limited year coverage. No datasets, other than ParlGov, cover both 
the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015) (Garrett 1998). 
Extended year coverage is critical, as the pace of globalization is vastly different in both eras. 
Second, ParlGov allows for the inclusion of non-European cases. This is especially important, as 
these cases tend to be market liberal countries, which differ substantially from corporatist European 
cases (Katzenstein 1985; Hays 2009). To not include the bulk of market liberal countries is to 
systematically reduce the generalizability of my findings. Thus, I consciously sacrifice precision to 
include more years and cases in my data. While this is not ideal, it is necessary given previous work. 
For these reasons, the ParlGov Cabinet dataset was selected. The ParlGov Cabinet dataset is 
publicly available on the internet.46 
I also control for the bifurcated nature of globalization data. The era of globalizing markets 
(1970-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-Present) are systematically different (Garrett 1998). 
 
44 One issue with any data on cabinets is the issue of care-taker cabinets. The literature on this is sparse, but it does 
indicate generally caretaker cabinets are a continuation of the previous status quo (Herman and Pope 1973; Mcdonnell 
and Valbruzzi 2014). However, there is a tremendous amount of variation on the institutional rules that govern the 
transition period of governments (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009), and the informal restrictions that shore up the lack 
of formal rules can be bent in certain contexts (Hloušek and Kopeček 2014; Schleiter and Belu 2015). To deal with this 
in my data, I have elected to treat care-taker cabinets as a continuation of the previous partisan cabinets ideological 
scores.   
45 The full list of countries in my data is noted in the appendix. 




This shifting of eras in my data is significant, as it coincides with the end of the Cold War. The end 
of the bi-polar world order (Gilpin 1983) significantly affected all dimensions of globalization 
(political, economic, and social). Newly sovereign countries now had the ability to establish global 
political, economic, and social connections. This necessitates a control variable for years that are in 
the Cold War period/era of globalizing markets.47 However, to create this control variable, a 
specified end date for the Cold War must be selected. This work designates the Cold War period as 
1970 to 1989. I agree with the argument that 1989 was the ‘water shed’ moment when the Cold War 
ended (Risse-Kappen 1994). In my data, 1970 to 1989 are coded as 1, all other years are coded as 0. 
This Cold War indicator is included in all empirical analyses.  
Some evidence suggests that other systemic shocks post-1989 are important (Rosendorff and 
Sandler 2005). However, the summed residuals and residual variance ratios (Stimson 1985) for the 
political, economic, and social globalization data indicate that only two systemic shocks meet the 
threshold that merits a control. The first is a 1991 year specific effect found in the political 
globalization data and a 2002 year specific effect found in the economic globalization data. These 
two effects are driven by the reentry of Soviet satellites into the international system and the 
economic impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks respectively. Each of these variables will be 
discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters. Other events, such as the Asian Financial Crisis, 
the Great Recession, etc. do not, in my data, rise to the level that necessitates a control variable. For 
this reason, no other shocks to the international system are controlled for here. 
I also control for the major regional institution in my data; the European Union (EU).48 The 
majority of the countries in my data become members of the EU during the period analyzed (1970-
 
47 For simplicity, I refer to the era of globalizing markets as the Cold War period from here onward. 
48 GATT/WTO membership is not controlled for here, as all states in my data are members of either the GATT/WTO 
for the entire length of the time series (World Trade Organization 2019b; 2019a). This includes all former Soviet 




2015). According to the EU literature, members are systematically different from non-members on a 
variety of fronts (Hanson 1998; Young 2004; 2007). These membership benefits alter behavior 
(Checkel 2001; Inglehart 2006; Perkins and Neumayer 2007) and include economic and social 
effects. According to economic theory (Krugman 1991), the EU has the ability to promote and 
hinder economic globalization. Findings show that the EU has unevenly promoted economic 
globalization via neoliberal policies (Young 2004; 2007; Hermann 2007). For example, trade and 
capital mobility has liberalized among EU members. This uneven liberalization will impact economic 
globalization. This necessitates an EU control variable in the economic globalization model. EU 
membership also alters how its members construct social reality. The EU plays a key role in identity 
and norm formation (Checkel 2001; Inglehart 2006; Jenson 2007). In addition, the EU’s social trade 
patterns (Young 2004; 2007), may also systematically affect how ideas and norms flow within and 
outside the EU. These ideational, normative, and social trade effects are likely to impact how socially 
globalized EU members are. These findings merit an EU control in the social globalization model. 
Based on these arguments, it is necessary to control for EU membership in the economic and social 
globalization models.49 To control for EU membership, I created a membership indicator variable. 
This variable is coded 1 for each year a country is an EU member and a value of 0 otherwise. This 
variable was coded based on the membership entry dates from the EU’s website.50 
The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) literature, the globalization literature, and work on 
international cooperation indicate that international agreements may impact globalization’s 
dimensions (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2007; Ha 2008; Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017). 
 
1992e; Keesing 1992c). The only exception to this is Hungary, who ascended in 1973. However, statistical tests reveal 
that the years in question for Hungary are not statistically different from other years in the same panel. Thus, a 
GATT/WTO membership control variable is not needed in these data. 
49 I do not control for EU membership in the political globalization model. This is because to do so is likely to introduce 
multicollinearity into the political globalization model, as EU membership (specifically EU ascension treaties) would be 
on both sides of the regression equation. 




This is because agreements impact how countries cooperate and with whom (Koremenos 2001), as 
countries learn across agreements, via repeated interaction. However, disagreement surrounds which 
subset of agreements might affect globalizations dimensions. Some argue that trade agreements are a 
catalyst for later cooperation (Lupu 2015) and others security agreements. This is regardless of 
whether later cooperation is political, economic, or social. If either argument is correct, this will 
impact all dimensions of globalization. To control for both effects, two separate variables are 
needed.  
If a trade agreement makes later cooperation more likely, the increase/decrease of each 
dimension of globalization fluctuates based on cooperation trends. In this case, trade agreements 
will need to be controlled for in my models.51 To control for trade agreements, I created a number 
of trade agreements variable. To construct the number of trade agreements variable, the needed data 
is taken from the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset (Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). 
But, to simply include the number of trade agreements signed by each country per year in my 
models is problematic. An agreement does not immediately go into effect upon signature (Fearon 
1998). A signature signifies the end of the negotiation phase, not the beginning of the compliance 
phase (von Stein 2005). This necessitates that the number of trade agreements be lagged to reflect 
this time ordering. In the DESTA dataset, the average amount of time it takes for a trade agreement 
to enter into force is one year.52 Therefore, the number of trade agreements is lagged one year, to 
capture the average amount of time between signature and entry into force.53 This variable is coded 
 
51 Due to the nature of the KOF political globalization variable, any agreement centric control variables cannot be 
included for methodological reasons. Alternatives were considered, primarily the inclusion of the other dimension of 
globalization as independent variables. However, including these variables is also problematic for the same reason, as 
they are significantly correlated with each (.5) other at the .05 level. Thus, alternatives introduce the same statistical 
problem.  
52 This year long period is the average amount of time between the final signature of the needed state, which ends the 
negotiation phase (Fearon 1998), and the entry into force date, which begins the compliance phase (Von Stein 2005). 
53 The entry into force date was considered for use here. However, for some agreements, there is not an entry into force 
date for most signatories. The reason for this is unknown (United Nations 1971; The Montreal Protocol on Substances 




as the number for agreements signed by each country in a particular year (say three for example). 
For each panel, the first year (1970) is coded as missing. This variable is included in the economic 
and social empirical analyses. The DESTA data is publicly available on the internet.54 
If security agreements effect later cooperation (Davis and Pratt 2017), a similar type variable 
is needed for security agreements. This line of reasoning argues that security agreements effect later 
cooperation, which could alter the patterns of global connections, effecting all dimensions of 
globalization. This could cause some of the dimensions to increase/decrease more rapidly than 
others.  To control for this effect, a variable was constructed like the above variable, using instead 
the number of security agreements signed each year. The data to construct this variable is drawn 
from the Continent of International Law (COIL) dataset (Koremenos 2013).55 Unfortunately, 
security agreements are much rarer than trade agreements, and fewer instances occur from 1970 to 
2015. However, there is still significant variation in the data, which allowed for a control to be 
created. And, given previous arguments, it is essential to control for the effect security agreements 
on globalization’s dimensions. This variable is coded the same as the previous variable. The number 
of security agreements is lagged by the average amount of time it takes for an agreement to enter 
into force (again one year). With 1970 coded as missing in each panel. This control is included in the 
economic and social globalization models. 
Previous work on globalization, beginning with Peter Katzenstein’s work (1985), note the 
role of corporatism. Corporatism has a significant impact on how countries behave when 
 
found in the signature date. To not introduce any unpredictable variation into the data, the use of the entry into force 
date was not used here. Further research is warranted to delve into this inconsistency regarding the entry into force date. 
However, the need to control for the time ordering of agreement negotiation was paramount, as the effect of an 
agreement cannot be felt until the agreement enters the compliance phase (Von Stein 2005). To do this, the length of 
time between the signature date and the estimated entry into force date from both the DESTA and the COIL datasets 
used (Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014; Koremenos 2013). This same coding procedure is applied to both the lagged number 
of trade and security agreements variables. 
54 https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/downloads/  




globalization increases. It is argued that corporatist countries are more able to respond, and 
therefore counter, the negative effects of increasing globalization (such as job loss in inefficient 
sectors of the economy). This is due to an electoral alliance among Leftist political parties and 
organized labor, often referred to as embedded liberalism (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). Additionally, it 
is argued that corporatist countries tend to be more globalized because of this electoral alliance. 
However, who is considered corporatist is disputed. Some claim one list (Katzenstein 1985), while 
others a different one (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). Typically, a union density variable is employed to 
draw an arbitrary line between corporatist and not (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1998; Garrett 1998; Hays 
2009). As this work is on the relationship between globalization and veto players, I am less 
concerned with the contextual differences between the shades of corporatism. Instead, the approach 
taken here is to cast as wide of a net as possible, and code all disputed countries are corporatist. This 
is because the disputed countries are clearly not market liberal or incoherent. Thus, I have elected to 
employ an indicator variable instead. The following countries are considered corporatist in my data; 
Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland.56 Corporatist countries 
are coded as 1, other countries are coded 0. In all empirical investigations, the corporatist indicator 
variable is included.57 
I also control for incoherent countries. These countries exhibit both corporatist and market 
liberal tendencies (Garrett 1998), hence their name. These countries are slightly more globalized than 
market liberal countries, but not as globalized as corporatist. This is due to the compromise of 
embedded liberalism being supported, but not to the same degree as in corporatist countries. The 
 
56 There is some disagreement on who is considered corporatist. The agreed upon corporatist states include; Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The disputed ones include; Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland (Katzenstein 1985; 
Garrett 1998; Hays 2009).  
57 Another indicator variable for market liberal countries is also included in the dataset. The following states are 
considered market liberal states: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, and Ireland. The 
following states are considered incoherent states: France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, and Spain. All other states in the 




following countries are considered incoherent in my data; France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, 
and Spain.58 I employ an indicator variable for incoherent countries. Incoherent countries are coded 
as 1, all others are coded as 0. This variable is employed in all empirical analyses. A third type of 
country, market liberal, is left out as the referent category. This is due to previous work that shows 
they are the least globalized (Hays 2009).  
A lagged political/economic/social globalization variable is also employed in the appropriate 
model of the same name. This lagged globalization variable is coded the same as the dependent 
variable (0-100), except that the first value of each panel (1970) is coded as missing. This variable is 
lagged by one year. Therefore, I control for the previous year’s value in the current year. Thus, in the 
political globalization model, the political globalization value in 1970 is controlled for in 1971, etc. 
This lagged globalization variable is included to help deal with autocorrelation present in the data 
(Stimson 1985; N. Beck and Katz 1995). This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. A 
lagged political/economic/social globalization variable is included in all empirical models.59 
Each of the dependent and independent variables discussed above are summarized in Table 
9, below. This table contains summary statistics on all variables common across the three 
dimensions of globalization. Other variables, specific to certain dimensions of globalization, are 







58 Some scholars refer to a subset of these countries as statist (Katzenstein 1985 is an example). 
59 Except for the rate of change model in the economic globalization chapter, as tests reveal autocorrelation is not 






Table 9. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Minimum Maximum 
Political 
Globalization 
79.9825 14.42538 208.0915 25.22975 99.54428 
Economic 
Globalization 
63.49044 15.26204 232.9298 24.04153 93.58852 
Social 
Globalization 
70.52212 12.54093 157.2748 34.94569 90.73035 
Ideological Range 1.783273 1.783266 3.180038 0 7.5 
Cold War .4347826 .4958782 .2458952 0 1 
European Union 
Membership 
.3979469 .4896222 .2397299 0 1 
Lagged # of Trade 
Agreements 
1.423457 2.681291 7.18932 0 31 
Lagged # of 
Security 
Agreements 
.0922559 .3408023 .1161462 0 4 
Corporatism .1944444 .395892 .1567304 0 1 
Incoherent .1672705 .37333 .1393753 0 1 
Lagged Political 
Globalization 
79.76918 14.45947 209.0763 25.22975 99.54428 
Lagged Economic 
Globalization 
63.22061 15.27933 233.458 24.04153 93.58852 
Lagged Social 
Globalization 





To analyze my data, a TSCS estimator is need. According to the literature there are three 
options for such data; Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), 
and OLS w/Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) (N. Beck and Katz 1995).60 Each option 
 
60 In the appendix I include PCSE, FGLS, and OLS models that employ the KOF aggregate globalization variable as a 
dependent variable. These models are for reference only and should be interpreted with great care. As to compare across 




presents its own unique challenges. Each are discussed in turn below. I argue here that PCSE is the 
most appropriate given the weaknesses of the other estimators. 
When beginning a statistical odyssey, the first stop is typically OLS. It allows for simple 
testing of various problems in the data (heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, etc.) and is a critical first 
stop for this reason (R. Anderson 2008). However, OLS is not appropriate here for two reasons, 
both of which are common in TSCS data; heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. First, TSCS data is 
plagued by heteroscedasticity. This is due to the units (N) in the data being of different sizes. This 
introduces heteroscedasticity into the OLS model, which biases the estimator, by violating the 
assumption of constant error variance (Kaufman 2013). This renders the OLS results problematic, 
as the resulting standard errors are biased (Stimson 1985; N. Beck and Katz 1995). A full battery of 
tests confirm that heteroscedasticity exists in my data.61 Thus, if OLS is employed, the standard 
errors will be biased. The second problem is autocorrelation. In TSCS data, each observation’s error 
term is correlated with the next (Stimson 1985; Berry 1993). This can cause problems for OLS, as it 
assumes no autocorrelation. When this assumption is violated, OLS is no longer the Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimate (BLUE). This again prevents accurate standard errors from being generated. The 
Wooldridge test, used to test for autocorrelation in TSCS data, confirms this. The test shows that 
the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected. Given the results of the 
 
61 In the Political Globalization model, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test reports a chi squared value of 524.39, 
with 7 degrees of freedom, and a p-value of 0.0000, the White test and the Cameron and Trivedi IM test reports similar 
results for the same model. Similar results for all tests are found for the economic globalization model and the social 




Wooldridge test, OLS is not appropriate (Wooldridge 2001; Drukker 2003).62 For both of these 
reasons (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation), OLS is not employed (N. Beck and Katz 1995).63 
A second possible estimator for TSCS data is FGLS.64 FGLS can be appropriate in some 
circumstances,65 particularly when heteroscedasticity is present. However, like OLS, FGLS also 
estimates biased standard errors. FGLS returns overly small standard errors, which can vary from 
50% to 300% smaller in some cases (N. Beck and Katz 1995). These biased standard errors cause 
FGLS to be prone to false positives. This makes FGLS a liberal estimator. Other possible 
estimators, even OLS, can be more conservative in some cases (N. Beck and Katz 1995). In fact, 
FGLS standard errors exhibit this very problem in my data. When compared to other estimators, 
FGLS standard errors vary significantly. This is found across all three models (political, economic, 
and social).66 This results in several variables becoming significant in the FGLS model, while they are 
not in other estimators. This is why the literature argues that FGLS is not an appropriate estimator 
for TSCS data, despite its ability to deal with heteroscedasticity (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 
2001).67 
 
62 The results of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data have an F value of 28.328, and a P value of 0.0000, 
which results in rejecting the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation in my data. 
63 However, the OLS model results are showcased in the appendix as a robustness check. These results are to be 
interpreted with caution, however. In addition to the facts noted above, the nature of my panels (unbalanced) also biases 
the OLS model results. 
64 Generalized Least Squares (GLS) is not discussed here, as it’s downfalls are clearly outlined in Nathaniel Beck and 
Jonathan Katz’s work (1995), as it’s assumptions are rarely met in applied research. 
65 Specifically, when the number of time points is greater than the number of units (T > N), as is the case here. 
However, the fact still remains that FGLS is an overly liberal estimator (N. Beck and Katz 1995). 
66 The FGLS political, economic, and social models are included in the appendix. 
67 The use of a fixed-effects model was considered here. However, initial tests (Stimson 1985) for country specific effects 
showed nothing of concern. Despite this, is best, I chose to test formally if fixed-effects was indeed appropriate. I 
performed the Hausman test for fixed-effects on each of the three globalization models (political, economic, and social). 
The Hausman test for fixed effects for the political globalization model reports a Chi Squared test, with 7 degrees of 
freedom = 27.24, and a P value of 0.0003. The economic globalization model reports a Chi Squared Test with 7 degrees 
of freedom = 26.98 with a P value of 0.0003. The social globalization model reports a Chi Squared test with 7 degrees of 
freedom = 46.61 and a P value of 0.0000. These results echo my initial test of the summed residuals and residual 
variance ratios compared to the mean of the dependent variable (2 times the dependent variable mean is problematic) 
(Stimson 1985). The results for all Hausman tests for fixed effects were not positive definite (which indicates that the 
assumptions of the test may not have been met, and therefore the results of the test are suspect). Taking both tests at 




A third possible estimator is PCSE regression. According to Monte Carlo Simulations, PCSE 
produces more accurate standard errors than OLS68 and FGLS. This makes the standard errors of 
PCSE the most accurate of the three TSCS data estimators. PCSE is even robust in the face of 
extreme heteroscedasticity, which is the main argument for the use of FGLS over PCSE. The one 
catch for PCSE is that autocorrelation is problematic. Autocorrelation, which is present in my data, 
will need to be dealt with prior to using this estimator. Beck and Katz (1995) recommend the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to deal with autocorrelation in PCSE models. Additionally, 
Beck and Katz also suggest that the model be specified to assume an autocorrelation factor of 1 
(AR1) process. When these two specifications are used, PCSE outperforms both OLS and FGLS. 
Evidence that supports the use of PCSE is found in my data. When a lagged dependent 
variable is included in the model the rho value decreases significantly (which is a crude indicator of 
autocorrelation). For example, in the political globalization model, the rho value is approximately .8, 
if no lagged political globalization variable is included. This high value indicates high autocorrelation, 
and is supported by the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2001; Drukker 2003). After the lagged political 
globalization variable is included, the rho value decreases to approximately .1. This result is common 
across all three globalization models. This sharp decrease indicates that the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable is necessary when estimating a PCSE model with my data. Therefore, the 
inclusion of these variables is necessary on statistical grounds. When PCSE is also specified 
assuming an AR1 process, autocorrelation is further dealt with. While not perfect, these model 
 
test is) (Bell and Jones 2015; N. Beck and Katz 2004; Clark and Linzer 2012). Random-effects models, which is 
estimated using Generalized Least Squares (GLS), has its own problems, as the assumptions of GLS are never met when 
using TSCS data (N. Beck and Katz 1995). Given the evidence of both tests there is, on statistical grounds, enough 
evidence to reject the use of a fixed-effects model.   




specifications shore up PCSE’s weakness to autocorrelation. When specified this way, PCSE is more 
effective than OLS and FGLS. (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). 
Therefore, PCSE is the most appropriate estimator for my data. It is not subject to the bias 
that afflicts its possible alternatives, leading to false positives. In addition, PCSE can be specified in a 
manner that makes it robust to autocorrelation. Using PCSE is common in the literature, as a 
majority of the authors who use TSCS data, be it in the globalization literature (Crepaz and Moser 
2004; Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; Ha 2008; Bergh and Nilsson 2010b) or in other 
literatures (Tsebelis and Chang 2004), employ PCSE. Therefore, I employ PCSE regression in all 
subsequent empirical investigations. All PCSE models will also be specified as recommended and 
include the relevant lagged dependent variable as an independent, while assuming an AR1 process. 
With these specifications, PCSE is the ideal choice of estimator (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 
2001; Stata 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
As of now, this work has introduced the concept of globalization and put forth a more 
complex definition of it. In addition, I argued that there is a need to disaggregate it into its three 
primary dimensions (political, economic, and social). I then argued that each dimension has a unique 
relationship with veto players. The current chapter has explored the data and methods needed to test 
my argument quantitatively.  
The first section of this chapter discussed my data. This chapter found that the KOF 
globalization index is the only dataset to contain composite measures of each dimension of 
globalization. Therefore, the KOF globalization index is the most appropriate operationalization of 




was the most appropriate operationalization of veto players. And, due to its expansive time series, 
ParlGov was the most appropriate source of the ideological position data needed to construct the 
ideological range of the veto players. In addition, a swath of other independent variables was taken 
from the literature, including; corporatism, incoherentism, and others.  
In the second section, the three statistical estimators that are commonly used to analyze 
TSCS data were discussed (OLS, FGLS, and PCSE). Of the three, PCSE is the best choice, as its 
standard errors are not biased and it can be specified to deal with autocorrelation (N. Beck and Katz 
1995; N. Beck 2001). This makes PCSE less prone to false positives and more robust than 
alternatives. For these reasons it was selected for use in later empirical analyses. 
The next chapter will begin to employ the theory, data, and methods already discussed to 
test for the three relationships outlined in the theory chapter. The data and methods discussed here 
will be employed to accomplish this. The first relationship to be explored will be veto players and 
political globalization. This chapter will specify a specific relationship between the ideological range 






Chapter 4: Political Globalization 
Previously, I argued that globalization is best described as multidimensional, in line with 
previous work (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). That being 
said, globalization is composed of three primary dimensions; political, economic, and social (Dreher 
2006a). As I argued in the Theory Chapter, each dimension has a unique relationship with veto 
players. In the Data and Methods Chapter, I discussed the data and statistical methods needed to 
test for these theorized relationships. The next step is to employ my theoretical argument, the data, 
and PCSE estimation to test my argument. I begin with political globalization, where my assumed 
relationship between veto players and political globalization is negative.  
In this chapter I review my theoretical argument about veto players and political 
globalization. Arguing that a negative relationship exists between veto players and political 
globalization. I then specify a hypothesis between ideological range and political globalization to 
express this relationship. I argue that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political 
globalization tends to decrease. Based on my empirical tests, I find that, as originally hypothesized, 
as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political globalization decreases.  
 
Political Globalization Revisited 
To reiterate, political globalization is defined as; the diffusion of government policy (Dreher 2006a, 
1092). As these policies diffuse, how politically globalized a country is increases. However, a 
successful instance of policy diffusion requires legislative action.69 When and how legislatures behave 
 
69 While executives are frequently involved in the legislative process in a variety of ways, from veto’s to conditional 
agenda setting, only a small subset of executives, under very specific circumstances, can initiate the legislative process. 




is conditional on the size of the veto player problem (Tsebelis 2002). For change to occur, the policy 
will need to overcome the status quo bias created by the veto players in the system. This can only 
occur when all veto players agree the policy is preferable to the status quo. When this is the case, the 
new policy is successfully implemented and becomes law. 
When discussing the effect veto players have on political globalization, it is entirely possible 
for diffusion to occur when policy is removed or added. For example, previous research indicates 
that aggregate globalization can cause both welfare policy retreat and expansion (Rodrik 1997; Rodrik 
1998; Garrett 1998; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002). In relation to political globalization, the 
direction is less important than the outcome. Thus, diffusion of political globalization is both 
positive and negative.70 When an existing policy is removed, and political globalization increases, this 
is negative diffusion. Positive diffusion is when a new policy increases political globalization. Both 
types of diffusion are subject to the impact of veto players. An example will be illustrative.  
A textbook case of negative policy diffusion is the decriminalization of cannabis.71 This 
example involves removing a policy to become more politically globalized.72 In 1968, the Dutch 
government formed the Baan Commission to reform its drug laws (Laker 2003). The commission’s 
goal was to identify problems with current laws and determine their effects on youth populations. In 
1972, the Baan Commission issued its report, recommending the decriminalization of cannabis, as 
criminalization facilitates other anti-social behavior in youths. The Baan report led to the reform of 
the Opium Act in 1976, which decriminalized cannabis. When the Opium Act was revised, the size 
 
70 This is not to be confused with the mechanisms of diffusion discussed previously (Elkins and Simmons 2005; 
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).  
71 The term cannabis is used here, as the more commonly employed term, ‘marijuana’ is a product of a xenophobic US 
government propaganda campaign against minorities (D. Graham 2001). 
72 To be clear, this is not a normative claim. Prior work on deviant globalization and morality policy shows that demand 
for illegal goods and services is constant (Meier 1999; Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011). And, attempts to ban 
these goods and services are generally ineffective (Gershuny 1979). Thus, rational governments should learn this over 




of the veto player problem was 4.35. This is almost two standard deviations above the mean (2.46) 
for the Netherlands.73 Despite the size of the veto player problem, the Netherlands still passed the 
revised Opium Act. The significant veto player problem is indicative of how strongly the 5 Dutch 
veto players agreed on reform. The revised Opium Act was clearly within the winset of the veto 
players. This marked the first instance of a new cannabis policy arising in the OECD.74 While the 
Dutch case is not an example of negative policy diffusion per se it does mark the origin point of a 
new policy position on cannabis. What happens after this case is a chain of incidents of negative 
policy diffusion, beginning with the United States in the late 1970’s.75 
By 1978, ten US states followed the Netherlands and reduced cannabis possession charges to 
civil violations (equivalent to a parking ticket) (Single 1989). In these cases, the logic is like the 
Dutch one, but veto players impact the process differently. In the US case, the veto problem proved 
to be too large to overcome nationally. Thus, the policy change was sub-national. This variation in 
the Dutch and US cases can be attributed to veto players, as the policy diffused where it was within 
the winset of the veto players. Thus, each policy outcome was dependent on the size of the veto 
player problem (Tsebelis 2002).  
For both cases, the primary institutional constraint was veto players. As the ideological range 
of the parties in government increased, so too did the status quo bias. As the status quo bias 
becomes increasingly severe, policy implementation also becomes increasingly difficult (but not 
impossible as the Dutch case shows). This resulted in lower levels of policy diffusion in both 
countries, which adversely affected political globalization. So, as the ideological range of the veto 
players increased, political globalization decreased. In the Dutch case, despite appearances, the size 
 
73 The standard deviation of ideological range of the veto players for the Netherlands is 1.05. 
74 Aside from the obvious diffusion of criminalization that predated this period of legalization. 




of the veto player problem was not problematic due to the policies location in the issue space. In the 
US case, the size of the federal veto player problem was problematic, which prevented a similar type 
reform. Thus, how politically globalized a country is, is a function of the size of the veto player 
problem. This leads to my hypothesis regarding veto players and political globalization; 
  Hypothesis: As the ideological range of the veto players increases, political globalization decreases. 
 
Data and Methods 
The dependent variable employed here is the Swiss Economic Institutes Globalization Index 
of political globalization (KOF in German). This variable is operationalized as a 1-100 score, with 1 
signifying low political globalization and 100 signifying high. The KOF political globalization index 
is a composite indicator of six variables that get at the political conditions that underlie a politically 













76 The components of the KOF political globalization index are not an exhaustive list, but rather the most 






Table 10. The Components of Political Globalization 
Embassies (Absolute number of embassies in a country) 
UN Peace Keeping Missions (Personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council Missions per capita) 
International Organizations (Number of International Organizations in which the country is a member) 
NGO’s (Number of internationally oriented Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) with members in that 
country) 
International Treaties (International treaties signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest 
legislative body for each country since 1945) 
Number of distinct bilateral investment treaty partners for a state 




This operationalization was selected as it is the only composite variable of political 
globalization that is available.77 Given the components in Table 1, noted above, this 
operationalization precludes the inclusion of two variables discussed previously, the number of trade 
and security agreements. To include either agreement controls (trade and/or security) would 
introduce multicollinearity into the model. Therefore, both agreement controls cannot be included 
in the political globalization model. However, the fact remains that the KOF index of political 
globalization is still the only option available.  
The main independent variable of interest is veto players. I operationalize veto players as the 
ideological range of the partisan veto players in government. Each veto player is assigned a value on 
a 1-10 scale of economic liberalism (Doring and Manow 2019). Ideological range is calculated by 
subtracting the right most number is subtracted from the left most (right most – left most = range). 
This range represents the size of the veto problem in that year. This operationalization is one of two 
proposed in the literature (Tsebelis 2002). The other operationalization is a count of the number of 
 




veto players. As previously discussed, the count measure of veto players is subject to increased 
measurement error via lack of precision. I employ it here as a robustness check. This is to ensure 
that variable selection does not drive the results of the political globalization model. Both variables 
are taken from the ParlGov cabinet dataset, which contains the necessary ideological position data 
(Doring and Manow 2019).  
While other sources of ideological position data are available, they suffer from data 
restrictions. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) excludes non-European market liberal cases 
(Bakker et al. 2015). This is problematic as it eliminates systematically different cases from the data. 
For the political dimension, this is especially relevant, as the different political realities may impact 
trends in political globalization. CHES also limits the length of the time series, as it excludes data 
prior to 1999. This is problematic as the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) has a vastly different 
slope than the era of global markets (1990-2015). With these different slopes being driven by 
political forces (Garrett 1998; Potrafke 2009), to focus on one time period reduces the 
generalizability of my results. The other alternative data source, the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(CMP), is not a measure of position, but of salience, and thus is not appropriate here (Franzmann 
and Kaiser 2006). 
However, the ParlGov data comes with drawbacks. Of primary concern is the lack of 
precision in assigning ideological position. To calculate the ideological position of a political party, 
the ParlGov data averages several ideological scores and assigns that value to a given party each year. 
This reduces precision year to year but enables a longer time series and more cases. Thus, the trade 
off in ideological position data is one between precision and cases. Given previous arguments, I 




cases and years. Further details regarding the ParlGov data are discussed in the Data and Methods 
chapter. 
The first control variable is a Cold War/era of globalizing markets indicator variable. This 
variable controls for the different trends in the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of 
global markets (1990-2015) (Garrett 1998). This difference is due to the exogenous shock of the end 
of the bi-polar world order. While not specific to political globalization, each time period has a 
distinct political flavor. This could foreseeably affect my results if not included. Therefore, I control 
for this effect. To do this, all era of globalizing markets years (1970-1989) are coded as 1, other years 
are coded 0.78  
The second control variable is an indicator for corporatism. Corporatism is a common 
control in the globalization literature, as corporatist countries tend to be more globalized than 
others. This is due to an electoral alliance that allows for continued aggregate globalization, when its 
negative effects (such as job loss) are mitigated with domestic policy (Garrett 1998). While this effect 
has not been explicitly linked to political globalization, it stands to reason that a similar effect could 
be at play. I assume that as the opponents of globalization are bought off via policy concessions, 
political globalization should increase. It is for this reason that corporatism is controlled for.79  To 
control for this effect, all corporatist countries are coded 1, all others 0. 
I also control for incoherent countries in the political globalization model. These countries 
exhibit similar traits as corporatist countries, but to a lesser degree (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). 
Incoherent countries exhibit a Left/labor alliance for example, but the alliance is weaker politically. 
Incoherent countries are likely to be slightly more politically globalized than market liberal countries, 
 
78 This variable and the logic behind it are discussed at greater length in the data and methods chapter. 
79 See the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of which countries are considered corporatist in my data, as 




but not as politically globalized as corporatist. This is due to less extensive policy concessions. To 
control for this systematic difference in my data, I employ an indicator variable for incoherent 
countries. All incoherent countries are coded as 1, others are coded 0.80 Market liberal countries 
therefore make up the referent category in my analysis. 
Exclusive to the political dimension of globalization, I also control for the systematic 
difference between major powers and other countries in my data. Previous work on policy diffusion 
argues that some actors policy choices are more high profile that others (c.f. Walker 1969; Boehmke 
and Skinner 2012). Thus, when the United States, for example, adopts a new policy, the information 
costs associated with learning about the policy are much lower than attempting to learn about a new 
policy in Estonia. This increased salience regarding policy choices can be generalized to any major 
powers, which make up a defined subset of the OECD. Extending this insight to political 
globalization, it is entirely possible for major power status to impact political globalization levels, 
which is an aggregate of multiple policy diffusion instances. To control for this, I employ the 
Correlates of War dataset on state system membership (2017). The COW data designates a country 
as a major power if it has significant material capabilities, economic influence, global interests, and 
other countries recognize it as a major power (Small and Singer 1969).81 If a country is a major 
power in a given year, they are coded as 1, a 0 otherwise. The following countries are considered 
major powers in my data: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Austria. 
 
80 See the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of this variable, including who is considered incoherent in my 
data. 
81 This criteria for delineating who has major power status is not perfect but provides general guidelines. The COW 
coding scheme becomes less useful post 1991. I employ it here as no measure currently available can better capture the 




Also exclusive to political globalization, I control for the year-specific effect of 1991. 
Statistical tests for unit (country) and temporal (year) specific effects in the political globalization 
data indicate that 1991 is problematic. The summed residuals and variance ratios exceed the 
recommended guidelines of two times larger than the mean of the dependent variable (Stimson 
1985).82 This indicates that a temporal effect exists in the political globalization data that is not found 
in other dimensional globalization data and merits a dimension specific control. This temporal effect 
is due to the (re)entry of many countries into the international system with the end of the Cold War. 
This variable controls for the effect of a sudden increase in the number of less politically globalized 
countries in my data. All these countries are significantly less politically globalized than other OECD 
countries (mean of 67.97 compared to 81.27).83 The district pattern in the data is further evidence 
that a 1991 year-specific control is necessary in the political globalization model. The following 
states (re)enter the international system in 1991; Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic.  The exact timeline for each countries reentry 
into the international system varies based on the definition of reentry one employs.84 Regardless of 
the definition, only the year 1991 is problematic in statistical tests. This indicates that all countries, 
despite varying official reentry dates, de facto reenter the international system in 1991. This year-
specific variable is coded 1 for 1991, and 0 for all other years. 
As suggested in the TSCS data literature (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001), I also 
include a lagged political globalization variable. This variable is operationalized the same as the 
dependent variable discussed above (1-100 score). However, the first year in each panel (1970) is 
 
82 This test is displayed in the Appendix. 
83 A means comparison test indicates that these two means are statistically different from each other. 
84 Looking at the primary source data, reentry could officially take place at a variety of points, including; the date of 
official independence, the date when the first independent elections are held, the date when the previous one-party 
government is removed from office, and other dates (Keesing 1990; 1992d; 1992c; 1992e; 1992a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b). 
Despite the possibility of differing reentry dates into the international system for the Eastern European countries, 




coded as missing, and the previous year’s value is included in the current year (1970 is controlled for 
in 1971, etc.). This variable is included to deal with the autocorrelation present in my data. The logic 
behind this variable is discussed in more detail in the Data and Methods Chapter.  
The dependent and independent variables discussed in the above paragraphs are summarized 
in Table 11. This table presents summary statistics for each variable in the political globalization 
model. Table 11 is showcased below.85 
 
 
Table 11. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Minimum Maximum 
Political 
Globalization 
79.9825 14.42538 208.0915 25.22975 99.54428 
Ideological Range 1.783273 1.783266 3.180038 0 7.5 
Veto Player Count 2.344238 1.367571 1.870251 1 9 
Cold War .4347826 .4958782 .2458952 0 1 
Corporatism .1944444 .395892 .1567304 0 1 
Incoherent .1672705 .37333 .1393753 0 1 
Major Power .0435744 .2041784 .0416888 0 1 
1991 Indicator .0217391 .1458746 .0212794 0 1 
Lagged Political 
Globalization 





85 Looking at Table 1, the dependent variable has a mean value of approximately 79.9, while the median is 83.9 (not 
reported in Table 1). This indicates that the distribution of the dependent variable is negatively skewed, with a skewness 
value of approximately -0.83. However, this problem is likely due to the countries in the data, which are OECD member 
states, who tend to be more globalized on average. In addition, the interpretation of this skewness value is problematic, 
as a zero value may indicate the data approximates the normal distribution, or it may be indicative of nothing (N. J. Cox 
2010). Unfortunately, given the nature of data collection, it is often easier to gather information on more developed 
states. Given this fact, any scholarly project using this globalization measure is likely to experience this same problem. 




To test my hypothesis outlined above, I employ PCSE regression as my chosen estimator. 
While other estimators were entertained, the literature is clear that these alternatives are inferior to 
PCSE. This is due to alternative estimators resulting in biased standard errors (N. Beck and Katz 
1995; N. Beck 2001).86 The PCSE model employed here is also specified as suggested in the 
literature, employing a lagged political globalization variable. This variable is discussed above, as well 
as in the previous chapter. In addition, the PCSE model is specified to assume an autoregressive 
factor of one (AR1) process. When a PCSE model is specified in this manner, it reports the most 
accurate standard errors. The PCSE regression model is showcased below in Equation 1.87 Equation 
1 includes all variables discussed above.   
 
 
Equation 1. Political Globalization Model 
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚3 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡4 + 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟5





The primary fear of scholars using quantitative methods is the robustness of their findings. 
To ensure that my findings are robust, I employ to both operationalizations commonly used in veto 
player scholarship; ideological range and a count of the veto players. I estimate two PCSE models 
using both ideological range and count.88 However, I primarily discuss the ideological range model as 
 
86 A more detailed discussion as to why this is the case is taken up in the Data and Methods Chapter. 
87 For a detailed discussion of the procedure used to calculate the PCSE’s, I highly recommend Beck and Katz’s work 
(1995), as well as work by the Stata Corporation (2012). 
88 Findings that are robust to various model specifications are also preferable. I showcase FGLS and OLS models in the 




it is less afflicted with measurement error.89 To reiterate, my hypothesis is that; as the ideological 
range of the veto players increases, political globalization should decrease. This is caused by the 
inability of a country to pass policy that would result in more political globalization when faced with 





















89 See the Data and Methods Chapter for a more detailed discussion of this topic. 
90 It is worth noting that the R squared value for both PCSE models is very high. This is indicative of autocorrelation in 
the model, and has been dealt with as fully as possible (N. Beck and Katz 1995). In addition, two variables are left out of 
this model for specific reasons. First, I do not control for regime type in the political globalization models, as the mean 
Polity score for the OECD countries in my data is 8.27. This indicates that regime type is not an overly large concern for 
these data (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2018). Second, there is no Gross Domestic Product (GDP) control as such a 






Table 12. Political Globalization Model Results 
Variable PCSE w/ Ideological Range PCSE w/ Count 
Political Globalization   
Ideological Range -0.088* 
(0.04) 
 
Count  -0.069 
(0.04) 




























R Squared 0.972 0.973 
N91 1246.0 1292.0 




According to Table 12, veto players are significant and negatively related to political 
globalization. This result confirms my argument and hypothesis. As the ideological range of the veto 
players increases, political globalization decreases, holding all other variables constant. This 
relationship is significant at the .05 level (this relationship is not significant in the count model). This 
 
91 Due to the lack of ideological position data on the US, and conversion between DW nominate (J. B. Lewis et al. 2019) 




result showcases that as the veto player problem becomes larger, political globalization policy is less 
likely to diffuse. The example discussed above, regarding cannabis decriminalization, is illustrative of 
the relationship found in Table 3. In the US case, a veto player problem prevented national 
decriminalization of cannabis in the 1970’s. In the case of the Netherlands, the opposite occurred. 
The Baan Commission report set the agenda, facilitating the passage of the Opium Act of 1976 
(Single 1989; Laker 2003). This allowed for decriminalization to occur. Thus, political globalization 
increased in the Netherlands, while it remained constant in the US. 
To explore the relationship between veto players and political globalization graphically, 
Figure 3 is presented. Figure 3 graphs the fitted values of political globalization against the 
ideological range of the veto players.92 This graph shows the same negative relationship between the 
ideological range of the veto players and political globalization found in Table 12. As the ideological 
range of the veto players increases from 0 to 7, the fitted values for the political globalization 
equation decrease. This shows that, as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political 
globalization tends to decrease. This, like the above model results, supports my hypothesis. Figure 3 






















The other variables in the models all performed as expected. First, the Cold War/era of 
globalizing markets variable shows that political globalization is lower during the Cold War. This 
relationship is significant at the .001 level. This result comports with previous arguments made by 
Geoffrey Garrett (1998). It also shows that political globalization, like aggregate globalization, can be 
bifurcated into two distinct periods; the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global 
markets (1990-2015). After 1989, political globalization increased much more rapidly, as there were 
many new countries in the international system.  
Corporatism is also significant in the model. This shows that corporatist countries are more 




This finding verifies previous research that corporatist countries are more globalized (Katzenstein 
1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). This result also shows that previous arguments about corporatist 
can be extended down to the political dimension of globalization as well.  
Incoherent countries are also significantly more politically globalized than market liberal 
countries. This relationship is significant at the .01 level, and of the predicted sign. This supports 
arguments in the literature that incoherent countries are systematically different from both 
corporatist and market liberal countries. This finding is also important, in that it establishes the 
effect of incoherentism is generalizable to the political dimension of globalization. This comports 
with previous work (Garrett 1998), and showcases its continued relevance to political globalization. 
Also significant in the political globalization model is the major power variable. This 
relationship is significant at the .001 level (in both models). This result is consistent with previous 
work on policy diffusion (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Boehmke and Skinner 2012). This indicates 
that powerful countries are often focal points for diffusion, whether it is positive or negative. Thus, 
political globalization increases when a country obtains major power status.   
The last variable in the political globalization model is the 1991 year-specific indicator. This 
variable is also significant and of the predicted sign. The 1991 variable indicates that political 
globalization increased more in 1991 than in other years. This year specific effect is likely caused by 
the (re)entry of many countries into the international system. Thus, a set of countries were able to 
politically globalize for the first time in decades. This year specific effect showcases that political 
globalization is systematically different from aggregate globalization, as no 1991 specific effect is 
found in previous work. 
The lagged political globalization variable is also significant. Thus, the previous year’s value 




Thus, including this variable is essential (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). For comparison, 
when this variable is not included in the PCSE ideological range model the rho value is .835. This 
indicates high autocorrelation in the model. When this variable is included in the model, the rho 
value decreases to a modest 0.18. The same result in found in the PCSE count model. This indicates 
that this variable is extremely successful in mitigating the effect of autocorrelation. 
Given the results of Table 12, veto players play a critical role in how politically globalized a 
country is. As the ideological range of the veto players increases, a country cannot become politically 
globalized as easily. This finding shows that previous work on globalization (Crepaz 2001a; Crepaz 
and Moser 2004; Ha 2008) was correct in concluding that veto players do significantly impact 
globalization. I extend previous arguments by concluding that this relationship also applies to the 
political dimension of globalization. The performance of the other variables in the model also 
indicates that previous work on globalization was largely correct, as my findings corroborate 
previous work (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). In addition, the performance of the 
1991 variable also indicates that political globalization has unique qualities that merit its separation 
from aggregate globalization. This lends credibility to the arguments regarding the disaggregation of 
globalization (Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
Given my findings, it is possible to draw expectations of how politically globalized certain 
countries are. On average, corporatist country with a narrow ideological range are the most 
politically globalized in my data. By contrast, market liberal countries with a large ideological range 
are the least politically globalized. And lastly, a market liberal country with a single veto player is 




with a narrow average ideological range (.7). in 1970, Sweden had a political globalization value of 
85.7. In 2015, Sweden achieved one of the highest values of political globalization in my data 
(97.16). Ireland, a market liberal country with a large mean ideological range (2.28) achieved a 
political globalization value of 56.72 in 1970. By 2015, Ireland had only increased to 76.27, placing it 
amongst the least politically globalized countries in my data. Canada, a single veto player (ideological 
range of 0 and count of 1), market liberal country, should be moderately politically globalized. This 
is indeed the case, as Canada is moderately politically globalized in 1970 with a value of 72.06. In 
2015, Canada achieved a value of 93.52. While Canada was able to close the gap between Sweden at 
the end of my data, its political globalization value still falls within the predictions of my model. 
Thus, Sweden is always more politically globalized than Canada, who is always more politically 
globalized than Ireland. 
As of now, I have established that globalization is composed of three primary dimensions 
(political, economic, and social). I have also argued that each dimension has a unique relationship 
with veto players. The data and statistical method needed to test for these relationships has also 
been explored. This current chapter adds to this discussion, by explicitly hypothesizing a relationship 
between veto players and political globalization. I found that as the size of the veto player problem 
increases, political globalization decreases. This is because the policies of political globalization 
cannot diffuse as easily when a veto player problem is present. 
The next chapter will explore the relationship between veto players and economic 
globalization. I build upon previous chapters by employing the theoretical and statistical logic 
already outlined. I argue that a unique relationship between veto players and economic globalization 




Chapter 5: Economic Globalization 
Thus far, I have followed previous scholars (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; 
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) in arguing that globalization is multidimensional. Specifically, it is 
composed of three dimensions; political, economic, and social (Dreher 2006a). I have also posited a 
unique relationship between each dimension and veto players. Then, I reviewed the data and 
methods needed to test these relationships in the Data and Methods Chapter. In the Political 
Globalization Chapter, the first of these relationships was explored and tested. I found that as the 
ideological range of the veto players increases, political globalization tends to decrease. 
This chapter continues testing the overall theoretical argument laid out in Chapter 2. Here I 
focus on the economic dimension of globalization. In this chapter, I argue that economic 
globalization is not hindered by the increased ideological range of veto players. But it is affected by 
the presence of a liberal executive. I test this relationship empirically and confirm my predictions. 
There is no relationship between veto players and economic globalization. The presence of a liberal 
executive, however, is significant. 
 
Economic Globalization Revisited 
Economic globalization is defined as, “…long distance flows of goods, capital and services 
as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges…” (Dreher 2006a, 1092). 
I argue that veto players do not affect the continued increase of economic globalization. To 
understand my argument, it is critical to understand the compromise of embedded liberalism. The 
first half of the compromise consists of efforts to liberalize economic exchange globally (Ruggie 




coordinate. This usually occurs through international institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and has been relatively successful (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Pelc 
2013). The second half of the compromise of embedded liberalism requires domestic economic 
intervention. This allows governments to respond to the negative effects of liberal markets, such as 
job loss. Corporatist countries in Europe are the best example of domestic intervention, as they 
often ease the pains of liberal market efficiency (Hays 2009).  The twin goals of domestic economic 
intervention and multilateral liberal efforts make up the ‘compromise’ of embedded liberalism.  
However, voter preferences for embedded liberalism and those of veto players differ. Voters 
have simplistic views of globalization (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2004; 2005), while veto players do 
not. This is due to economic performance being tied to electoral fates (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 
1992). This incentivizes veto players to understand economic globalization, while voters have no 
such incentive.93 This results in informational asymmetry, as veto players are more willing to pay the 
associated costs than voters. This allows veto players to fool voters, by labeling policy ‘free trade’ 
which is viewed positively, instead of ‘globalization’ which is not (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005). By 
exploiting this informational asymmetry, veto players can continue economic globalization by 
invoking certain rhetoric (Kono 2006). Thus, veto players are freed from electoral constraints 
(Mansfield and Milner 2012), which significantly alters their behavior (Rothenberg and Sanders 
2000). They can then pursue economic globalization at will. Thus, the ideological range of the veto 
players will not matter, as all strategic actors will desire continued economic globalization to ensure 
reelection. This results in my first hypothesis; 
Hypothesis #1: The ideological range of the veto players has no effect on economic globalization. 
 
93 There is mixed evidence that income level may impact voter preferences (Ehrlich 2010). However, this finding is very 




Depending on the institutional structure, another actor may desire increased economic 
globalization; the chief executive. Given that economic globalization is, “driven by a set of discrete 
but intersecting logics…which operates simultaneously across several institutional domains” (Held 
1997, 263–64) such an effect is likely. Given that US executives are delegated economic authority 
(Haggard and McCubbins 2001) and similar delegation is found elsewhere (Huber 1992; Borghetto 
2018), executives have the ability to singlehandedly impact economic globalization. However, the 
exact nature of the effect will depend on the ideology of the executive. 
I focus on liberalism, as it is central in previous globalization scholarship (Ruggie 1982; 
Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009), as embracing liberalism often predisposes an actor to 
increase globalization. I argue a similar effect can be found in when an executive embraces 
liberalism. A  liberal executive can ensure continued economic globalization by pursuing liberal 
policy internationally, and he is generally successful (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Pelc 2013). 
This ensures a status quo of continued economic globalization, as economic performance is also 
linked to executive electoral fate (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 2000; Heckelman 2001). This allows 
economic globalization to increase, and certainly does not cause it to decrease.94 So, the rate of 
change in economic globalization increases when a due to the status quo bias generated by the 
liberal chief executive is in office. Given this, the presence of a liberal executive will affect the 
growth rate of economic globalization positively. This leads to my second hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between liberal executives and economic globalization; 
Hypothesis #2: A liberal executive causes economic globalization to increase at a faster rate 
 
 
94 The major exception here is protectionist policy that is justified on moral grounds (Meier 1999). This includes deviant 
goods such as illegal drugs (Seddon 2008), and deviant services such as prostitution (Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 
2011). However, these policies tend to be highly ineffective (Gershuny 1979). Some antidotal evidence does suggest that 




Data and Methods 
The dataset employed here is the same one discussed in previous chapters. This dataset is a 
TSCS dataset of OECD members from 1970 to 2015, excluding Chile, Mexico, and South Korea.95 
The unit of analysis employed here is a country/year dyad (France in 1970 for example).96 For a 
more detailed discussion of my data, please refer to the Data and Methods Chapter.  
 The first dependent variable in my analysis is the KOF economic globalization index. 
This variable is a 1-100 scale of how economically globalized a country is each year. For example, 
Canada had a score of 53.3 in 1970 and a score of 58.3 in 1980. The KOF economic globalization 
index is composed of 14 indicators of economic globalization.97 These indicators are summarized in 












95 These countries are excluded due to the lack of veto player data. The US is only included in count models, as no 
compatible ideological range data exists, and conversion has proved impossible (J. B. Lewis et al. 2019). 
96 Other units of analysis are not possible due to data restrictions. 
97 A subset of these economic globalization indicators are sometimes referred to as ‘financial globalization’ (Tobin 2000; 
Stulz 2005; Schmukler and Vesperoni 2006; Azzimonti, Francisco, and Quadrini 2014). The KOF data has a variable of 
this type of globalization, but as this project is focused on the three theoretically agreed upon dimensions of 
globalization (Keohane 2002; Dreher 2006a), the measure of economic globalization (which includes all financial 






Table 13. Components of Economic Globalization 
Trade in Goods (Sum of exports and imports in goods as a share of GDP) 
Trade in Services (Sum of exports and imports in services as share of GDP) 
Trade partner diversification (Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index) 
Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Foreign Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) 
International Debt (% of GDP) 
International Reserves (% of GDP) 
International income payments (% of GDP) 
Trade Regulations (Average of prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers and compliance costs of importing and 
exporting) 
Trade Taxes (income from taxes on international trade as % of revenue) 
Tariffs (Unweighted mean of tariff rates) 
Prevalence of foreign ownership and regulations to international capital flows 
Chinn-Ito index of financial openness 
Jahan-Wang index of openness of the capital account 




The indicators in Table 13 are oft employed. Two examples include trade in goods/services 
(c.f. Garrett 1998; Ha 2008; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) 98 and capital account openness (c.f. 
Hays 2009). By aggregating these variables together appropriately via factor analysis (Lockwood 
2001; T. M. Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Vujakovic 2009), the KOF economic 
globalization index better reflects previous work on globalizations multidimensionality (Eichengreen 
and Leblang 2008). This is why the KOF economic globalization index is viewed as the gold 
 
98 It is important to keep in mind, that the two variables, trade in goods and trade in services, are equivalent to trade 
openness. Both indicators are constructed as trade over Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and when added together, 










𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 . This is because the denominator, GDP, is common across both fractions and one simply adds 




standard (Dreher et al. 2010; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). For this reason and others discussed in 
the Data and Methods Chapter, it is employed here. 
The second dependent variable in my analysis is the lagged rate of change in economic 
globalization. This variable is coded as the current year’s KOF economic globalization value minus 
the previous year’s value (t2 - t1 = rate of change). This results in the rate of change from year to 
year, for each country in my data. The first value of each country’s panel is treated as missing (1970), 
as no rate can be calculated for that year. This variable is calculated using the KOF economic 
globalization index.  
The first independent variable of interest is the ideological range of the veto players. This 
variable is operationalized as suggested by Tsebelis (2002). Each party in government is assigned an 
ideological score. I then subtract the ideological scores of the parties from each other to create an 
ideological range (right most – left most = range). The resulting number represents the size of the 
veto player problem that year. The alternative operationalization of veto players, a count of the 
number of parties in government, is employed as a robustness check.  
I use the ParlGov dataset to obtain the needed ideological position data for each political 
party (Doring and Manow 2019). While alternative data sources are available, these data would limit 
my data to European countries after 1999 (Bakker et al. 2015). This excludes the bulk of market 
liberal countries, which are different from corporatist European cases (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 
1998; Hays 2009). In addition, this is problematic, as the pace of economic globalization differs 
between the era of globalizing markets (1960-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015) 
(Garrett 1998). Thus, despite possible alternatives, it is essential to employ ParlGov over alternative 
data sources. This is particularly relevant to the rate of change economic globalization models, as to 




The second independent variable, and an economic globalization specific one, is the 
presence of a liberal executive. In OECD democracies the executive retains some influence over 
economic policy, due to the incentive to delegate (Huber 1992; Borghetto 2018; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999) and informational asymmetry in foreign affairs. This provides defined institutional 
advantage to executives whose liberal ideology mandates increased economic intervention. To 
capture the presence of a liberal executive, I employ the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
economic orientation variable (T. Beck et al. 2000). This variable provides information on the party 
of the executive, and if they embrace economic liberalism each year. The parties that are considered 
liberal are as follows; communist, socialist, social democratic, and left-wing parties.99 If the party of 
the executive is liberal in that year, it is coded as 1, a 0 otherwise. This captures the effect of a liberal 
executive. 
Another variable included in the economic globalization models is an era of globalizing 
markets indicator. This controls for the different growth rates found in the era of globalizing 
markets (1960-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015) respectively (Garrett 1998). With the 
growth rate of the era of global markets being much larger. This systematic difference between the 
two periods is driven by an explosion of market activity after 1989.100 To control for this difference, 
I have constructed an indicator variable. All era of globalizing market years in my data (1970-1989) 
are coded 1, all other years are coded 0.  
 
99 At first glance, the inclusion of communist parties seems incorrect. However, due to the influence of institutional and 
electoral inceptives, it is within reason to argue that most communist parties moderated to ensure electoral viability 
(Sitter 2002; Sokhey and Yildirim 2013; Berman 2008; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004). 
100 To justify the inclusion of this control variable commonly employed in the literature, a comparison of means test was 
conducted to ensure that the Cold War period and the Post-Cold War period were in fact statistically different from each 
other. The mean amount of economic globalization in the Cold War period is 54.5, while the mean value of the post-
Cold War period is 69.3. According to the statistical test, reported in the appendix, this difference between the two 




I also control for European Union (EU) membership. Looking at the countries in my data, a 
subset joins the EU over time. In addition, EU membership has specified economic effects on its 
members. EU membership prevents protectionism and result in more open economies (Hanson 
1998; Hermann 2007; Young 2004; 2007).101 To control for this effect on economic globalization, an 
EU membership indicator variable was constructed using the dates of entry from the EU’s 
website.102 This variable is coded 1 for all years that a country is a member, a 0 otherwise.  
According to the literature (Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017), cooperation has the ability to 
effect a variety of outcomes. Countries learn across cooperative agreements (Koremenos 2001; 
Cottrell 2017), which reduces uncertainty (Koremenos 2016). However, which type of cooperation 
this effect originates from (security and/or economic) is disputed. There are two causal arguments in 
this regard. First, that economic cooperation reduces the costs of later cooperation (Lupu 2015). 
This effect could impact how economic globalization changes over time, by increasing it post 
cooperation. To control for this effect, I control for the number of trade agreements signed each 
year. To construct this variable, I use the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset (Dur, 
Baccini, and Elsig 2014). Second, others claim that security cooperation has a similar effect (Davis 
and Pratt 2017) which would also increase economic globalization. To control for this effect, I 
control for the number of security agreements signed in a given year.103 This data is drawn from the 
Continent of International Law (COIL) dataset (Koremenos 2013).  
Regardless of issue area, international agreements are subject to a time ordering problem. It 
takes time for an agreement to enter into force (Fearon 1998; Von Stein 2005). To solve this time 
 
101 This effect is uneven however, as social trade policy (welfare) (Young 2004; 2007) is unaffected. 
102 The membership entry dates can be found at the following link; https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries_en#tab-0-1  
103 Unlike economic agreements, security agreements are rather rare. Thus, there are less instances of security 




ordering problem, the average time between the signature date and the entry into force date was 
calculated for each dataset. Then both variables were lagged by that amount of time. For both 
datasets (DESTA and COIL), this was one year (Koremenos 2013; Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). 
Both variables are lagged by this interval to solve this time ordering problem.104 Thus, the number of 
trade or security agreements signed in 1971 is controlled for in 1970, etc. 
I control for corporatism, as it is consistently employed in the literature (Katzenstein 1985; 
Garrett 1998; Hays 2009 are just a few examples). These countries tend to be more globalized than 
others, and it stands to reason that this effect may also apply to the economic dimension. 
Corporatism strengthens the compromise of embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982; 2003; Abdelal and 
Ruggie 2009), enabling more open markets. To control for this effect, I employ an indicator variable 
for corporatism. Corporatist countries are coded as 1, all others 0.105 
Next I control for incoherent countries. These countries typically exhibit a moderate amount 
of globalization, being more globalized than market liberal countries (my referent category). 
Incoherent countries thus represent the compromise of embedded liberalism, but to a lesser degree 
(Garrett 1998; Hays 2009).106 It stands to reason that this logic may be generalizable to the economic 
dimension of globalization. If so, this effect will need to be controlled for in the economic 
globalization model. To control for this difference, an indicator variable was created. Incoherent 
countries are coded 1, a 0 otherwise.  
 
104 The entry into force date was considered for use here. However, upon closer inspection, many of the entry into force 
dates reported in both data sets were subject to variation. This variation is not reported in the dataset. Certain signatories 
were already bound by the treaty, while others were not. The exact reason that these dates vary is unknown. This 
inconsistency is not found in the signature date, where a state party either signs or does not. I therefore approximate the 
entry into force date, by averaging the interval between the signature date and the entry into force date across the entire 
dataset. Further research is warranted to delve into this inconsistency regarding the entry into force date.  
105 Who exactly is considered corporatist is disputed. See the Data and Methods chapter for a more detailed discussion. 
106 One group here that is noted in the literature is statist countries, with state-run economies. Examples often include 
France and Japan. However, as this group is often dubbed incoherent, as they are not truly corporatist and not truly 
market liberal, I treat these states as incoherent. This is due to the distinctiveness of statist countries has been less 




According to Rosendorff and Sandler (2005), the global economy suffered a shock caused by 
the September 11th terrorist attacks. This resulted in a worldwide economic downturn. This shock 
poses a problem for economic globalization. Statistical tests for temporal (year) specific effects 
reveal that the summed residuals and variance ratios are above the threshold that is acceptable (two 
times the mean of the dependent variable) in 2002. Thus, 2002 is markedly different from other 
years in my data (Stimson 1985).107 Intuitively, this makes sense, as the 9/11 attacks occurred late in 
2001, and their impact would not become apparent until 2002 when new economic data was 
published.108 Given the statistical test, a temporal effect exists in the economic globalization data that 
is not found in other dimensions of globalization and merits a dimension specific control. Thus, the 
9/11 attacks significantly impacted economic globalization. To control for this effect, a year specific 
indicator variable was created. The year 2002, is coded 1, all other years are coded 0.  
Specific to economic globalization, I also control for ‘peak oil’ (Curtis 2009). It is argued that 
oil prices and economic globalization co-vary, with oil acting as a cap on economic globalization. 
This dependency is referred to as peak oil. There is some evidence of this, as the price of oil has 
increased alongside economic globalization for a significant portion of my data. Therefore, I control 
for this possible effect on economic globalization. I include the average price of bent crude per year 
to operationalize this effect. This variable is coded as a US dollar value (for example $37.89 in 1980). 
The data used to construct this variable is taken from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
International Financial Statistics database, found on the IMF’s website.109 Due to data limitations, 
the average price of crude oil is only available from 1980 onwards (International Monetary Fund 
2019). All years prior to 1980 are coded as missing values. 
 
107 The test that is referred to is showcased in the Appendix.  
108 This particular example again showcases why annual measurement of data can be problematic (Stimson 1985), but as 
already discussed, the data is not available in any other format (quarterly, monthly, weekly, etc.) 




Lastly, I include a lagged economic globalization variable. This variable is included to deal 
with autocorrelation in my data (N. Beck and Katz 1995).110 This variable is coded the same as the 
dependent variable, a 1-100 score of economic globalization in that year. However, the first year of 
each countries panel coded as missing (1970) and that year’s value is controlled for in the subsequent 
year (1970 is controlled for in 1971, etc.).  
All variables discussed above are summarized below in Table 14. This table displays 
summary statistics for all variables included in the economic globalization models. 
 
 
Table 14. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Minimum Maximum 
Economic Globalization 63.49044 15.26204 232.9298 24.04153 93.58852 
Ideological Range 1.783273 1.783266 3.180038 0 7.5 
Liberal Executive .1827031 .3864953 .1493786 0 1 
Cold War .4347826 .4958782 .2458952 0 1 
EU Membership .3979469 .4896222 .2397299 0 1 
Lag of the # of Trade 
Agreements 
1.423457 2.681291 7.18932 0 31 
Lag of the # of Security 
Agreements 
.0922559 .3408023 .1161462 0 4 
Corporatism .1944444 .395892 .1567304 0 1 
Incoherent .1672705 .37333 .1393753 0 1 
2002 Indicator Variable .0217391 .1458746 .0212794 0 1 
Average Price of Crude 41.74562 30.72082 943.7688 12.71917 111.9596 
Lagged Economic 
Globalization 
63.22061 15.27933 233.458 24.04153 93.58852 
Lagged Econ Globalization 
Rate 









I employ PCSE regression as my chosen estimator. Other alternative estimators are inferior 
to PCSE due to producing biased standard errors (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). The 
PCSE model is specified as suggested. I include a lagged economic globalization variable (discussed 
above). In addition, the model is specified to assume an autoregressive factor of one process (AR1) 
is present in the data. When the PCSE estimator is specified in this manner, it reports the most 
accurate standard errors. The PCSE regression model equations are showcased below in Equation 2 
and 3.111 Equation 2 includes all variables in models 1 and 2. Equation 3 includes all variables in 
models 3 and 4.   
 
 
Equation 2. Economic Globalization Model 1 and 2 
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟2 + 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝3 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠4
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠5 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚6 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡7 + 2002 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟8




Equation 3. Economic Globalization Model 3 and 4 
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟3 + 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝4
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠5 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠6 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚7





111 See the Data and Methods Chapter for a more detailed discussion of PCSE. For a detailed discussion of the 






This section will discuss the results of the PCSE estimator. I estimate four models. The first 
two models include economic globalization and both operationalizations of veto players (ideological 
range and count). These models test my first hypothesis regarding the effect of veto players on 
economic globalization. Models 3 and 4 use a rate of change economic globalization dependent 
variable and both veto player measures (ideological range and count respectively). Models 3 and 4 
test my second hypothesis about the effect of a liberal executive on economic globalization’s rate of 
change. I will discuss all models, but primarily focus on the ideological range model(s), as this 
operationalization of veto players is more appropriate, due to decreased measurement error. To 
reiterate, my hypotheses are; that veto players have no effect on economic globalization, and that a 
liberal executive increases economic globalization. The results of the economic globalization models 



















Table 15. Economic Globalization Model Results (1-4) 
Variable Model 1: 
Range 







  Rate of Change  
































































































R Squared .981 .981 .117 .118 
N 1053.0 1090.0 971 1008 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 






Looking at Table 15, the ideological range (and count) of the veto players is not related to 
economic globalization. This relationship is not significant at any level. Thus, my hypothesis 
regarding veto players can be tentatively retained. The size of the veto player problem appears to 
have no effect on economic globalization. This result is robust across both operationalizations of 
economic globalization and veto players. This relationship can also be explored graphically. The 
fitted values of economic globalization are plotted against the ideological range of the veto players. 
This is presented below in Figure 4. 
 
 





Looking at Figure 4, it is apparent that there is no systematic relationship between the 




and wide confidence intervals are indicative of this. The implications of this are quite important. 
This is contrary to previous work that shows economic globalization is related to political 
phenomena (Crepaz 2001a; Crepaz and Moser 2004; Ha 2008). However, I contend that this 
findings is consistent with embedded liberalism (c.f. Hays 2009).  
I argue that previous work that found a relationship between veto players (a political 
variable) and economic globalization is the poster child for why globalization should be treated as a 
complex and multidimensional concept. The reason my findings are so different from previous is 
because past work is, in the words of Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang, “…a figment of the 
particular aspect of globalization on which the investigators focus…” (Eichengreen and Leblang 
2008, 319) and are attributable to the uni-dimensional globalization framework these authors 
employed. If past work had employed a multidimensional globalization framework, their results would 
have likely been more in line with my own. As they would have employed an entirely different 
operationalization of globalization (political globalization) in their models, which would have been 
more closely related to their political dependent variable (welfare). 
Additionally, if embedded liberalism is to be believed (Ruggie 1982; Abdelal and Ruggie 
2009), the fact that veto players and economic globalization are not related to each other is not 
surprising. If liberalism is truly embedded, then it can be argued that all veto players in systems 
where liberalism is embedded, share a common preference; liberal economic policy. When this 
shared preference is combined with the delegation of economic policy authority in most systems 
(Huber 1992; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Borghetto 2018), veto players are unlikely to affect 
economic globalization. This is because they strategically delegated authority over it to another 




resources. Thus, veto players do not affect economic globalization. This finding will be expanded 
upon in the next section. 
The second variable in the model is the presence of a liberal executive. According to Model 
3, this result is statistically significant and of the predicted sign. Given this result, a liberal executive 
has a significant impact, by increasing the rate of change in economic globalization. With a liberal 
executive in power, economic globalization will continue to increase at a much faster rate than when 
a non-liberal is in power. This appears to indicate that economic globalization is a plank of a liberal 
agenda. This contextualizes previous arguments (Hays 2009 for example). And outlines predictions 
of when protectionist policy should result (when the executive is illiberal). 
The next variable in the model is the Cold War variable. This relationship is significant at the 
.1 level, which is weaker than expected, but still of the predicted sign (negative).This finding is 
consistent with previous work (Garrett 1998), and is evidence that there is a difference between the 
Cold War/era of globalizing markets and later years for economic globalization. The weakness of 
this finding, however, is striking. This lends credibility to my argument that separating globalization 
into its dimensions is extremely important.   
The third variable in the model is the EU membership variable. This variable is a significant 
predictor of economic globalization in both models and of the predicted sign. This result is 
consistent with previous work on the EU (Hanson 1998; Hermann 2007; Young 2004; 2007). When 
a country joins the EU, many domestic controls over economic policy are removed, allowing 
economic globalization to increase. This explains why EU members tend to be more economically 
globalized than non-members. 
The fourth variable in the model is the lagged number of trade agreements signed each year. 




evidence in my models to support of this. The trade agreements variable is not significant and any 
level. Thus, the signing of a trade agreement by a country has no effect on how economically 
globalized it is. This is even when the effect is lagged to correct for the time ordering problem 
(Fearon 1998; von Stein 2005). This is consistent with my theory, in that institutions do not impact 
economic globalization. However, it also indicates that some actions favored by liberals may be 
ineffective. 
The fifth variable in the model is the lagged number of security agreements a country signed. 
Like the trade agreements variable, it is also not statistically significant. Security cooperation, despite 
contrary arguments (Davis and Pratt 2017) does not result in a country becoming more economically 
globalized. The performance of this variable shows that economic globalization is not increased by a 
security treaty providing less uncertainty. This finding indicates that economic globalization is not 
affected by one form of power politics.  
The next variable included in the economic globalization model is corporatism. Despite 
claims to its relevance in previous work (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009), corporatism is 
not significant in model 1 and 2, even at the .1 level. In model 3 and 4, it performs the opposite of 
expectations, and decreases the rate of change to economic globalization. This is a rather large pill to 
swallow, but, given the argument here, it is quite logical. With liberalism’s high popularity (Ruggie 
2003; Ehrlich and Hearn 2014), the appeal of liberalism is constant, regardless of corporatist 
structure. What corporatism does allow for is the adjustment to the implications of economic 
globalization, it does not affect the phenomena itself. This finding regarding economic globalization 
fits with opinion research on globalization (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005; Ehrlich 2010; Ehrlich and 
Hearn 2014). Thus, strategic politicians select the policy label that suits their own needs (free trade 




others, is they pass policy to quiet discontent after becoming economically globalized, others do not. 
This fits with scholarship on globalizations effect on the welfare state (Crepaz 2001b; Crepaz and 
Moser 2004; Ha 2008), where the implication is welfare effects after globalization occurs. 
The next variable in the model is an indicator variable for incoherentism. Much like the 
corporatist variable, it is also not significant. Thus, incoherent countries are no more economically 
globalized than market liberal ones. With incoherent countries having some corporatist tendencies, 
this is further evidence that corporatism, and varying shades of it, do not affect economic 
globalization. This is likely due to  informational asymmetry and the power of the electoral incentive, 
which forces democratic politicians to relentlessly pursue economic globalization, regardless of 
domestic preferences (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Kono 2006).  
The next variable included in the economic globalization model is an indicator for the 2002 
year-specific effect. This variable is significant at the .05 level, and of the predicted sign. According 
to the results, 2002 is on average less economically globalized than other years. Thus, the 9/11 
attacks had a significant negative impact on economic globalization. This dimension specific 
indicator also showcases that economic globalization is systematically different from the other 
dimensions. As no other dimension of globalization has a 2002 year-specific effect. 
Also included in the economic globalization model is the price of crude oil. The argument 
that ‘peak oil’ and globalization covary (Curtis 2009), is marginally supported here. The price of 
crude is significant at the .1 level, and of the predicted sign. However, substantively, the effect is 
small. As crude oil price increases, economic globalization decreases only slightly. Thus, 
substantively, I argue that this effect is not as significant as previous authors claim. This indicates 





The last variable in model 1 and 2 is the lagged economic globalization variable.112 This 
variable was included for statistical reasons (N. Beck and Katz 1995), and performs as expected. It 
combats the autocorrelation present in the model, as its inclusion decreases the rho value of both 
models.113 When this variable is included, the rho value decreases from .848 to .0189 (in the 
ideological range model) with higher values indicative of autocorrelation.114   
Given these results, the ideological range of the veto players does not affect economic 
globalization. I contend that this result can be explained by the widespread acceptance of liberalism 
by most of the veto players in democratic systems. This, combined with the electoral returns that 
liberalism provides, seem to explain why veto players do not play their usual role of slowing change. 
The presence of a liberal executive, however, affects the rate of change in economic globalization. 
The presence of a liberal executive causes the pace of economic globalization to become more 
furious, as a liberal ideology instructs the executive to push for more economic globalization. Given 
the preponderance of power over economic affairs due to delegation (Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999), a liberal executive having such an impact makes sense intuitively. 
 
Conclusion 
My findings suggest that, on average, a country with both EU membership and a liberal 
executive would be the most economically globalized. A country with only EU membership, will be 
the second most economically globalized. And, a country with only a liberal executive would be the 
third most economically globalized. Lastly, a country without EU membership or a liberal executive 
 
112 The inclusion of a similar variable in model 3 and 4 has no effect on the level of autocorrelation. This result is 
corroborated by the Wooldridge test and a less formal rho comparison. 
113 For a more detailed discussion of this, please refer to the Data and Methods Chapter. 




will be the least economically globalized. This is exactly what my data shows. Looking at 2015, 
Austria, a country with both EU membership and a liberal executive has an economic globalization 
value of 81.36. Germany, an EU member without a liberal executive in 2015, has a value of 77.06. 
The US, a country with only a liberal executive in 2015, has an economic globalization value of 
63.83. And Australia, a country without EU membership or a liberal executive in 2015, has a value 
of 63.53. Thus, the results of my economic globalization models can improve our understanding of 
why certain countries exhibit certain amounts of economic globalization. 
As of now, I have discussed why globalization must be disaggregated into its three primary 
dimensions (political, economic, and social). I also sketched a theoretical relationship between veto 
players and each dimension. In the Data and Methods chapter, I discussed the data and estimator 
most appropriate to test for these theorized relationships. In the Political Globalization chapter, I 
examined the first of these arguments. I found that as the veto player problem increases, political 
globalization decreases. This result confirmed the first of my three theorized relationships. The 
current chapter focuses on the second dimension of globalization; economic globalization. 
In this chapter, I hypothesized two relationships, first that veto players and economic 
globalization are not related and second that a liberal executive increases the rate of change for 
economic globalization. Empirical tests reveal that these relationships are as expected; veto players 
do not impact economic globalization and a liberal executive increases the rate at which economic 
globalization increases. Also, EU membership is of critical import. When a country is a member of 
the EU their economic globalization value increases when compared to non-members. Additionally, 
corporatism does not behave as expected in several of my models, in fact returning the opposite of 




economic globalization is a critical dimension of globalization and that to examine it separately is 
critical. 
The next chapter will discuss the social dimension of globalization. Much like this and the 
previous chapter, I will test the relationship between veto players and social globalization, in addition 
to the normative role played by liberal executives. To do this, I employ the data and methods 
discussed in the Data and Methods Chapter. The social globalization chapter yields fascinating 






Chapter 6: Social Globalization 
Previously, I defined globalization and its dimensions (political, economic, and social). I 
argued that each dimension has a different relationship with legislative veto players. I also argued 
that the KOF globalization data and PCSE regression should be employed to test my argument. I 
found, in the Political Globalization chapter, that veto players have a negative relationship with 
political globalization. In the Economic Globalization chapter, I found that veto players and 
economic globalization are not related, but the presence of a liberal executive is critical. This leaves 
one final dimension of globalization to be examined; social globalization. 
This chapter will analyze the relationship between veto players and social globalization. First, 
I will briefly summarize by argument regarding how veto players impact social globalization. Then, I 
will articulate my hypotheses regarding veto players and social globalization. Then, I will test these 
hypotheses empirically, using the data and estimator discussed in the Data and Methods chapter. 
Lastly, the results of the empirical investigation will be discussed in relation to my hypotheses. 
 
Social Globalization Revisited 
Social globalization is the, “…spread of ideas, people and images…” (Dreher 2006a, 1092). 
As new ideas, people, and images interact, new norms emerge that ascribe meaning (Ruggie 1998). 
These norms define the bounds of actors understanding (Ring 2014) and constitute social reality. 
The resulting norms are maintained by collective agreement (Adler 1997), with a variety of actors 
having a stake in the survival of certain norms. For example, the norm embedded liberalism (Ruggie 
1982; Abdelal and Ruggie 2009) has defined stake holders in the form of elected officials who 




normative stake holders are veto players. Thus, a veto player may prefer the continuation of certain 
norms (liberalism) and the erosion of others (protectionism). This is to ensure their preferred 
outcome (economic growth) is achieved via normatively acceptable means (liberalism). Thus, veto 
players seek to modify social reality to fit their own needs/understanding and influence how a given 
norm develops or is modified. 
However, the ideological range of the veto players is critical. According to Veto Player 
Theory, as the distance between veto players increases, status quo bias also increases. This makes 
veto players less able to act on a variety of levels (Hallerberg 2002; Witold J. Henisz and Mansfield 
2006; Tsebelis 2002). Assuming this inaction extends into the ideational realm, this has profound 
implications for social globalization. First, when veto players are distant, they are unable to promote 
the spread of norms they agree with. This would for example, prevent the maintenance of 
embedded liberalism. Second, as veto players become more distant, they are unable to prevent the 
spread of norms they find disagreeable. When hamstrung by a veto player problem, a government 
cannot intervene to derail norms, such as protectionism, which actively hurt veto players. Thus, the 
spread of ideas and norms, a critical component of social globalization, is likely to be influenced by a 
veto player problem. As the ideological range of the veto players increases, social globalization is 
likely to benefit from less interference. This is due to the lack of a highly influential normative agent. 
Thus, as social globalization increases, the ideological range of the veto players is likely to increase, 
and certainly won’t decrease. This is restated formally as hypothesis one below. 
Hypothesis #1: as the ideological range of the veto players increases, so does social globalization   
However, social globalization does not operate in a vacuum. It is, “driven by a set of discrete 
but intersecting logics…which operates simultaneously across several institutional domains” (Held 




institutional actor is precluded from interfering in normative space.115 However, certain actors are 
likely to have a pronounced effect, due to their privileged institutional position. Of specific interest 
to social globalization is the impact of the executive. Previous work points to the significance of 
executive agenda controls (Tsebelis and Aleman 2005; Tsebelis and Rizova 2007) and normative 
influence (Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008). I argue that executive normative agenda controls 
influence social globalization. These agenda controls allow executives to begin a discussion about 
social globalization and (in some systems) effect how it evolves over time. This is likely to influence 
how social globalization evolves across time and space.116 
Executive agenda controls come in two types; either informal or formal agenda powers. 
Informal powers, such as going public (Kernell 2006) are available to all executives, providing a 
potent tool to influence the agenda. By going public, the executive injects his policy position into the 
normative discussion, which influences how the normative debate over social globalization evolves 
over time. Previous work on going public supports this claim (D. Lewis 1997; Edwards and Wood 
1999; Welch 2003; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008).117 Executives imbued with formal agenda 
powers have greater agenda control. These formal powers give executives the ability to influence the 
normative discussion as it develops over time. For example, an executive can reframe the discussion 
by using an amendatory positive agenda power (Tsebelis and Aleman 2005). This influences the 
evolution of social globalization over time, by reframing the discussion during the debate. This 
provides defined formal institutional leverage over social globalization. When both informal and 
 
115 Other dimensions, such as political globalization, are more isolated from the interference of other actors than social 
globalization. 
116 This line of reasoning is similar to the ones used by Tsebelis regarding the veto players concept (2002) 
117 The effectiveness of going public does however vary based on issue area. I argue that social globalization issues are 




formal powers are present, executives can both set the normative agenda initially and actively 
influence a debate while still ongoing. 
How these informal and formal agenda controls are used to effect social globalization 
depends. I ague the ideology of the executive dictates if they impact social globalization positively or 
negatively. I focus on one ideology, as it is of special interest in the social globalization context; 
liberalism. Liberalism, loosely defined, is a cluster of ideologies that tend to be pro-market and/or 
pro-free trade. Liberalism is central to previous globalization scholarship (Ruggie 1982; Katzenstein 
1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009), as those who embrace it often want to increase aggregate 
globalization. I argue a similar effect can be found in the social dimension, stemming from a liberal 
executive. 
Liberal executives tend to view social globalization as normatively ‘good.’ They seek to 
promote it, by injecting norms into the ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Ballentine and Snyder 1996). They 
also believe that this behavior is necessary, due to competition ensuring the ‘best’ idea prevails. 
Thus, the way in which liberal executives impact social globalization is predictable given their 
ideology. A liberal executive will attempt to increase social globalization, as this behavior is constructed 
as both good and necessary. Thus, liberal executives will use their normative agenda powers to set an 
agenda favorable to social globalization in the marketplace of ideas. Additionally, liberal executives 
will (in some cases) influence the evolution of social globalization via formal agenda controls. 
Together, these will cause an increase in normative activity, by igniting discussion. This discussion 
will result in increased social globalization. Thus, a liberal executive should result in a noticeable 
increase in social globalization. This is stated formally in hypothesis two; 





Data and Methods 
The dependent variable for the social globalization model is the KOF social globalization 
index. This variable is constructed as a 1-100 index, with 1 indicating low social globalization, and 
100 indicating high. This variable is currently the only composite measure of social globalization.118 
This composite index is composed of 22 variables (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). These 



























Table 16. The Components of Social Globalization 
International voice traffic (Sum of landline and mobile telephone traffic in minutes per capita) 
Transfers (Sum of gross inflows and outflows of goods, services, income or financial items without a quid pro 
quo per capita) 
International tourism (Sum of arrivals and departures of international tourists as a % of the population) 
Migration (Number of foreign or foreign-born residents as a % of the population) 
Patent Applications (Patent applications by non-residents as a % of the population) 
International students (Sum of inbound and outbound tertiary students as a % of the population) 
High Technology Exports (Exports of products with a high R&D intensity as a % of total merchandise 
exports) 
Trade in Cultural Goods (Sum of exports and imports of cultural goods defined by UNESCO) 
Trademark Applications (% of applications for trademarks by non-residents as a share of total applications) 
Trade in Personal Services (Sum of exports and imports in personal services) 
McDonald’s Restaurants per Capita 
IKEA stores per capita 
Telephone subscriptions (landline and mobile telephone subscriptions as a % of the population) 
Freedom to Visit (% of states for which a state requires a visa from foreign visitors) 
International airports (Number of airports that offer 1 or more international flights, per capita) 
Television (% of households with a television) 
Internet Users (% of the population) 
Press Freedom (Numerical score evaluating press freedom) 
Internet Bandwidth (Total capacity of international internet bandwidth in bits per second per capita) 
Gender Parity (Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary education, including private schools) 
Expenditure on Education (Government expenditures on education per capita) 
Civil Freedom (Quantification of freedom of expression, belief, association, organization, rule of law, personal 
autonomy, and individual rights) 




The first independent variable of interest is veto players. This variable is operationalized as 
the ideological range of the parties in government. Each party is assigned a value between 1 and 10 
on a scale of liberalism (Doring and Manow 2019). Then, the right most party’s value is subtracted 
from the left most (right most – left most = ideological range). This range proxies for the size of the 




alternative operationalization of veto players, a count, is used as a robustness check. This is to 
ensure my results are not driven by variable selection. 
The data used to construct this variable is taken from the ParlGov cabinet dataset. This 
dataset contains the needed ideological position/count data (Doring and Manow 2019). However, 
the ParlGov data averages these scores from several sources to extend the time series. While this is a 
weakness, I have chosen to forgo accuracy here to allow for the inclusion of more cases and years. 
Alternative data sources exclude non-European market liberal cases and only contain data from one 
period of globalization (1990-2015) (Bakker et al. 2015; “The Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems” 2020). This excludes systematically different cases (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009) and years. 
These factors could significantly bias my results. Thus, the ParlGov data was selected to be used 
here. 
The second independent variable of interest is the presence of a liberal executive. A liberal 
executive impacts the evolution of the norms that compose social globalization. Via agenda setting 
powers, liberal executives cause increased normative competition and increase social globalization. 
This normative influence is critical and should result in increased social globalization (regardless of 
executive stance on the norm). To operationalize the presence of a liberal executive, I employ the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) economic orientation variable (T. Beck et al. 2000). This 
variable indicates if the party of the executive embrace’s liberalism each year. The parties that are 
considered liberal are as follows; communist, socialist, social democratic, and left-wing parties.119 If 
the party of the executive is liberal each year, it is coded as 1, a 0 otherwise.  
 
119 At first glance, the inclusion of communist parties seems incorrect. However, due to the influence of institutional and 
electoral incentives, it is within reason to argue that most communist parties moderated to ensure electoral viability 




I also include an era of globalizing markets variable. Prior work on globalization has 
identified the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015) as 
substantially different (Garrett 1998). Each era’s slope is markedly different, with the era of 
globalizing markets having a much shallower slope. Controlling for this difference is of paramount 
importance, as global norms were no longer restrained by the iron curtain. To control for the effect 
of the era of globalizing markets on social globalization, I created an indicator variable using 1989 as 
the cutoff point. Thus, 1970 to 1989 are coded as 1, all other years are coded 0.  
Most OECD member states in my data are members of the European Union (EU). The 
literature indicates that EU membership may affect how individuals interact with ideas (Checkel 
2001; Manners 2002). This is shaped through a variety of processes, but most obviously by the 
notion of ‘European citizenship’. Additional examples of EU membership social effects are found in 
social trade policy, such as labor and environmental standards (Young 2007). In these areas, EU 
members tend to be substantively different from non-members. Thus, EU membership will need to 
be controlled for. To control for EU membership, I created an indicator variable. If a country is a 
member of the EU in that year it is coded 1, otherwise 0.120  
In the literature, certain types of agreements facilitate later cooperation (Lupu 2015; Davis 
and Pratt 2017). This is due to cooperation becoming less costly in time B, due to cooperation in 
time A. For example, a trade agreement might lead to increased cultural penetration via trade in 
cultural goods. Or, a security agreement could facilitate the same process, as ideas are passed from 
one country to another during negotiation and compliance (Fearon 1998; von Stein 2005). The 
 
120 This variable was constructed using the membership entry dates on the EU’s website. See the Data and Methods 




literature is divided however, on which type of agreement, economic or security, causes the decrease 
in uncertainty. To be safe, I control for both effects. 
First, I control for the number of trade agreements signed by a country each year. The data 
used to construct this variable is drawn from the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset 
(Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). Second, I control for the number of security agreements signed by a 
country each year. This variable is drawn from the Continent of International Law (COIL) dataset 
(Koremenos 2013). This variable takes on the number of security agreements signed by a country 
per year. However, to simply include both variables is problematic. Agreements take time to enter 
into force (Fearon 1998). Therefore, I lag both variables by the average number of years it takes to 
enter into force (one year). This coding scheme corrects for a time ordering problem.121  
The longest standing variable in globalization research is corporatism (Katzenstein 1985). 
Corporatist countries tend to be more globalized than other countries (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). 
This is due to corporatist countries epitomizing the compromise of embedded liberalism (Ruggie 
1982; 2003; Abdelal and Ruggie 2009). This allows continued aggregate globalization, but the question 
remains if this also affects social globalization. Therefore, I control for this effect. I operationalize 
corporatism as an indicator variable. All corporatist countries are coded 1, others are coded 0.122 
I also control for incoherent countries as well. These countries exhibit imperfect corporatist 
tendencies (Garrett 1998), as the strength of the compromise of embedded liberalism is less. Thus, 
like corporatist countries, incoherent states tend to be slightly more globalized than other countries. 
 
121 The entry into force date was considered for use here. However, upon closer inspection, many of the entry into force 
dates reported in both data sets were subject to variation. This variation is not reported in the dataset. Certain signatories 
were already bound by the treaty, while others were not. The exact reason that these dates vary is unknown. This 
inconsistency is not found in the signature date, where a state party either signs or does not. I therefore approximate the 
entry into force date, by averaging the interval between the signature date and the entry into force date across the entire 
dataset. Further research is warranted to delve into this inconsistency regarding the entry into force date. 




To control for this possible effect, I employ an indicator variable for incoherent countries. I code all 
incoherent countries 1, 0 otherwise. Market liberal countries are therefore the referent category for 
the social globalization model.123   
Another control variable is the major power variable. Previous work has argued that the 
concept of hegemony (loosely defined) can extend to the normative realm (Manners 2002; Diez 
2005; 2013). This hegemonic influence would allow a major power, such as the United States, to 
have a disproportionate influence on how norms develop over time. This would in turn affect social 
globalization. To control for this effect, I employ the Correlates of War dataset on state system 
membership (2017). If a country is a major power each year, they are coded as 1, a 0 otherwise. The 
following countries are considered major powers in my data: United States, United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Austria. 
The final control in the social globalization model is the lagged social globalization variable. 
This variable is coded the same as the dependent variable (1-100 index). The only difference is that 
the first value of each panel (1970) is coded as missing. All subsequent values are the previous year’s 
value. I therefore control for 1970’s social globalization in 1971, etc. This variable is included to deal 
with the autocorrelation present in my data (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001).124  
The dependent and independent variables are summarized below in Table 17, below. This 






123 For a more detailed discussion of incoherent countries, please refer to chapter 3. 






Table 17. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Minimum Maximum 
Social Globalization 70.52212 12.54093 157.2748 34.94569 90.73035 
Ideological Range 1.783273 1.783266 3.180038 0 7.5 
Liberal Executive .1827031 .3864953 .1493786 0 1 
Cold War .4347826 .4958782 .2458952 0 1 
EU Membership .3979469 .4896222 .2397299 0 1 
Lag of the # of Trade 
Agreements 
1.423457 2.681291 7.18932 0 31 
Lag of the # of Security 
Agreements 
.0922559 .3408023 .1161462 0 4 
Corporatism .1944444 .395892 .1567304 0 1 
Incoherent .1672705 .37333 .1393753 0 1 
Major Power .0435744 .2041784 .0416888 0 1 
Lagged Social Globalization 
Variable 




I employ PCSE regression here, as it is the only model that reports unbiased standard errors. 
For example, comparable models standard errors tend to be 50% to 300% smaller (N. Beck and 
Katz 1995). To deal with any autocorrelation in the PCSE model, I employ the two suggested 
specifications in the TSCS literature. First, I include a lagged dependent variable (discussed above). 
Second, PCSE models should be specified to assume an autoregressive factor 1 process (AR1) is 
present in the data (Stata 2012). I employ both specifications in the social globalization model as 










Equation 4. Social Globalization Model 
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟2 + 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝3 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠4
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠5 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚6 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡7 + 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒8





The social globalization model tests my hypothesis noted previously, regarding the 
relationship between veto players and social globalization. To reiterate, I argue that as the ideological 
range of the veto players increases, so should social globalization. And, that the presence of a liberal 
executive should also increase social globalization. The model results are reported in Table 18, 
below. Table 18 showcases the PCSE model, using both operationalizations of veto players 

















Table 18. Social Globalization Model Results 
Variable PCSE w/ Ideological Range PCSE w/ Count 
Social Globalization   
Ideological Range .027+ 
(0.01) 
 
Count  .017 
(0.02) 








































R Squared125 0.989 0.989 
N 1077 1119126 




125 This high value is indicative of autocorrelation, which the Wooldridge test identified (Wooldridge 2001; Drukker 
2003). I have dealt with this problem as is common in the literature (N. Beck and Katz 1995).  
126 Differences in the N size are due to the lack of compatible ideological position data on the US case. Despite my best 




Looking at Table 18, ideological range is marginally significant at the .1 level. It also has the 
predicted sign (positive). This shows modest support for the hypothesized relationship between veto 
players and social globalization. These results suggest that norms spread faster without veto player 
interference. This relationship is likely driven by the underlying logic of veto player effects.  When 
the ideological range of the veto players increases, their ability to interfere in any policy area, 
including those in the idea phase, which are contained within the social globalization concept, is 
reduced. The relationship between veto players and social globalization can also be explored 
graphically. Figure 5 showcases a graphical representation of the relationship between ideological 
range and social globalization. This figure is presented below. 
 
 








Looking at Figure 5, a similar relationship as previously discussed is showcased. As the 
ideological range of the veto players increases, so does social globalization. In addition, this 
relationship holds at much the same power, until the ideological range of the veto players exceeds 4. 
Past this point, the confidence intervals begin to widen rapidly. The caveat regarding the relationship 
between veto players and social globalization, is that it is significant at the 90 percent level. This 
indicates that the relationship should not be discounted, but also must be interpreted with a grain of 
salt. Considering this finding in the context of my argument, the relationship between veto players 
and social globalization is weak but present.  
The presence of a liberal executive also effects social globalization. On average, as social 
globalization increases, the likelihood that the executive embraces liberalism increases. This 
relationship is marginally significant at the .1 level (it is insignificant in the count model). This shows 
modest support for the idea that an executive can influence norms and ideas. This is consistent with 
previous research (D. Lewis 1997; Welch 2003), however, it extends the argument to a broader set 
of social policies than previously. This relationship can also be explored graphically. Figure 6 
showcases the relationship between social globalization and the presence of a liberal executive. This 




















Looking at Figure 6, the relationship is indeed positive, as seen in Table 18. This indicates, 
again, modest support for hypothesis two. When a country transitions from an executive who does 
not embrace liberalism to one who does, there is a marginal increase in its social globalization. 
However, this finding should be interpreted with care. The exact details of how a liberal chief 
executive increases social globalization is something for future qualitative work to explore. 
The next variable in the model is the Cold War/era of globalizing markets indicator. This 
variable is highly significant, which is consistent with prior work by Geoffrey Garrett (1998). On 
average, Cold War years tend to be less socially globalized than post-Cold War years. This 




also be bifurcated into the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global markets 
(1990-2015). This indicates that ideas and images spread more rapidly after the end of the bi-polar 
world order. This lends credibility to the study of social globalization post-1990, as its relevance 
appears to have grown.  
The EU membership variable is also significant in the model. This relationship is significant 
at the .01 level. It is also of the predicted sign, in line with previous work (Young 2004; 2007). This 
indicates that the level of social globalization is affected by EU membership. This result supports the 
idea that EU members have been successful at isolating themselves from global social influences. 
This is consistent with the spirit of previous work (Checkel 2001), which argues that EU 
membership has influenced the spread of ideas. My findings contextualize this argument and show 
that EU membership decreases the spread of global ideas. This warrants further testing, as my 
findings are important to understanding social globalization in relation to the EU and other 
international institutions.  
Trade agreements also affect social globalization. This relationship is significant at the .1 
level (.05 in the count model). The direction of the relationship is also positive, indicating that 
previous work on international agreements affects social globalization (Lupu 2015). This showcases 
that economic cooperation does positively impact social globalization.127 When a trade agreement is 
signed, in the following year, a signatory country will see a small increase in its social globalization 
level. This effect is consistent across both models.  
 
127 This is especially important given the high correlation between social globalization and economic globalization (above 
.8). While the idea of controlling for economic globalization in the social globalization model was entertained, tests 
showed that this was inappropriate. To include economic globalization in the model increases the collinearity to 




A similar result is also found for security agreements. This relationship is significant at the .1 
level in the ideological range model (but not the count). It is also of the correct sign (positive) Thus, 
security cooperation affects how socially globalized a country is. When a country signs a security 
agreement, in the following year, it will experience an increase in its social globalization level. This is 
consistent with previous arguments (Davis and Pratt 2017). Taken together, these two findings 
indicate that various types of cooperation do affect social globalization. This does not rule out the 
possible effects that other types of cooperation (human rights, etc.) may have on social globalization.  
The next variable is corporatism. Regardless of model specification, corporatism is not a 
significant predictor of social globalization. This is contrary to prior work, which argues that 
corporatism is a significant predictor of aggregate globalization (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998; 
Hays 2009). I argue that previous work is not incorrect, but that their results were driven by 
measuring globalization as unidimensional instead of multidimensional as is recommended (Held 
and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002). This caused them to claim corporatist countries are more 
globalized, when this finding is driven by an underlying dimension of globalization. My finding 
regarding corporatism is consistent with recent work on globalization (Eichengreen and Leblang 
2008), that stresses multidimensionality. This finding showcases why the argument that globalization 
is multidimensional should be taken seriously in the literature. 
Incoherent countries, according to both models, are less socially globalized. This relationship 
is significant at the .05 level. It is however, of the opposite sign as conventional wisdom would 
indicate (negative). The literature would argue that this finding should be the positive (Garrett 1998; 
Hays 2009). An incoherent country should be more socially globalized than a market liberal country, 




implications. Further exploration of incoherent countries and their relationship to social 
globalization is warranted. 
As social globalization increases, the likelihood that a given country is a major power also 
increases. This relationship is significant at the .05 level (it is not significant in the count model). 
This result is consistent with previous work on normative hegemony (Manners 2002). This suggests 
that the major powers in the international systems are also powerful normative hegemons. As the 
relevance of social globalization is increasing over time, this is an interesting finding that merits 
further work. 
Lastly, the lagged social globalization variable is significant. This is to be expected based on 
previous work (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). Previous chapters have discussed this 
variable in more detail.128 However, the rho values of both models without this variable is 
instructive. When the lagged social globalization variable is excluded, the rho value is .9 (for both 
models). When this variable is included, this value drops to -.038 (in the ideological range model). 
This is indicative of how well this variable mitigates autocorrelation. 
 
Conclusion 
Two overarching points can be taken away from my empirical examination of social 
globalization. First, veto players attempt to influence social globalization, but are impeded by the 
presence of a veto player problem. Second, when the executive embraces liberalism, social 
globalization is furthered via the institutional powers of the office. Both findings paint a general 
picture of social globalization. 
 




Given that ideas and norms are fluid (Adler 1997) and ascribe meaning (Ruggie 1998), it is 
rational that veto players would seek to influence global social norms. However, one glaring problem 
hinders a veto player’s influence over social globalization; ideological distance. As the ideological 
distance between the veto players in government increases, it becomes more difficult to successfully 
intervene and trim the sails of social globalization. For example, a conservative veto player may 
desire to reduce spending on education, which would expose children to new global ideas. However, 
if another veto player is opposed to this idea, gridlock results. While the veto players engage in the 
politics of gridlock, no single normative view is espoused. However, this does not stop the forces of 
social globalization. In fact, this allows social globalization to flow more freely, unhindered by the 
normative dam that is a single veto player.  
When an executive embraces liberalism, they are ideologically directed to intervene in the 
marketplace of ideas, as it is normatively ‘good’ to do so. In addition, their liberal ideology informs 
them that social globalization is something to increase, as competition between ideas is perceived as 
beneficial. In this case, the liberal executive speeds up the flow of ideas that constitute social 
globalization. Thus, social globalization increases when a liberal executive is present.   
Considering my findings, it is also possible to predict how socially globalized certain 
countries are. A country with a larger ideological range should be more socially globalized than a 
country with a narrow ideological range. France and Portugal fit this expectation well. France has on 
average, a larger ideological range than Portugal (1.46 in France and .786 in Portugal). In 1970, 
France had a social globalization value of 61.9 and Portugal a value of 53. In 2015, France had a 
value of 85.3 (slightly above the OECD average of 81.6). In contrast, Portugal had a social 
globalization value of 77.04 in 2015. This difference among the two countries can be partially 




Additional variation between the French and Portuguese cases can also be attributed to 
variation in major power status and EU membership. Since 1970, France has been considered a 
major power, while Portugal has not. This likely contributed to some of the difference between 
France’s social globalization compared to Portugal’s across time. In addition, France was a founding 
member of the EU. However, Portugal joined later in 1986. This likely inhibited the growth of 
France’s social globalization across the entire time period, while Portugal was initially able to socially 
globalize much faster until it became an EU member. 
Also, of note, countries without a liberal executive should be less socially globalized than 
those with liberal executives. This is indeed the case in my data. Two such examples are Japan and 
Switzerland, which fit this expectation perfectly. For most years, Japan did not have a liberal 
executive, while Switzerland did. In 1970, Japan had a social globalization value of 35, while 
Switzerland has a value of 74.3 in 1970 (compared to the OECD average of 59.3 in 1970).129 In 2015 
Japan had a value of 64, while Switzerland has a value of 89.5 (compared to the OECD average of 
81.6). Even the status of Japan as a major power (which increases social globalization) was not 
enough to overcome the lack of a liberal executive. Thus, Japan remains among the least socially 
globalized countries in my data, far behind Switzerland.  
As of now, I have introduced the topic of globalization. I then argued that globalization is 
composed of three dimensions (political, economic, and social). And that each dimension has a 
unique relationship with veto players. I then discussed the evidence and the estimator needed to test 
these relationships. The Political Globalization Chapter found that as the ideological range of the 
veto players increases, political globalization decreases. In the Economic Globalization Chapter I 
 
129 It is worth noting that Switzerland has had a liberal executive since 1848 (Obinger 1998). This explains the vast 




found no relationship between veto players and economic globalization. However, the presence of a 
liberal executive is critical, as they tend to increase economic globalization. 
The current chapter examined the final dimension of globalization; social globalization. I 
found that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, social globalization also increases. 
This finding, while weaker than my previous two, is bolstered by the fact that social globalization is 
more complex than previous dimensions. Cooperation, the presence of a liberal executive, and 
major power status all effect how socially globalized a country is each year. 
The next chapter will conclude my dissertation. In this chapter, I will review my overall 
argument and compare it to my empirical results. This will allow for my theory to be refined based 
on the evidence. This chapter will also note my unique contributions to the globalization literature. 





Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Globalization is a fact, because of technology, because of an integrated global supply chain, because of changes in 
transportation. And we’re not going to be able to build a wall around that. 
Former US President Barack Obama 
 
I have introduced the topic of globalization and proposed a definition that more closely 
maps onto theoretical scholarship (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and 
Leblang 2008 and others). I then argued that globalization can be separated into three primary 
dimensions; political, economic, and social. Next, I argued that each dimension of globalization has 
a unique relationship with veto players and executive institutions. To test these relationships, I 
employed the Swiss Economic Institute’s Globalization Index and PCSE regression. I found, in the 
Political Globalization Chapter, that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political 
globalization tends to decrease. In the Economic Globalization Chapter, I found no relationship 
between veto players and economic globalization. However, the presence of a liberal executive is 
critical, as they increase the growth rate of economic globalization.  Lastly, in the Social 
Globalization Chapter, I found that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, social 
globalization is marginally increased. In addition, the presence of a liberal executive increases social 
globalization. 
This chapter concludes my investigation of the relationship between institutions and the 
dimensions of globalization. In this chapter I return to the theoretical argument laid out previously 
and note its predictions. I then discuss the fate of each predicted relationship with the dimensions of 
globalization. My findings show that previous work is correct, globalization is multidimensional 




the dimensions of globalization very differently. In addition, my results show that globalization, 
regardless of dimension, appears to be a preference of liberal actors. 
The number of different relationships in my findings begin to unravel why divergent results 
exist in globalization research. These divergent results are caused by not modeling globalization as 
multidimensional. Since veto players effect each dimension differently, it cannot be ruled out that 
other concepts have dimension specific relationships as well. In addition, my findings show that, 
liberal executives prefer increased globalization. My work expands previous arguments made by 
other scholars (Ruggie 1982; 2009; Hays 2009) about liberalism and contextualizes their findings. 
Regardless of where a liberal actor is situated in the institutional fabric of the state, they desire 
increased globalization. Their ability to implement change, however, varies given institutional 
constraints. I also point to avenues for future work to explore, considering my findings.  
 
Results Restated 
I defined globalization as; a complex multidimensional process of global interconnectedness, operating 
simultaneously across several institutional domains. This definition allowed for globalization to retain two 
key features overlooked in the literature; multidimensionality (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 
2002) and its numerous institutional effects. My definition allows for more contextual empirical 
work while also ensuring parsimony. This is accomplished by limiting the scope of research to 
specific institutional domains and to the dimensions of globalization. I employed both features to 
examine the impact of veto players and executives on the dimensions of globalization. This is 
possible thanks to significant advances in the measurement of globalization by Axel Dreher and 




Siemers 2012; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). Whose KOF Globalization Index contains the most 
advanced measures of each dimension of globalization.  
I posited that, according to Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002), each dimension of 
globalization has a unique relationship with veto players. Political globalization tends to decrease as 
the veto player problem becomes more severe. This is due to the increased difficulty of passing new 
policy. Economic globalization is generally unaffected by a veto player problem, due to liberalisms 
tendency to be preferred by at least one veto player. This ensures a status quo favorable to economic 
globalization. Additionally, when a liberal executive is present, the growth rate of economic 
globalization increases. This is due to an executives privileged institutional position (Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001) and their electoral incentive (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Hibbs 2000). 
Social globalization tends to increase as the veto player problem becomes larger. When hamstrung 
by a large ideological range, veto players cannot intervene in the market place of ideas (Ballentine 
and Snyder 1996), and effect social globalization. This leaves norms free of influence allowing them 
to grow more freely. Which results in increased social globalization. In addition, the presence of a 
liberal executive is also key to understanding social globalization. Agenda setting powers, such as 
going public, allow a liberal executive to increase social globalization. Thus, the presence of a liberal 
executive is critical to understanding social globalization. Each of these theoretical relationships is 












Table 19. Summary of Findings 
Dimension of Globalization Predicted Relationship Expectations Confirmed? 
Political Globalization As the ideological range of the 
veto player increases, political 
globalization decreases 
Confirmed 
Economic Globalization 1) Ideological range does not 
affect economic globalization 
2) The presence of a liberal 
executive increases the growth 




Social Globalization 1) As the ideological range of the 
veto players increases, so does 
social globalization  
2) The presence of a liberal 
executive increases social 
globalization 






The results of the political, economic, and social globalization models confirm the theorized 
relationships summarized in Table 19. First, I will briefly recap the political globalization model. 
Next, I will review the economic globalization’s model. And lastly, I overview the findings from the 
social globalization model. 
The political globalization model confirms my argument. Political globalization is negatively 
related to the ideological range of the veto players. Thus, for political globalization to increase, a 
narrow ideological range is required. When the ideological range is narrow, this allows for policy 
diffusion to occur more easily, which is how political globalization increases. The political 
globalization model also found that corporatist countries with a small ideological range are the most 
politically globalized. This is caused by the ease of policy implementation, as the veto player problem 
is smaller. When combined with corporatism, which results in higher levels of globalization (Garrett 




countries with a large ideological range of the veto players are the least politically globalized. Both 
findings are consistent with previous work on corporatism and market liberalism (Katzenstein 1985; 
Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). However, my findings extend beyond the corporatist, market liberal, 
incoherent typology. Veto players impact the ordering within each category of countries, allowing 
for more precise predictions, instead of a simple trichotomy. Lastly, the year specific effect of 1991 
in the political globalization model, which captures the effect of the reentry of several countries into 
the international system, is significant. This provides further evidence regarding globalizations 
multidimensionality, as this dimension specific effect is not found in other models.  
The economic globalization model showcases two primary relationship. First, that economic 
globalization is not affected by veto players. The ideological range and the count of the veto players 
is not a significant predictor of a countries level of economic globalization. This is regardless of 
model and variable specification. This lack of relationship may indicate that legislative institutions 
have little impact on the economic dimension of globalization. With the overwhelming popularity of 
liberalism, unless all veto players who prefer liberalism are removed, economic globalization will 
remain unaffected by legislative institutions. And second, when a liberal executive is present 
economic globalization’s growth rate tends to increase. Given previous arguments regarding the 
delegation of economic policy (Haggard and McCubbins 2001), this finding is altogether not 
unexpected. This is caused by the liberal preference for economic openness (a component of 
economic globalization). The executive’s preferences become reality due to the institutional 
advantage executives have in the realm of economic policy. This institutional advantage enables a 
liberal executive to ratchet up economic globalization. 
Additionally, economic globalization is also affected by three other variables; EU 




economically globalized than non-EU members. This is consistent with prior work on the EU 
(Young 2004; 2007), showcasing that economic connections tend to increase after joining. 
Additionally, I found marginal evidence in support of peak oil (Curtis 2009). Which states that 
globalization and oil prices co-vary, with oil prices acting as a cap on globalization. Thus, the price 
of oil each year has a small negative effect on economic globalization. However, it is unclear if oil 
prices function as a hard cap on economic globalization. Lastly, there is a year-specific effect for 
2002 in my economic globalization data. This negative effect is due to the economic downturn 
immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler 2005). This year specific effect 
is not found in the other dimensions and is further evidence in support of globalizations 
multidimensionality. 
Social globalization is marginally related to veto players. As the ideological range of the veto 
players increases, so does social globalization. This is caused by a veto player being unable to 
intervene in the market place of ideas (Ballentine and Snyder 1996) to promote/erode the norms 
they find agreeable/disagreeable. Thus, a veto player problem prevents legislative actors from 
interfering in how norms evolve over time. Thus, when a veto player problem is large, norms are not 
subject to legislative influences. This frees up norms and ideas to change more rapidly over time. 
The main caveat to my finding regarding veto players and social globalization is that my results are 
marginally significant. The relationship between social globalization and veto players is significant at 
the 90 percent level, but still of the predicted sign. Given that all three dimensions of globalization 
behave much as expected, this result is less concerning. My theory accurately predicted the 
relationship of political, economic, and social globalization. Taken together, this is little cause to toss 




I also found that the presence of a liberal executive has a significant effect on social 
globalization. Given that liberals construct ideational intervention as ‘good,’ and necessary, liberals 
want to increase social globalization. This preference in the hands of an executive, which is imbued 
with institutional advantage in the realm of ideas causes an increase in social globalization. Of 
particular interest are agenda setting powers, such as ‘going public’ (Kernell 2006; Neto and Lobo 
2009). These powers allow for the executive to dictate how social globalization changes over time. 
This is accomplished by influencing the growth of norms (a component of social globalization). This 
results in liberal executives increasing social globalization over time. 
My findings regarding social globalization can also be further contextualized in three ways; 
the role of cooperation, the significance of EU membership, and the role of major power status. 
Beginning with cooperation, both security and trade agreements increase social globalization. This 
result is consistent with previous work that has argued that both types of cooperation decrease 
uncertainty (Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017). This enables more cooperation later. But, instead of 
only one effect being impactful, as previously argued, I found evidence of both effects operating 
simultaneously. Thus, cooperation of various stripes increases social globalization. In addition, EU 
membership has a uniquely negative effect on social globalization. This finding is consistent with 
prior work (Young 2004; 2007), in that EU membership has positive economic and negative social 
effects. This finding is important to debates regarding the effect the EU has on identity formation, 
as it indicates that the EU may preserve existing identities instead of eroding them (Checkel 2001). 
Lastly, a major power in the international system tends to be more socially globalized. This insight 
combined with other scholarship on hegemony (broadly defined) (Keohane 2005; Diez 2013) is 
particularly interesting. It suggests that two forms of hegemony may exist, one material the other 





My findings show previous arguments to be largely correct. Globalization is indeed best 
understood as  multidimensional and operating across several institutional domains (Held and 
McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Only by separating globalization 
into political, economic, and social dimensions can its relationship with veto players be fully 
understood. My findings on the three dimensions of globalization also provide analytical leverage to 
resolve divergent findings in the literature (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002 are two 
examples). I contend that many of the divergent findings are driven by theoretical missteps. 
Assuming that globalization is a unified whole can lead to problematic variable selection. If a 
multidimensional measure is not selected, the scholar runs the risk of accidentally measuring a single 
dimension of globalization. Take for example the work of Geoffrey Garrett (1998). He employs 
trade openness (imports + exports/GDP) to operationalize globalization. This variable, I would 
argue is an operationalization of economic globalization. Indeed, the Swiss Economic Institute 
determined much the same when crafting their economic globalization variable (Gygli, Haelg, and 
Sturm 2018). Thus, while I do not discount Garrett’s work, I do contend that it must be 
reinterpreted in the light that his argument is only about economic globalization. To generalize his 
work to other dimensions is an empirical question that must be tested, not assumed. A similar 
argument applies to work by Jude Hays (2009), who also employs capital account restrictions as a 
measure of globalization. Again, this variable only captures economic globalization. By considering 
the multidimensionality of globalization, and specifying which dimension is being studied, divergent 
findings in the literature be reconciled. This requires careful examination of past scholars’ variable 
choices given that globalization is multidimensional. Then separating them according to which 




dimensions, it would not have been uncovered that three different relationships exist. This would 
have prevented globalization scholars from understanding that legislative and executive institutions 
have a more complex relationship with globalization. This valuable insight would have gone 
undiscovered and confusion in the literature would have remained. 
In addition, evidence from the political and economic models provide further evidence in 
support of globalizations multidimensionality. In tests for unit and year-specific effects (Stimson 
1985), both political and economic globalization contained year-specific effects. The political 
globalization data contained a year-specific for 1991. This is caused by the reentry of several 
countries into the international system. In the economic model, there was a year specific effect for 
2002. This effect represents the economic impact of the 9/11 terror attacks. The performance of 
both year specific effects is sound evidence to further support the claim that globalization should be 
treated as multidimensional. This, clearly shows that globalization must be treated as 
multidimensional in later work (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 
2008). 
I also argue that my results corroborate previous work. Geoffrey Garrett’s argument that 
globalization is subject to short-term domestic political fluctuations is indeed correct (1998). I would 
add that these effects originate from veto players. Thus, Garrett’s overall point is correct, but 
domestic political fluctuations vary across globalizations dimensions, based on their relationship 
with veto players. Additionally, domestic political effects are partially due to executive institutions. 
The presence of a liberal executive is a critical determinant of economic and social globalization. 
When a liberal executive is present, the rate of growth of economic globalization is increased. A 
similar effect is also found for social globalization: liberal executives directly impact social 




results in the increase of social globalization over time. Taken together, my findings indicate that 
globalization is indeed subject to domestic political fluctuations. However, the direction of those 
fluctuations depends on what dimension and which institutional domain is being considered. 
The work of Jude Hays (2009) argues that liberalism is key to understanding globalization. 
When liberalism is without corporatism, the externalities of globalization are not mitigated, and vice 
versa. My findings echo much the same sentiment but refine Hay’s argument. My results point to the 
main institutional actor that, when liberal, pushes for increased economic and social globalization; 
the executive. My multidimensional treatment of globalization also shows that veto players also play 
various roles. Thus, from my results, it does appear that liberals do want increased globalization. 
However, the institutional position of the liberal actor is key. When a liberal actor controls the 
executive branch, it becomes possible to increase economic and social globalization. Thus, I would 
argue that liberals tend to be pro-globalization, but their effectiveness depends upon institutions.  
Limitations 
The dangers of a multidimensional globalization framework are not new. While a 
multidimensional framework does bring powerful insight (Held and McGrew 1993; Eichengreen and 
Leblang 2008), it also charges scholars to engage in careful theorizing. Without careful theorizing, 
the tendency to disaggregate globalization can render the concept useless. For example, military 
globalization, is a step too far down the disaggregation ladder (Keohane 2002). This concept, I 
argue, is not useful as it is a theoretical equivalent of material capabilities measures, such as the 
COW National Material Capabilities (NMC) data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1988). 
By disaggregating globalization too much, globalization ceases to be both multidimensional and 
complex interconnectedness. It becomes another concept entirely, in the case of military 




that all dimensions of globalization be accompanied by methodical theorizing. Simply labeling new 
dimensions off hand (c.f. Martens and Zywietz 2006; Martens and Raza 2009) is incredibly 
dangerous. It poses the threat of undoing all current strides made in the literature and balkanizing 
globalization scholarship into dimensional fiefdoms. No new knowledge can be gained from going 
down this road. Globalization scholarship that accepts positivism then, must exercise caution when 
arguing for new dimensions of globalization. 
Empirically, there is one part of globalization that generally left out of the data. This is 
deviant globalization (Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011). Illicit political, economic, and social 
connections are unaccounted for in the KOF data. While there is notorious difficulty in estimating 
the informal economy (Gershuny 1979), this does not however prevent adding it to a complex 
multidimensional framework. What it does present is a data challenge similar to that confronted my 
previous globalization scholars seeking to construct a robust composite data (Lockwood 2001; T. M. 
Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Dreher 2006a; Martens and Zywietz 2006; 
Martens and Raza 2009; Vujakovic 2009; Dreher et al. 2010). The question is not one of perfection, 
but one of slowly creating better multidimensional globalization data over time. The next step is to 
include deviant globalization indicators. Previous work indicates that this is possible, and particularly 
relevant right now, as countries are experimenting with political, economic, and social reforms that 
touch upon deviant globalization (Haak 2018; Sapara 2018). The Canadian case in particular has 
interesting implications for the OECD as a whole, as they have aggressively incorporated deviant 
globalization within the normal policy, economic, and social space. Aggregating these deviant 
globalization indicators into established data will allow for a more complete picture than is presented 
here. If my work is limited empirically, it is limited in that it only explores the formal aspects of 




Additional minor empirical limitations also are applicable to each dimensional model. The 
political globalization model attempts to account for the influence of higher policy salience but does 
so imperfectly. More sophisticated methods do exist (Walker 1969; Boehmke and Skinner 2012), but 
have yet to be applied to international policy diffusion. The economic globalization model shows 
that national veto players do not impact economic globalization. However, it is possible that under 
certain ideological configurations this may be incorrect. Particularly when all veto players share a 
common preference for protectionism. While this instance does not occur in my data, given how 
much of the ideological spectrum is considered liberal (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; 
Bakker et al. 2015), it does merit noting that such instances have been wildly important (Hays 2009). 
My findings have little to say about how veto players impact economic globalization when they all 
embrace protectionism. Lastly, the social globalization model indicates, in the performance of the 
EU membership variable, that regional and possibly international institutions affect social 
globalization. However, it says little about the specifics of this relationship. It demonstrates they 
matter but provides no specifics as to why this is the case. These minor limitations in each 
dimensional model should not diminish my findings. They should, however, be taken into account.  
Future Work 
The extensions of my work are quite logical. I have tested how each dimension of 
globalization impacts legislative and executive institutional domains. Future work will need to 
examine how other domestic institutions impact the dimensions of globalization. For example, it is 
possible to explore how judicial and bureaucratic institutions impact the dimensions of globalization. 
In particular, judicial institutions, depending on their strength and independence, may either increase 
or decrease certain dimensions of globalization. For example, the “switch in time that saved nine,” 




Levinson 2016), likely increased economic globalization. This may indicate that judicial institutions, 
more broadly, may impact one or more of globalization’s dimensions. Future scholars will need to 
examine this link empirically. 
Bureaucracies, depending on their independence, might affect the dimensions of 
globalization as well. If a significant degree of independence exists, then bureaucratic agencies are 
likely to use it. How exactly this might affect the dimensions of globalization, is an empirical 
question. Additionally, when little bureaucratic discretion exists, it would be assumed that legislative 
or executive preferences are closely followed. However, this assumption needs to be verified 
empirically. 
Additional work is also needed to unravel the effect of executive ideology on the dimensions 
of globalization. My work clearly shows that one ideology, liberalism, has a positive effect on 
economic and social globalization. However, other political ideologies exist. For example, some 
scholars would argue that a conservative ideology should result in decreased globalization (Hays 
2009). However, work by scholars of comparative partisanship (Castles and Mair 1984) needs to be 
headed, as the effect of other ideologies may not be as clear cut as those of liberalism. This presents 
scholars of globalization with an intriguing question; which ideologies positively or negatively impact 
each dimension of globalization? It seems likely that Far Right political parties should seek to slow 
social globalization, as global ideas may be perceived as threatening to national identities. However, 
this assumption needs to be verified empirically. And, where this effect stops on the ideological scale 
is an open question, as the Far-Right of the ideological scale becomes more complex than a simple 
scale of economic liberalism would estimate. Additional ideological scales based on other criteria will 
also need to be investigated. This line of reasoning merits exploration, as it may explain why 




International institutions might also affect the dimensions of globalization. Given that 
international institutions have agency (Guzman 2013), a wide variety of effects are possible. Some 
institutions may seek to increase a particular dimension. Likely examples of this might be the 
WTO/GATT, who promote international economic outcomes. However, they may also have 
surprising effects on political or social globalization. Given that the EU membership has a negative 
effect on social globalization, it is entirely possible that the WTO/GATT could also have a similar 
effect. This effect will need to be estimated and tested empirically.   
Certain international institutional types may also affect globalization in different ways. For 
example, the difference between state created institutions and emanations (institutions created by 
other international institutions) (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996). It is entirely possible that 
institutions created by states may have larger positive or negative impacts on certain dimensions of 
globalization. This may be due to these institutions mirroring its creators’ preferences. Or, it may be 
that institutions created by other institutions (such as the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, created by the United Nations in the 1980’s) might impact globalizations 
dimensions independent of state preferences. If this is true, then international institutionalization 
could perpetuate globalization.  
Or, the presence or lack of binding decision powers might be critical (Pelc 2013). If an 
international institution lacks binding decision powers (like the Arctic Council) it is likely that its 
effect on any of the dimensions of globalization could be muted. However, this claim merits 
empirical examination. Conversely, international institutions with binding powers, such as the 
United Nations, could be expected to increase the dimensions of globalization more than soft power 




predictions. These empirical questions merit exploration. This leaves many research possibilities on 
how various institutional domains impact the dimensions of globalization. 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I unpacked globalization’s relationship to institutions. I argued that 
globalization needs to be separated into three dimensions, given past scholarly work (Held and 
McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Dreher 2006a; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). I then argued that 
each of these dimensions has a different relationship with veto players and executive institutions. 
Political globalization has a negative relationship with veto players. Economic globalization is 
unaffected by veto players. I argued that this is because only when all veto players with a liberal 
preference are removed can economic globalization be affected. But economic globalization’s 
growth rate is significantly increased when a liberal executive is present. This is due to executive 
dominance in economic policy. Social globalization has a positive relationship with veto players. 
This is because as the larger the veto player problem, they are less able to interfere in the 
marketplace of ideas. Additionally, social globalization is also increased when a liberal executive is in 
power. This is because liberals see normative competition as beneficial, and actively promote it, 
which causes social globalization to increase. Overall, my findings indicate that globalization is 
indeed best separated into its three primary dimensions, as each has a different relationship with 
legislative and executive institutions.  
If globalization is not unpacked into its component dimensions, there is a risk that any 
aggregate findings could be driven by one dimension. This forces scholars to conceptualize 
globalization not as one complex process, but as several that are subject to a variety of institutional 
effects. Legislative institutions have differing directional relationships with each dimension of 




subset of globalization’s dimensions. This theoretical insight may explain why, for example, scholars 
examining welfare expansion/shrinkage and globalization cannot come to agreement (Garrett and 
Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002 are examples). This may be because both sets of findings are correct 
about a different dimension of globalization. This gives future scholars the ability to progress our 
understanding of globalization, by employing a dimensional framework to capture its complexity. 
My findings regarding the dimensions of globalization and veto players suggest that a shift in 
globalization research is warranted. Scholars need to explore the various relationships between the 
dimensions of globalization and other phenomena. Future work on institutional domains and 
globalization’s dimensions will need to control for the effect of veto players and executive 
institutions. But other institutions, both domestic and international are likely to be shown as 
impactful across the three dimensions. Beginning from this starting point, research on 








Table 20. List of States and Years in the Data 
































United Kingdom 1970-2015 






Below is the test for year specific effects in the political globalization data. The sum value 
cannot exceed twice to five times the mean of the dependent variable. The mean of the dependent 
variable (political globalization) is 79.9. Certain years are omitted for spatial considerations. 
 
 
Table 21. Year Specific Effects - Political Globalization 
Year Sum Variance 
1970 0 . 
1980 13.13363 .6869195 
1989 -38.78772 12.51226 
1990 -26.51636 1.3597 
1991 96.66368 15.16315 
2000 .1035728 .8599202 
2010 -12.34526 .5080818 















Additional political globalization models specified using FLGS and OLS. 
 
 
Table 22. FGLS and OLS Political Globalization Models 




OLS w/ Ideological 
Range130 
OLS w/ 
Count    
Political Globalization     



























































R Squared   0.982 0.982 
N 1246.0 1292.0 1246.0 1292.0 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 








130 The results of all OLS models in the appendix are presented for reference purposes only. Any divergence between the 
OLS models and the other models (FGLS and PCSE) is likely to be driven by the myriad of violated assumptions of the 
OLS model due to the nature of TSCS data. The reader is strongly cautioned to not infer that differing variable 

























Test for year specific effects in the economic globalization data. The sum value cannot 
exceed twice to five times the mean of the dependent variable. The mean of the dependent variable 
(economic globalization) is 63.49. Certain years are omitted for spatial considerations. 
 
 
Table 23. Year Specific Effects - Economic Globalization 
Year Sum Variance 
1970 0 . 
1980 3.06855 .7522892 
1990 -17.47308 .7566 
2000 63.59042 3.52548 
2002 -69.05186 5.452834 























Table 24. FGLS and OLS Economic Globalization Models 1 of 2 




OLS w/ Ideological 
Range 
OLS w/ 
Count   
Economic Globalization     































































































R Squared   0.982 0.982 
N 1053.0 1090.0 1053.0 1090.0 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 












Table 25. FGLS and OLS Economic Globalization Models 2 of 2 
Variable FGLS w/Ideological 











Executive    
Rate of Change in 
Economic 
Globalization 
    
































































































R Squared   0.118 0.119    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 































Table 26. FGLS and OLS Social Globalization Count Models 





Range   
FGLS w/ Count OLS w/ Count   
Social Globalization     
Ideological Range 0.027 
(0.02) 
0.027 
(0.02)    
  
Count   0.017 
(0.02) 
0.016 
(0.02)       
Cold War -0.503*** 
(0.08) 
-0.505*** 




(0.08)    







(0.07)    









(0.01)    



























































(0.32)    
R Squared  0.988     0.988    
N 1077.0 1077.0    1119.0 1119.0    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01  









The below figure is the fitted social globalization values plotted against the count of the veto players. 
 
 



































      






















































































































































R2 0.990 0.990   0.989 0.989 
N 974 1011 974 1011 974 1011 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01  
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